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 Abstract 
 
    This thesis analyses and compares the two strategies of power projection pursued by 
Western European countries and the United States in the Middle East region (ME) since 
the demise of the Soviet Union until the beginning of the Third Gulf War.  
    Starting with the Second Gulf crisis onward, these strategies have reviled their own 
peculiar characters in both the ideal development of tradition of political thought and 
practical deployment of material resources.  
    Thus, on the one side of the Atlantic the establishment of the European Union has 
introduced the necessity of investing in the construction of a distinctive political identity 
in world politics.  
    This specific aim has been pursued in particular through the projection of a concept of 
security in the ME politics that, as it is well known, is based on the European model of 
regional coexistence. In this sense the analysis also emphasizes the new relevance of 
the ME to the EU and not solely vice-versa: a relevance, in fact, that is explained above 
all by the geopolitical dimension of the EU/ME relations whereby spatial-geographic and 
conceptual-political aspects in the ME have the capacity to affect deeply those of the EU, 
as in the case of issues related to inter-regional security and stability;  
   Looking at the ME from the other side of the Atlantic, a geo-political perspective also 
explains the terms of a strategy of global hegemony that by targeting a key-ME country 
such as Iraq from 1990 to 2003 has been searching for re-construct a role of political 
leadership in world politics especially vis-à-vis an emerging political competitor as the 
EU in the ME. The analysis underlines that the US paradigm of power projection is 
politically and military grounded on a model of instability pursued through ethnic-
religious fragmentation, as showed especially in the case of the Third Gulf War. Most 
important, however, is that this model together with the pre-emptive strategy is functional 
to redesign a space of global sovereignty: being the spatial borders of the cold war no 
more regulated by territorial limits of containment, Iraq and Afghanistan- have become 
gates toward the Eurasian landscape where corridors for energy transportation are the 
new source of strategic control and global sovereignty.    
   All in all, the thesis intends to show that as much as the EU has progressively 
established a policy of political enlargement toward the East and a policy of 
emancipation through a constructed identity in the South Mediterranean and Middle East, 
the US has also entered into a phase of sovereignty's powers enlargement with the 
occupation of Iraq in 2003.           
    With respect, therefore, to the deeper status of instability initiated by the occupation of 
Iraq, main purpose of the research has been to verify the existence of a political linkage 
between the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and the growing role of the EU in the 
ME. In the course of the study, however, this perspective has reviled to explain facts only 
on a first level of analysis; most important are the theoretical results emerging in the 
conclusive stance. These aspects, in fact, re-focus a central problem of the Third Gulf 
War in the light of a profound ideological crisis that in the course of a decade has become 
structural in the nature of transatlantic relations: the state of exceptionality throughout 
which the military intervention has been possible and through which all the related 
actions in the international scene are also made possible  as the Guantanamo model 
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 ﻟﺨﺺ
هDﺬﻩ اﻟﺮﺳDﺎﻟﺔ ﺗﺤﻠDﻞ و ﺗﻘDﺎرن ﺑDﻴﻦ اﺳDﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺘﻴﻦ ﻹﺳDﺘﻌﺮاض اﻟﻘDﻮى اﻟﻤﺘDﺒﻌﺔ ﻣDﻦ ﻗDﺒﻞ دول  أوروﺑDﺎ اﻟﻐDﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﻣDﻦ ﺟﻬDﺔ و 
اﻟDﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤDﺘﺤﺪة ﻣDﻦ ﺟﻬDﺔ أﺧDﺮى ﻓDﻲ ﻣDﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸDﺮق اﻷوﺳDﻂ و ذﻟDﻚ ﻣDﻨﺬ ﻓﺘDﺮة اﻧﻬDﻴﺎر اﻹﺗﺤDﺎد اﻟﺴDﻮﻓﻴﺘﻲ و ﺣﺘDﻰ ﺑﺪاﻳﺔ 
 .ﺣﺮب اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ
ﺣﺘDﻰ اﻵن أﻇﻬDﺮت هﺎﺗDﺎن اﻹﺳDﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺘﺎن ﺧﺼﺎﺋﺼﻬﻤﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻤﻴﺰة ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻄﻮر اﻟﻤﺜﺎﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﻔﻜﺮ ﻣDﻨﺬ ﺑDﺪء ﺣDﺮب اﻟﺨﻠDﻴﺞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧDﻴﺔ و 
 .اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪي و ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻮﻇﻴﻒ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﻮارد اﻟﻤﺎدﻳﺔ
و هﻜﺬا ﻇﻬﺮت ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻃﻠﺴﻲ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻹﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ ﻹﻣﺘﻼك هﻮﻳﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ  اﻟﻤﺘﻤﻴﺰة و اﻟﻤﺆﺛﺮة 
 .ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔ
ﺬا اﻟﻬDﺪف أﺻDﺒﺢ ﻣDﻨﻈﻮرا ﺑﺎﻟDﺬات ﻣDﻦ ﺧDﻼل اﻟﻤﻔﻬDﻮم اﻷﻣﻨDﻲ ﻟﻠﺴﻴﺎﺳDﺔ اﻟﺸDﺮق أوﺳDﻄﻴﺔ  و اﻟDﺬي، آﻤﺎ هﻮ ﻣﻌﺮوف، و هD 
ﻧﺴﺒﻴﺎ " اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺚ"ﻣﺒﻨDﻲ ﻋﻠDﻰ اﻟDﻨﻤﻮذج  اﻷوروﺑDﻲ ﻣDﻦ اﻟDﺘﻌﺎﻳﺶ اﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻲ،  و ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎق ذاﺗﻪ ﻳﺄﺗﻲ اﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻞ ﻟﻴﺆآﺪ اﻟﺘﻘﺎرب  
واﻗﻌDﻴﺎ ﻳﻤﻜDﻦ أن ﻳﻮﺻDﻒ ﺑﺄﻧDﻪ ﻳﺄﺗDﻲ و ﻗﺒﻞ آﻞ ﺷﻲء ﻣﻦ ﻟﻠﺸDﺮق اﻷوﺳDﻂ ﺗﺠDﺎﻩ أوروﺑDﺎ و ﻟDﻴﺲ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻄﻠDﻖ اﻟﻌﻜDﺲ، ﺗﻘDﺎرب 
ﺧDﻼل اﻟDﺒﻌﺪ اﻟﺠﻴﻮﺳﻴﺎﺳDﻲ ﻟﻠﻌﻼﻗDﺎت اﻟﺸﺮق أوﺳﻄﻴﺔ و اﻹﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ ، ﺣﻴﺚ أن اﻟﻤﺤﻴﻂ اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﻲ و ﻣﻨﺎﺣﻲ اﻟﻤﻔﺎهﻴﻢ 
اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳDﻴﺔ ﻓDﻲ اﻟﺸDﺮق اﻷوﺳDﻂ ﺗﻤﻠDﻚ اﻟﻘDﺪرة ﻋﻠDﻰ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴDﺮ و ﺑﻌﻤDﻖ ﻋﻠDﻰ ﻣﺜDﻴﻼﺗﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻹﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ، آﻤﺎ هﻮ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ 
 .اﻟﻤﻌﻄﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎﻹﺳﺘﻘﺮار و اﻷﻣﻦ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻲ
و ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈDDﺮ ﻟﻠﺸDDﺮق اﻷوﺳDDﻂ ﻣDDﻦ اﻟﺠﺎﻧDDﺐ اﻵﺧDDﺮ ﻟﻸﻃﻠﺴDDﻲ، ﻓﺈﻧDDﻪ و ﻣDDﻦ اﻟﻤDDﻨﻈﻮر اﻟﺠﻴﻮﺳﻴﺎﺳDDﻲ ﻳﻤﻜDDﻦ ﻟDDﻨﺎ ﻓﻬDDﻢ ﻧﻮاﺣDDﻲ 
 و ﺣﺘﻰ 0991إﺳDﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ  اﻟﻬﻴﻤDﻨﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤDﻴﺔ و اﻟﺘDﻲ ﺑﺈﺳDﺘﻬﺪاﻓﻬﺎ دوﻟDﺔ ﻣﺤﻮرﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮق اﻷوﺳﻂ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﻌﺮاق ﻣﻨﺬ اﻟﻌﺎم 
 آﺎﻧDﺖ ﺗﺼDﺒﻮ ﻹﻋDﺎدة ﺑDﻨﺎء دور ﻟﻬDﺎ ﻟﻠﻘDﻴﺎدة اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳDﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻴﺎﺳDﺔ اﻟﺪوﻟDﻴﺔ و ﺧﺎﺻDﺔ أﻣDﺎم ﻣDﻨﺎﻓﺲ ﻗDﻮي آﺎﻹﺗﺤDﺎد 3002اﻟﻌDﺎم 
اﻷوروﺑDﻲ ﻓDﻲ ﻣDﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺸDﺮق اﻷوﺳDﻂ، هDﺬا اﻟﺘﺤﻠDﻴﻞ ﻳﺆآﺪ أن اﻟﻨﻤﻮذج اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﻹﺳﺘﻌﺮاض اﻟﻘﻮى ﻗﺪ ﺗﻤﺜﻞ   ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺎ و 
ﻖ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﻲ و اﻟﻌﺮﻗﻲ ، آﻤﺎ هﻮ ﻣﺒﻴﻦ و ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺧﻠﻖ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪم اﻹﺳﺘﻘﺮار أوﺟﺪت ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﺘﻔﺮﻳ 
ﻣDﻦ اﻷهﻤDﻴﺔ ﺑﻤﻜDﺎن اﻟﺘﺄآDﻴﺪ ﺑDﺄن هDﺬا اﻟDﻨﻤﻮذج ﻗﺪ أﺗﻰ ﺟﻨﺒًﺎ ﻟﺠﻨﺐ ﻣﻊ إﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ  اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة اﻟﻤﺴﺒﻘﺔ . ﺣDﺮب اﻟﺨﻠDﻴﺞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟDﺜﺔ 
ﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ أﺑﺎن ﻣﻊ اﻷﺧﺬ ﺑﻌﻴﻦ اﻹﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺑﺄن ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﻟﻨﻔﻮذ اﻟﺘ.واﻧﻤDﺎ هDﻮ ﻓﻌDﺎل ﻹﻋDﺎدة ﺗﺸDﻜﻴﻞ ﻓﻀDﺎء ﺟﺪﻳDﺪ ﻣDﻦ اﻟﺴDﻴﺎدة اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔ 
اﻟﺤDﺮب اﻟDﺒﺎردة ﻟﻢ ﺗﻌﺪ ﻣﻘﺘﺼﺮة ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪود إﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ أو ﺗﺒﻌﻴﺔ، و ﻣﻦ هﻨﺎ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن اﻟﻌﺮاق،  و ﻣﻦ ﺛﻢ أﻓﻐﺎﻧﺴﺘﺎن، ﻗﺪ 
 .أﺻﺒﺤﺖ ﺑﻮاﺑﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﻬﺪ اﻷوروﺁﺳﻴﻮي
 و ﺑﺸDﻜﻞ ﻋDﺎم ﺗDﻨﻮي هDﺬﻩ اﻟﺮﺳDﺎﻟﺔ اﻹﻳﻀDﺎح ﺑﺄﻧDﻪ و ﺑﻘDﺪر ﻣDﺎ ﺑDﻨﺎﻩ اﻹﺗﺤﺎد اﻷوروﺑﻲ و ﺑﺈﺿﻄﺮاد ﻣﻦ ﻧﻬﺞ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻲ 
ﺗﺠDﺎﻩ اﻟﺸDﺮق و ﻧﻬDﺞ ﻣDﻦ اﻟﺘﻌDﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﺒDﻨﺎء ﻓDﻲ اﻟﺠDﻨﻮب ﻓDﺈن اﻟDﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤDﺘﺤﺪة ﻗDﺪ دﺧﻠDﺖ أﻳﻀDًﺎ ﻣDﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺑﺴﻂ اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة 
 3002اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻌﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل إﺣﺘﻼﻟﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻌﺮاق ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺎم   
ﺎن ﻣDﻦ هDﻨﺎ، و ﻣDﻊ اﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﻟﻠﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪم اﻹﺳﺘﻘﺮار إﺑﺎن اﻟﺤﺮب ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﺮاق، ﻓﺈن اﻟﻬﺪف ﻣﻦ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ هﻮ ﺗﺒﻴ 
 و ﺑDﻴﻦ ﺗﻨﺎﻣDﻲ دور اﻹﺗﺤDﺎد اﻷوروﺑDﻲ ﻓDﻲ 3002اﺑﻌDﺎد اﻟﺘDﺮاﺑﻂ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳDﻲ ﺑDﻴﻦ اﻟﻘDﺮار اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜDﻲ ﺑﻐDﺰو اﻟﻌDﺮاق ﻓDﻲ اﻟﻌDﺎم 
ﻓDﻲ ﺳDﻴﺎق هDﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳDﺔ ﻧDﺘﻤﻜﻦ ﻣDﻦ  اﻟﻜﺸDﻒ و ﺗﻮﺿDﻴﺢ اﻟﺤﻘﺎﺋDﻖ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻮى اﻷول ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺤﻠﻴﻞ . اﻟﺸDﺮق اﻷوﺳDﻂ 
 .ﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻹﺳﺘﻨﺘﺎﺟﻴﺔﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﺗﺒﻘﻰ اﻷهﻢ هﻲ اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺒﺎدﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤ
 هﺬﻩ اﻟﻨﻮاﺣﻲ، ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ، ﺗﻌﻴﺪ اﻟﺘﺮآﻴﺰ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺮب اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺿﻮء اﻷزﻣﺔ اﻷﻳﺪﻟﻮﺟﻴﺔ 
ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻹﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ  اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻮﻻهﺎ ﻟﻤﺎ : و اﻟﺘDﻲ ﺧﻼل ﻋﻘﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺰﻣﻦ ﻗﺪ أﺻﺒﺤﺖ هﻴﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت ﻋﺒﺮ اﻷﻃﻠﺴﻴﺔ 
ن ﻳﺼﺒﺢ ﻣﻤﻜﻨﺎ و اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻮﻻهﺎ أﻳﻀًﺎ ﻣﺎ آﺎن ﻟﻜﻞ اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺮب ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﺎﺣﺔ آDﺎن ﻟﻠﺘﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي أ 
ﺣDﻴﺚ ﻳﻤDﺜﻞ اﻟﻤﻌﺘﻘﻞ اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﺒﺜﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺪهﻮر اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻲ ﻓﻲ " ﻧﻤDﻮذج ﻏﻮاﻧﺘDﻨﺎﻣﻮ " اﻟﺪوﻟDﻴﺔ أن ﺗﺼDﺒﺢ ﻣDﺮﺋﻴﺔ، آﻤDﺎ ﻓDﻲ 
 . ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺔ اﻟﻨﻤﻮذج اﻟﻐﺮﺑﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻴﺎدة
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction  
1. Subject of Study.. I 
2. Theoretical Framework: complementing Neorealism and     
    Constructivism . IV 
3. Main Questions, Outline and Sources .. VIII 
 
 
CHAPTER I     A European Concept of Security: the Power of Identity 
1.  Introduction. Defining a global actors interests: Problems and   
     solutions .... 1  
1.2 Second Gulf Crisis Revisited: economic interests of the Community                    
     toward political interests of the Union .. 6 
     -Fragmentation  8                                                       
     -Shared Interests 13                                                       
     -Significance of the ME to a European Political Identity.. 18                                                      
     -Strengthening European-ME Relations21                                                       
     -The Reluctant Cooperation  23                                                      
1.3 The Long Way to MEPPs Strategy:  an Alternative Model for   
       Security . 27                    
       -Political Approach .29                                                       
       -Alternative Security Strategy .. 32                                                       
1.4  On the Wake of the Third Gulf War: New EU Interests in the ME36                   
       -Geography at stake 42                                                       
       -Challenges to a European security strategy from the Iraqi crisis.45                                                
1.5 Conclusions: Building the Power of Identity through Alternatives  
      on Security . 58 
 
 
CHAPTER II   The US Paradigm of Global Hegemony: Contradictions  
                          of Security                           
2. Introduction. Effects of systemic changes: Reassessing the US  
    Leadership .. . 68 
2.1 The crisis of energy resources as a mean for leadership and  
       the Second Gulf War.. 73 
2.2 From containment to enlargement. 79                                                       
2.3 Geopolitics of the Third Gulf War: Establishing 
      a New World Order  87 
      -The new world order. Economics.. 94                                                       
      -The concept of order. Politics .. 97                                                       
      -The concept of order. Ideology ......  99                                                      
2.4 Conclusions: The use of exceptionality in the US paradigm 
      of the new world order . 107 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III     The Significance of the Eurasian landscape 
3.    Introduction. Geopolitics of new world order.. 118                                                       
3.1 The Greater Middle East: The Global Source of Strategic Power.120                                                     
    - Reality and Contradictions in the Greater Middle East project.. 123                                                       
3.2 The Middle East as the Geopolitical Rimland of Eurasia  129                                                       
     - The Role of Iran... 131                                                       
     - The Role of Russia136                                                      
3.4  Some Remarks on the Regional effects of the Third Gulf War .. 142                                                       
3.5 Conclusions. The Paradigm of Ethnic Fragmentation.. 143                                                       
86 
 
CHAPTER IV            Final Conclusions 
4.1 Comparing EU and US Paradigms of Power Projections  
      in the ME .. 149                                                 
4.2 Iraq, the US and the EU 161                                                       
4.3 Fragmenting and Connecting the ME to the Eurasia ... 170                                                       
4.4 Effects of the Third Gulf War on the EU . 181                                                       
4.5 Significance of the Research: International Wars as a 
      Reflection of Weakness in Sovereign Powers . 190                                                       
 
Map 1.. 205                                                      
Bibliography . 206                                                       
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter I 
 
A European Concept of Security: The Power of Identity 
 
1. Introduction. Defining a global actors interests: Problems and Solutions.   
     The purpose of this chapter is to define a long-term European foreign policy and the 
promotion of common interests in the ME since the demise of the Soviet Union, dating 
from the beginning of the second Gulf crisis in 1990 until the outbreak of the third Gulf 
crisis in 2003.    
     In order to analyse the substance of this policy it is first necessary to look at the 
specific nature of the EU as an actor based on the premise that the qualification and the 
pursuit of interests originate in relation to the kind of entity to which such interests are 
appropriate1.     
    The EU, as declared in the narrative of its own official representatives2, is a global 
actor. The definition of a global actor rests upon two basic concepts.  
   The first concept refers to the idea of being an actor whose main nature implies the 
basic qualities of autonomy and capability3. An actor, thus, is an independent entity 
endowed with capabilities. What is important here with regards to the EU is the fact that 
this capability may imply different evaluations in terms of power.  
    The second concept (global) attributed to the first (actor) clarifies the space of action, 
next to the means of action, whereby the term global refers to the interactive web of 
                                                
1 McSweeney 1999: op. cit. 179.  
2Javier Solana 2004: A European route to security, at http://www.euro-horizon.com/isolana.html. 
3 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler 1999: The European Union as a Global Actor, 37.   
relations in the international system as a specific and not just generic attribute to the 
noun.   
     Our basic question, therefore, regards the qualification of EU interests as an existing 
and self-determined actor whose significance is ontologically tied to external world 
global relations.  
    Moreover, since we see the EU acting as a reflection of an ongoing process whose 
prime end rests on its factual existence4, the analysis does not intend to give an evaluation 
of either the positive or negative achievements of EU foreign policy. Rather, the analysis 
seeks to avoid an examination of the regional process just in terms of effectiveness in 
relation to potential ends, but instead, focuses on the factual functions exercised in the 
historical context under consideration.  
    Particular attention is placed on the relevance that the progressive construction of a 
distinctive identity of the European Union has assumed during the 90s, at the point when 
this process came to represent an alternative and effective political center in international 
relations with a range of priorities wider than economics.  
    A crucial factor stemming from the Maastricht agreement has been the shaping of a 
shared knowledge for a distinctive and qualified foreign and security policy among 
Western European countries. 
    From this perspective, we suggest that a fundamental factor in explaining EU 
behaviour, and the interests of the EU in the ME is to be found in the reasoning of the 
identity theory5. One aspect of primary importance to our analysis which is developed by 
this approach, concerns the issue of security.  
                                                
4 Haas 1961: op. cit.   
5 See in particular Alexander Wendt 1999: op. cit. 
     The concept of security is deconstructed here from a traditional neo-realist outcome 
whereby a state-centred and militaristic focus prevails6. In this view, the relation between 
identity and security should not be limited to the outcome of survival as neo-realism 
tends to underline at the minimum level of power7.  
    It is, instead, the centrality of the outcome of political choice that prevails and 
characterizes the behaviour of our actor, thereby also explaining its ends. 
    By applying the image of world order as described by Wendt to European countries we 
see, in fact, that the EU has shaped a form of cooperative identity for which not just 
states behaviour but also the fundamental properties of their interests have changed in 
substance8.  
    This is particularly evident when we focus on the developments that have taken place 
in the concept and meaning of security for the EU in the post-Cold War environment. 
That is, when a European collective identity finally had the opportunity to emerge from 
an advanced process of interaction and concretely deploy political programs outside its 
borders.  
    Accordingly to a different and broader understanding of what security means, a tie 
exists between identity and security for which security is an essential component in the 
definition and construction of identity9.  
    If the world of international relations is anarchic it is not autarchic however.    
                                                
6  McSweeney 1999:op. cit. 82ss  
7 Kenneth N. Waltz (1959): Man, the State and War, 159-86. 
8 Wendt 1999: op. cit. 418.  
9 McSweeney 1999: op. cit. 156ss  
    Hence, in a world which is not autarchic, relational interaction is an essential part in 
the making of self-identity. External relations became a way of building a distinctive 
political identity.  
    A definition of EU interests in the ME, therefore, cannot be understood without a focus 
on the nature of the EU structure because the interests promoted outside are reflective of 
domestic entity developments. Since the Union process was deepened in 1992, the quality 
of the EU external interest has also changed.   
    In this light, the significance of the EU process of integration in the system of IR is a 
political phenomenon active in world politics whose choices and inclinations played a 
role in the distribution of power in the system of international relations.  
    This reasoning is particularly  resonant when we consider security as being an identity 
issue that, in the EUs projection of power, is explicable under the terms of the process of 
political construction, above all, throughout the autonomous exercise of a distinctive and 
global foreign policy.     
   For this main reason, security has a stronger significance to European countries when it 
is translated into the terms of a constructivist identity issue. To put it differently, 
throughout foreign policy matters the EC/EU gave special attention to a distinctive and 
peculiar European approach during the 90s in order to strengthen its own domestic 
political identity.  
    Middle Eastern key issues, such as the second and the third Gulf crisis, have played a 
crucial role in this process.  
    As we shall see in the following sections, European mainstream countries have 
approached the two main crises in the Gulf with the aim of redesigning a post-Cold War 
geopolitical identity for the European Union, starting with a long-term project for 
deepening relations with the ME not only from an economic perspective but with the 
special purpose of affirming a distinct EU political role in the region, and therefore, in 
world politics.   
 
 
 
 
2. Second Gulf Crisis Revisited: Economic Interests of the Community Towards 
Political Interests of the Union  
      The international crisis leading to the Second Gulf War represents a case study of 
great interest for academic scholars because it provides a combination of old and new 
analytical factors to examine in between Cold War and new world order issues.  
    In particular, one school of thought has focused on the role played by EC countries in 
the outcomes of the war, and on their stance during the crisis in particular. From this 
perspective, the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis, coming as it did immediately after the Cold War, 
served as the first test of the ECs ability to assume a prominent role in the ME and in 
world politics in general.  
    Most analysts have thus evaluated the political performance of European countries as a 
failure because, in this view, they missed the opportunity to promote a viable alternative 
to the policy formulated almost exclusively in Washington10.  
                                                
10 Friedman Buettner and Martin Landgraf 1994: The European Communitys Middle Eastern Policy, 77-
131. 
    The problem with this evaluation however, lies in the fact that it assumes that EC 
members did have the aim of formulating an alternative solution to that of US policy. In 
fact, although there has been a European position demanding an alternative solution to 
military intervention, it is more realistic to consider such a position from a pragmatic and 
political perspective. In this way, European diplomatic performance would not 
necessarily have been indicative of a concrete willingness to engage in a policy directly 
opposed to that promoted by the US.    
    Instead, we presume that predominant concern in Europe has been that of 
consolidating a cooperative- transatlantic way of dealing with the ME and its status of 
structural instability.    
     This view can be supported, above all, by the fact that in the immediate aftermath of 
the Cold War, EC members were not endowed with the necessary institutional 
capabilities needed to have the political strength to oppose their transatlantic partner.  
    Instead, they could have begun investing political resources in the long-term objective 
of containing the hegemonic tendencies of the sole remaining superpower, especially by 
binding the legacy of international military operations to a multilateral approach.  
    Having considered this, two factors emerge: on the one hand, political fragmentation 
occurred within the European front in the face of a crisis and, on the other, shared 
political interests emerged from the development of the strategy adopted during the 
course of the war.  
     If fragmentation served to prevent a cohesive standing against US policy, it also 
allowed the EC system to find a suitable compromise and benefit from the overall 
strategy of intervention.  We should, therefore, review some outcomes related to these 
two factors from a different perspective.  
 
Fragmentation  
       Under the pressure of US policy, the second Gulf crisis has been a source of 
fragmentation among EC members. Since the beginning of the crisis, European countries 
national responses were not homogeneous. EC members were confronted with the double 
problem of satisfying both the US demand for support, as well as domestic-regional 
interests.  
     Differences in the national interests of member states have acted in favour of what has 
been recognized as the low diplomatic profile of European institutions11. Nevertheless, 
while non-key countries opted mostly for the anonymization of national measures, the 
role played by mainstream founder-members played an important political function in the 
management of the crisis, a function that created a common priority from the need to 
reassess the terms of the transatlantic partnership following the end of the Cold War.. 
     It is commonly recognized that Britain, who was the second largest military 
contributor to the allied forces, had a special interest in avoiding that the oil reserves of 
its former protectorate, Kuwait12 fell into other hands13.  
                                                
11Buettner and Landgraf 1994: art. cit., 80. 
12 At the time of Kuwaits independence a mutual defence pact was signed between Kuwait and UK in 
1961 when the process for independence has opened a crisis with Iraq: Michael Brecher and Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld 1997: A Study of Crisis, 313. 
13 Kuwaits relevance for the UK financial stability is long-rooted, coming back to 1958 when the 
nationalist revolution take place in the neighbouring Iraq; since then UK officials have stressed the 
importance of Kuwait oil reserves for granting financial stability to the Western power. See See Dilip Hiro 
2003: Desert Shield to Desert Storm, 18. 
    The case of Britain, however, appears far more important if considered from a political 
perspective because its behaviour introduces an essential aspect of the European dilemma 
that goes beyond national members interests in the new world order.  
    What was important to Britain was the opportunity of reinforcing ties with the US 
because this meant the possibility of gaining importance as an independent and strong 
power in the changing system of international relations.  
    Hence, political, along with strictly economic interests in the Gulf led the former 
British Empire to take up the US strategy for a new world order without hesitation.  
    Nevertheless, it is important to note here that at the political level, the UKs preference 
is in line with the prevalence of a traditional concept of security in the tradition of the 
Kingdom for which the ex-Empire is still the European country fully and effectively 
endowed with military capabilities.  
    Thus, strong capabilities led the UK further from the European central focus on 
cooperative interest and nearer to unilateral behaviour in order to achieve national 
interests.  
    In fact, the dynamics of intra-European relations also have played a role in highlighting 
the UKs defensive position, which aims at counterbalancing the emergence of a stronger 
continental front, renewed by the re-unification of Germany and the challenges posed by 
the Franco-German axis.  
   The possibilities of reaching concrete advantages from a French-German 
understanding14 were reduced however by the weak political position in which Germany 
                                                
14 The strategic partnership between France and Germany come back to the Elysee Treaty of 1963 aiming 
at the advancement of the European integration program, especially because an integrated Europe was the 
only viable solution to grant both Germany's readmission in western politics together with its political 
supervision by France. German unification caused first some concerns in Paris but after the debate about 
found itself from the beginning of the crisis onwards. Germanys difficulties stemmed 
from its role as an economic power within the Western front and its historical 
background, which complicated relations with the two fronts in the ME: the Arab and 
Israeli. 
    A favourable strategy was, as far as was possible, to assume a neutral approach 
towards the crisis. Under harsh UK-US pressure, the situation became more problematic 
when evidence was provided demonstrating the German role in supplying Iraq with 
essential parts used in the Iraqi unconventional arms industry15. Neutrality for Germany 
became a risk, negating the advantages envisaged by keeping a non-aligned position.  
    Frances political stance has been that most in opposition to the US-UK alliance, one 
that illustrates a clear preference for a strong UN role in the crisis.  
    Two main factors are relevant in analysing and explaining French (op)position: the 
deep historical and economic involvement with Arab-ME countries, and the influence of 
domestic pressure from Frances significant Arab communities16.  
    However, these reasons can also be applied to the British, and as such, the variable 
factor should be identified differently.    
    A real difference can be found when considering the importance attributed by France 
to the process of European political union that offers individual nations the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                            
Germanys eastern border, the French reaction was to support self-determination and to engage the united 
Germany deeper in the EU. See Fraser Cameron 2003: Franco-German axis alive and well, at 
http://www.theepc.be/en.html. 
15 It was the judicial case of the German engineer Karl Schaab found guilty of selling nuclear secrets. 
Khidir Hamza 2003: The Inspections Dodge, The Wall Street Journal, Opinion Journal 11 February 2003, 
in www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html  
16 Five million Muslims live in France, the biggest Islamic community in Western Europe. Several times in 
the early 1990's suburbs of Paris were the epicentre of riots. Nowadays, experts underscore that the riots 
occurred in late 2005 recall a phenomenon more related to domestic problems than to issues of foreign 
relations with the Arab world. Matein Khalid 2005: Tragedy and Paradox of French-Arab Relations, 11 
November 2005, at www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article 
cope with a major dilemma in Europe, when domestic stability and foreign policy 
interests are being challenged by unilateral policies. The aim of avoiding being cut out of 
any redistribution of power following military interventions in the ME has been in the 
case under analysis critical to the solution of the dilemma.  
      From this perspective, French behaviour in terms of specific diplomatic choices made 
in dealing with ME politics is indicative of a wider range of interests within the 
Community in the region, together with outcomes relevant to the meaning of transatlantic 
relations. Maintaining stable relations with the transatlantic partner is also necessary to 
preserving stability among intra-European politics.  
      The French presidency opted for a strong diplomatic-political position in promoting 
an independent role for the solution of the crisis at the negotiating table.  
      In pursuing his policy, Mitterrand presented a four-point peace plan to the UN 
General Assembly on 24 September 1990 which showed, if not the concrete possibility, 
the prospect of a European diplomatic involvement in brokering a peace initiative with 
Arab countries and the Soviet Union.  
     It is worth noting that the French president developed his political position by linking 
the Gulf crisis with the general condition of instability in the ME and, indirectly, with the 
unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict17.  
     Nevertheless, any alternative prospect of containing the Iraqi threat by avoiding 
military intervention was  definitively swept away with the invasion of Kuwait.    
     Hence, whether Saddams decision was determined by the weakness of European 
political influence or by the feeling that the US would not be concerned with such an 
                                                
17 Since the Six-Days War although France repeatedly declared its support for Israels right to exist it was 
also emphasizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. P.C Wood 1993: France and the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict: Mitterand Policies. 19811992, 22.   
invasion,18 this does not change the idea that the formal invasion of Kuwait and not 
European fragmentation determined the unavoidable development of the crisis towards 
military intervention.  
     Instead, in the context of a lack of a stable institutional framework, fragmentation at 
this stage acted as a flexible mechanism to work out challenges posed by the crisis. On 
the one hand, it avoided a radicalization in transatlantic divergences.  On the other, it 
permitted the engagement of a freer policy in assuring the conduct of an international 
conflict under the aegis of the UN. This last objective is above all understandable as a 
long-term goal essential to a European role in world politics.   
  
 Shared Interests  
     Just as fragmentation may represent a source of flexibility in the face of external 
pressure in specific historical contexts, the delicate balancing of European powers is also 
based on the firm assumption that political coexistence (outside of conflict) is possible 
when clashes over nationaleconomic interests are reduced in favour of common 
benefits19. This assumption is political in nature and has driven the process of European 
integration since the beginning of its development20.  
    The successful model of European economic integration is, nevertheless, contradicted 
by the structure of a weak institutional framework unable to project any significant power 
in world politics.  
                                                
18 Shibley Telhami 1993: Explaining American Behaviour in the Gulf Crisis, 153-83. 
19  This approach is well known as rooted in the political thought of Illuminist tradition. See above all the 
concept of liberté conventionnelle in Russeau (Du contrat social) and the assumption for which pour 
survivre on doit se fair agréer (Discourse sur linégalité). Piere Burgelin (ed.) 1992 (1762): Russeau, Du 
Contrat Social, 39.   
20 Gilbert defines it the politics of cooperation (la politica della cooperazione): Marc Gilbert, Surpassing 
Realism: The Politics of European Integration since 1945, 18. 
    Historically however, this weakness is relative: in the contradictory logic of the Cold 
War -through its main instruments of NATO and the Warsaw Pact- hegemony, 
dismemberment and regional integration granted Western Europe a certain geopolitical 
importance in world politics21.  
    It is, instead, after the logic of containment that possibilities for Europe to exercise 
influenceespecially in the transatlantic alliance- turned out to be weak when confronted 
with the EUs lack of military power and military interventionist policies.  
    The rise of a multilateral coalition against Iraq in 1991 indicated however,  the 
existence of a sphere of common political interests that EC founder members agreed to 
share at the end of the Cold War: that is, in a period of great uncertainty about the future 
development of a new world order when the bipolar system of power was over and a 
different paradigm for the redistribution of power in world politics was emerging, 
especially in relation to the Western system of alliances.  
    Indeed, the historical relevance of the end of the Cold War coincided with the second 
Gulf crisis, a war that called for an renewed political order regulating alliances in 
multipolar system.  
    Thus, although the driving factor of instability stemmed from the regional contest, the 
conceptual space of the crisis has been wider: the emerging of the crisis implied, first of 
all, the formulation of different terms of reference in the system of international relations. 
Among these terms, the legitimacy of international military interventions and the political 
meaning granting alliances at the global level became key issues.  
                                                
21 David P. Calleo 2003: Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU, 20.    
     The dimension of a crisis, while indicative of a break with the past on the surface, 
tends to exasperate the salient element of the past and may even reinforce it as an 
essential factor in the development of the historical process22.  
     In the specific context of the second Gulf War, the crisis demonstrated the opportunity 
to give more space to the emergence of a multi-polar system of sovereignty on the one 
hand, while also leaving one super-power as the unconditional leader in world politics on 
the other.  
    This double nature in the reality of the IR system is, at the same time, a contradiction 
and invariable factor of the post-Cold wWar era. The tension produced explains in great 
part the ambivalence of transatlantic relations and the relevant role played in this tension 
by the construction of a definite European political identity. The second Gulf war, 
beyond fragmentation, has been the turning point for the shaping of a sphere of political 
interests shared by mainstream European countries.       
    In attempting to measure this space of shared objectives, it is possible to presume the 
existence of a continuous line where common interests prevailing among EC-EU 
founder-members including the UK - are articulated.  At one end of the spectrum lies 
the preservation of the EC-EU process and at the other, the containment of external 
challenges such as the threat posed by US unilateralism.   
    To put it differently, if in the wake of the 1990 crisis EC founder-members could not 
aim at assuming a prominent role in the ME for the short-term, their main and common 
concern was instead the international challenges introduced by the end of the Cold War. 
A concrete aim has been, therefore, to preserve the status of regional intra-European 
                                                
22 See the cyclical concept of history in Vico and that of progress in Popper: Leon Pompa (ed.) 2002: 
Gianbattista Vico, Scienza nuova (1725). The First New Science, 21; John Watkins 1997: Popperian Ideas 
on Progress and Rationality in Science, at www.eeng.dcu.ie/~tkpw/tcr/volume-02/number-02/node1.html   
cooperation as much as possible, which is considered essential for the future development 
of the political union.  
   We should recall at this point the holist hypothesis formulated by Wendt, based on the 
vision of an anarchic structure of IR characterized by a certain redistribution of both ideas 
and material capabilities that, taken together, affect states behaviours and choices23. 
According to this theory, the distributional process creates three progressive levels of 
shared knowledge.  In the first degree, states behaviour is constructed by the concept of 
necessity as the driving source of their action. At this level, the space of choice is 
narrowed to merely the necessity of acting in order to avoid a negative consequence.  
     This is a full Hobbesian scenario in which the idea of political choice emerges as an 
oxymoron since necessity eliminates the possibility of choice, and political concept is 
deprived of a substantial meaning indicating decisional possibility. Instead, a second 
degree of shared knowledge implies that states focus on self-interests and thus, national 
behaviour is driven by a meaningful space of choice in order to achieve such interests24.  
   It is the shared meaning that is important to our argument because from it emerges a 
common evaluation of the political reality, the understanding of expectations and external 
challenges. In other words, the acceptance of certain choices is instrumental to shared 
expectations. 
   Hence, the importance of the common project has introduced a second level of shared 
expectations and ideas that have augmented the interest for deepening ties with the 
Middle East, especially in that relations between Europe and the region express a deeper 
meaning for the political nature of the European Union.   
                                                
23 Wendt 1999: op. cit. 248. 
24 Wendt 1999: op. cit. 271. 
   Just as much as individual countries in Western Europe had different priorities and 
perspectives from the post-Cold War US, European-ME relations were not motivated by 
the need to exercise a hegemonic role in the region, but to consolidate a political alliance 
that would have enhanced the degree of Europes political role and identity with the 
countries in the region, and at the same time, demonstrating the ability to contain the US 
space of leadership.  
    The ME in particular, through its regional politics and crisis, has played a very 
important role in constructing a shared knowledge of ideas in Europe.  Among these 
ideas is the perception of the interest of overcoming fragmentation in response to external 
pressure or challenges which has become crucial both on the individual national and 
inter-regional levels.  
     As we shall see, some key passages in the history of the ME before and after the 
second GGulf crisis confirm this view and help to clarify elements of coherence and 
contradictions in the behaviour of European countries.  
 
Significance of the ME to a European Political Identity  
     The 70s represented a turning point for the European Community, during which the 
challenges stemming from critical events destabilising the ME pressured the Community 
to overcome political limitations imposed by a weak regional institution.   
     In the course of the decade, EC members have taken the first steps necessary in order 
to coordinate matters of foreign policy within the framework of the European Political 
Cooperation25. The EPC had a non-binding character and was thought of as an 
                                                
25 The initiative was first suggested by French President Pompidou at Hague Summit in 1969. H. Wallace 
and W. Wallace, Policy Making in the European Union, 464..  
intergovernmental forum outside of EC institutions and treaties and coordinated regular 
meetings of members-states foreign ministers.  
     The decision to create the forum was mainly due to the assumption that economic 
integration had to be accompanied by political integration in order to cope with the 
network of the communitys foreign relations26.  
    Not surprisingly, EC members endowed with what was intended to be a diplomatic 
declaratory platform could not offer, for instance, a factual response to the Afghani crisis 
of 1979. Hence, their role was limited to ensuring that US sanctions against the U.S.S.R. 
after the invasion of Afghanistan were not broken by Community members27.  
    Most importantly however, is the fact that the increased frequency of meetings 
between EC foreign policy-makers within the EPC framework created the so called co-
ordination reflex enhancing the tendency to assume common positions on important 
external issues. This mechanism was intended, above all, to prevent the differences 
between member states being exploited and used against them28.  
     The relationship between ME key issues and the construction of a shared European 
knowledge is evident in the development of the EPC initiative as it is codified in the 
contribution of specific reports - Luxemburg 1970, Copenhagen 1973 and the London 
Report 1981- that were initiated by main events central in the politics of the ME, such as 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 197929.  
    From an historical perspective, if the Afghani crisis pointed out limits to reacting 
quickly to international crisie, the EPC turned out to be more significant for its 
                                                
26 Fraser Cameron 1999: The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future. 
27 Christopher Hill 1982: Changing Gear in Political Co-Operation, 48. 
28 Hill 1982: art.cit., ibid. 
29 Christopher Hill and K. Smith 2000: European Foreign Policy: Key Documents, 114. .  
aspirations than its achievements at a time of rare agreements by the Community on the 
ground when, in fact, security matters were almost wholly reserved for NATO30.  
    During the 80s it became more and more clear that EC institutions had to face this 
political weakness if it wanted to promote the interests of its members in world 
politics.An important step for the process of European Foreign Policy was given within 
the Single European Act, the first written agreement on the way of the EC treaty 
establishment31.  
    The objective could be achieved by developing supranational institutions and, 
therefore, by reforming the whole policy-making machinery of the Community.  
    As it is well known however, during the Cold War, the strong US role in EU security 
matters always prevented European countries from producing a stable institutional 
framework with which to advance a political strategy for a common foreign policy.  
    Nevertheless, if the logic of the Cold War gave NATO the responsibility for security 
and military affairs, it was through the war against Iraq in 1991 that the US tested for the 
first time an automatic passage of this responsibility from NATO to US leadership.  
   In parallel, however, the European Council also convened the first intergovernmental 
conference in 1990 to discuss possible steps towards political union.  
    The establishment of a separated institution dealing with external affairs created a 
division between economic and political matters however32. Nevertheless, such a division 
                                                
30 Just later on conflicts over the out-of-area competence of NATO pointed out even the limits of the 
Atlantic alliance and the necessity to reform its principles of security. NATO, for example, did not proved 
to be a very useful tool dealing with the growing instability of Eastern Europe that have followed the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union: Richard N. Haass 1995: Paradigm Lost, 26.   
31 The Single European Act was signed on February 1986: Hugh Compston 1998: The end of national 
policy concertation? Western Europe since the Single European Act, 507  526. 
32  See Buettner and Landgraf 1994: op.cit., ibid.  
was inherent as much as was necessary- to the background of the Cold War era under 
which governments in Western Europe had initiated the regional process of integration.  
 
Strengthening European-ME Relations 
  As discussed above, constraints stemming from the European structural division were 
reflected in the ambivalent position assumed by EC members in the face of the crisis. The 
lack of political institution, in fact, determined a movement toward other means for 
constructing relations between the two regions. Hence, especially before the second Gulf 
crisis was officially declared, while the EC had not developed an autonomous and 
common strategy for the Gulf region, mainstream countries in Europe opened preferential 
relations for arms exports with Arab countries  which, in parallel, strengthened political 
ties with them33.      
     From the Arab countries perspective however, importing arms from the EC instead of 
importing them from US had the advantage of reducing dependence on the United States 
and helped to neutralize the growing restrictions on arms sales to Arab states imposed by 
Congress, which was interested in responding to growing Israeli security concerns34.  
    It was at the end of the Iraq-Iran war that Western European countries initiated a 
concrete policy for an autonomous security program, coordinating their first military 
undertaking in 1987-88, the Cleansweep Operation, organized to secure free navigation 
in the Gulf35. From a NATO perspective however, European initiatives had to be 
                                                
33 After Soviet countries had cut off arms export to Iraq following the invasion of Iran, China France and to 
a lesser extent Britain were at the end of the 80s the largest weapons suppliers. The issue became known as 
the Arms to Iraq scandal after the Scott Report was presented in the UK by Matrix Churchill in 1996. See 
data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in www.answers.com/topic/arms-sales-to-iraq-
1973-1990 
34 See www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/ hcrep.html .   
35Catherine McArdle Kelleher 1995: The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment,  54.. 
considered as part of a Western defence policy that could also strengthen the European 
pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance36. 
    Although at this stage the EC could not be free to engage in any security strategy 
separately from the US, these initiatives all together reflect a progressive search for a role 
in hard security matters and a political orientation towards establishing preferential 
relations with Arab countries.  
    A homogeneous aspiration of Western Europe countries in this direction would have to 
enhance a latent but constant tension in the transatlantic alliance for which competitive 
EU-US behaviour would be clearly framed in the second half of the 90s.  
     European countries arms deals came in sharp contrast to the political position 
assumed by the Community towards the MEs instability, starting with the commitment 
declared by the EC to end the Iraq-Iran war.  In this light however, the supposed lack of 
political coherence on the part of the EC is reduced to a less sharp contradiction and a 
more rational policy.  
     Especially to mainstream European mainstream, the coming of the second Gulf crisis 
just after the first signified growing concerns for ME instability and called for the 
preference of a security strategy aimed at assuring the maintenance of renewed, long-
term political relations between the forthcoming EU and Arab suppliers of oil.  
     After the second Gulf crisis and after Maastricht, the EU was freer to project its 
diplomatic power and engage a different strategy for stability in the ME37.  
    Among EC strategic interests before and during the second Gulf crisis, priority was 
given to a merely political objective to preserve and strengthen political understanding 
                                                
36 See www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm. 
37  See below: 3.  
with Arab countries in order to contain and reduce the US possibilities to use ME 
instability as a lever for exercising indirect pressure on mainstream European countries. 
The search for a closer European-ME understanding could not come, therefore, without 
competing with the US leadership.  
     
The Reluctant Cooperation       
    An important factor in considering the ECs policy during the second Gulf crisis is the 
prevailing of national interests among EC members. This aspect is not relevant just 
because it illustrates the limits and advantages of the European system, but also because 
it allows following the line of political development towards the creation of a common 
sphere of political interests with respect to the ME.      
    Indeed, if the EC was not intended to assume an autonomous policy in the region 
because of its structural weakness in front of the US consolidated role in security matters, 
the strategy adopted during the crisis was driven by the usefulness of gaining benefits 
within the major US plan of intervention.  
   This view is supported by some outcomes that emerged during the war. 
    In contrast to the strategic objectives pursued by Bush Junior in the third Gulf war, the 
strategy of Bush Senior was based on the idea that low costs and speed were critical 
factors to the success of the war38. Thus, an important aspect of the overall strategy was 
                                                
38 To defend America's interests around the world, future force structure must enable us to continue to 
employ the winning strategy of concentrating superior force anywhere rapidly enough to deter aggression 
or achieve quick success in combat. More factors have contributed at the success of the intervention, 
among which the Iraq's survival-oriented strategy, the fact that Iraq was not a maritime power while  
possessing only limited ability to threaten the coalitions forces: See US Department of the Navy 1997: U.S 
Navy in the Desert Shield/Storm. Lessons Learned and Summary, at 
http://www.history.navy.mil/index.html  
to isolate Iraq39 while improving and consolidating favourable relations with Arab states- 
those ready to stand with the West against Iraq- through economic assistance.  
    The political involvement of the EC became fundamental to this task. European 
countries granted the adoption and the success of the main US strategy assured by the 
extensive humanitarian and financial aid offered to the Arab countries most badly  
affected by the embargo against Iraq and by the ensuing refugee emergency.   
    Secondly, due to the weakness of the Iraqi regime an immediate objective pursued by 
the EU was to prevent new imbalances from emerging in the region in the aftermath of 
the Gulf war by creating a system of security that would not be dependent on the 
presence of outside troops.  It is important to note here that the same concern is expressed 
in the official documents issued by the EU Ministers Council in the wake of the third 
Gulf crisis40.  
  From its position inside the Western front, the Community has developed concrete 
finalities limiting its objectives to what could be achieved on the ground of a new stage in 
transatlantic relations. The community had, therefore, the important function of managing 
-with success- relations with Arab countries providing financial support to accomplish 
the overall US strategy to isolate Iraq. Rationally, it could be argued that EC cooperation 
with the US in the ME was seen as being the best choice available in order to consolidate, 
and begin to enlarge a European sphere of influence in the region.     
                                                
39 Regional allies, in fact, gave an essential logistic contribution providing a well-developed infrastructure 
for quickly base over 500,000 troops and over 2,000 aircraft in what could have been a difficult operating 
environment: U.S Navy in the Desert Shield/Storm: ibid. 
40  
    Participation in the war under the UN framework was a solution offering each EC 
member higher benefits than what the community as a whole could have offered by 
opting for an absolute refusal of the US approach. 
   Division in war proved to pay more than unity against war.  
    Thus, while the costs of a radical and concrete opposition to the transatlantic partner 
would have largely exceed those of a reluctant cooperation, EC diplomatic and 
economic capacities turned out to be a contradistinctive means characterising the 
European role in ME politics. Moreover, EC countries also provided the US with an 
essential contribution to the military logistics for the US deployment of troops in the 
region41.  
    This choice - legitimated first of all by the multilateral nature of the intervention 
against the invasion of a sovereign state as provided by the UN Charter - had the prospect 
of avoiding the US acting unilaterally and not being excluded from the redistribution of 
power in the aftermath of the war.  
    In fact, even though during the war the role of the community was part of the US 
overall strategy of intervention, the crisis opened a new stage for a progressive 
development of the European policy towards the ME intensifying ties with Arab 
countries.  
    French political stances played a key role in shaping basic aspects of a European 
political identity in international relations. Great importance was given to the 
                                                
41 The European allies also contributed about 10 per cent of the total forces in the region, with the British 
sending the largest portion of these. Nevertheless major European contribution was made with the logistic 
support to troops deployment provided by European next to US basis:  William H. Taft 1992: European 
Security: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War, 16-21.    
involvement of the UN in granting the international legitimacy necessary to assuring a 
multilateral approach towards ME politics. 
    All this considered, and given the circumstances of a severe change of the IR structure 
in the wake of the second Gulf war, the EC-EU was concerned first of all with limiting 
the predictable tendency of the victor of the Cold War to use its military power by acting 
unilaterally in the ME.  
    It was in the interests of all countries of the European Community to grant the US their 
support and demonstrate, at the same time, the relevance of their cooperation for the 
success of any future Western approach towards the ME. Indeed, once Saddam had 
invaded Kuwait, EC members were bound to cooperate and participate in military 
intervention as a means of strengthening the system of multilateral mechanisms in the 
management of international crises.   
 
 
3. The Long Way to MEPPs Strategy:  An Alternative Model for Security  
    From early 70s, the EC began shaping ME policy within the Global Mediterranean 
Policy, through which a network of agreements with Middle Eastern countries was 
built42. As mentioned above however, attempts at creating an effective policy toward the 
region did not succeed during the Cold War, when the paradigm of the East/West 
confrontation in the region represented a principal constraint limiting possibilities for an 
approach independent from that of the United States.  
    In particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict constituted a cause of fragmentation among 
European member-states holding different attitudes towards what became a dominant 
                                                
42 Cameron 1999: op. cit. 
issue on the European agenda in the 70s43. The two greatest crises of the ME in 1967 and 
1973, in fact, revealed that political linkages between European and Middle Eastern 
stability were unavoidable.  Outcomes of the conflict were directly reflected as 
challenges to EC welfare and the political system44. EC founder-members clearly 
identified the need to coordinate their respective political position in the face of the 
conflict.  
    However, the policy adopted by the community with the first official ME policy paper 
in 1971 (the Schumann Paper45) did not open the path for a homogeneous EC standing in 
regional politics. Instead, from this first political initiative emerged the structural 
dilemma trapping the system of relations inside the Community when founder-members 
found themselves in the situation of facing key-issues in international relations. European 
countries foreign policies were confronted with a double challenge for which the 
necessity to engage in ME politics involved risks and difficulties on the level of both 
intra-European and transatlantic relations. 
    The Israeli-US criticism of the main points adopted in the Schumann Paper was 
substantial. Above all, it was indicative of the US-Israeli refusal of a European political 
initiative conducted autonomously in the region, either because the initiative could bring 
evidence of a possible, active EC role in critical matters in the region, or because any 
                                                
43 In the first EPC ministerial meeting in November 1970 the Middle East was one of the two items in the 
agenda. S. George and I. Bache 2000: Politics in the European Union, 396-7.  
44 It was the first time that an international crisis as such caused EC governments to face a precarious 
situation seriously threatening their economic and political interests. Compared to US EC members were 
more dependent to the Arab oil. Thus, from 67 European countries had strong indication of the 
significance represented by the Arab-Israeli conflict to their own regional stability: Philip Gordon 1998:  
The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, 16. 
45 Israeli withdrawal from the 67 Occupied Territories; the right of Palestinian refugees to return; 
international administration for Jerusalem: George and Bache 2000: op. cit., 402. 
initiative for dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue could have important effects on local 
power assets.  
    Nevertheless, while Israel did not welcome the initiative -arguing that the position 
expressed in the document was considered to be pro-Arab-, disagreements also emerged 
within the Community46. Divergences that emerged in the 70s remained the major aspect 
characterising the European system composed by different national interests and different 
aptitudes, that were overcome however, with the identification of an alternative model of 
security.   
 
Political Approach  
   It was in the middle of the European structural weakness of the 70s that the Community 
took the most important step in identifying the basic principles of its distinctive policy 
that formed the European approach to problems of instability in the ME. The turning 
point introduced with the new policy consisted in decentralising political tension from the 
core Arab/Israeli-US block -highly problematic for the political unity of the Community- 
toward the redefinition of the nature of the conflict on the basis of the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinian national identity.  
     After the Schumann Paper, the 1977 London European Councils Declaration47 
represented this important shift by which mainstream European countries convened to 
engage in political support for the Palestinian issue, giving it a central role in the 
resolution of the conflict.  
                                                
46 On one side the French-Italian position was pushing for a European foreign policy more independent 
from the US sphere of influence and on the other the Anglo-Benelux position was inclined to preserve tied 
relations with the US. 
47 The European Councils London declaration of 29 June 1977, in http://www.ena.lu/europe/european-
union/organisation-european-council-meetings-1977.htm   
    European countries already sought closer relations with Arab partners leading to the 
establishment of the diplomatic framework of Euro-Arab Dialogue by which the newly 
enlarged European community tried to face the consequences of the 1973 threat of an 
Arab oil embargo48. The Arab participants insisted on a linkage between trade and 
political matters, which forced the EC to overcome this demarcation. Since the 
beginning, the distinctive character of the EC move towards these two fields lay in the 
emphasis given to the promotion of regional integration in the area49.  
      More concrete action in this direction was then taken in the 80s when the 
Commission identified regional cooperation as a priority, and allocated financial 
assistance for the promotion of regional integration50.  
     However, just at the end of the East/West confrontation, and especially in the 
aftermath of the second Gulf war -between 1992 and 1996- the EU actively financed 
projects in the area based on an inter-states cooperative approach aimed at regional 
integration.  
     The Gulf war led to a substantial deepening of the existing Middle Eastern policy 
especially in terms of diplomatic relations between EU members and the Arab countries. 
In this perspective  in a way not so different from what occurred in the case of the 
Afghani crisis and the establishment of the ECP - the second Gulf war had the effect of 
accelerating the development of a European institutional framework, enabling a more 
concrete foreign policy specifically oriented towards the ME51.  
                                                
48 The Euro-Arab Dialogue was founded in 1974 and, however, it remained a forum limited to the 
discussion of economic and technical issues: George and Bache 2000: op. cit., 396.  
49 Such a policy was initiated by the EC Council of Ministers in 1974 adopting a resolution on regional 
integration among developing countries in an overall framework for development cooperation policies 
50 See the 1985 European commission declaration of assistance for regional integration.  
51 Analysts of European institution believe that the community external policies tend to be crisis-driven and 
that such policies develop when the community is confronted by an immediate need to offer a response to 
     Meetings and conferences were convened between the partners of the two regions.   
The proposals presented emphasized the same general objective: the creation of a stable 
mechanism of regional integration and cooperation aimed at granting a system of 
regional security52.  
    Thus, as soon as it became possible for the Union to engage in a freer foreign policy, 
the Oslo Peace Process offered the first diplomatic framework within which European 
countries under the Union framework has tested and developed the Unions capacity to 
represent itself as a political actor relevant in the ME.  
    After the Declaration of Principles, the South Mediterranean and the Middle East were 
openly recognised as areas of great importance for European foreign relations and 
included among high priority issues on the European agenda.  
    The immediate step forward resulted in the establishment of the comprehensive Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, launched at the Barcelona Conference in 1995 which 
governed relations with Middle Eastern countries53. These relations were obviously 
considered by the Unions foreign policy as being complementary to the Middle East 
Peace Process54.  
 
Alternative Security Strategy  
                                                                                                                                            
the crisis: Timothy Niblock 1994: Regional Cooperation and Security in the Middle East: the Role of the 
European Community, 116-31.   
52 Commission of the European Community: Proposal for a Council Regulation Concerning Financial 
Cooperation in Respect of all the Mediterranean Non-Members Countries, COM (91) 48, 19 February 
1991. Niblock 1994: art. cit., 123.   
53 The European institutions involved in this policy area the EU Commission's External Relations 
Directorate-General mainly in charge of implementing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Creating 
the Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area with the EUs 12 Mediterranean Partners existing in the area. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/free_trade_area.htm 
54 The EU external relations Directorate-general is also the official representative of the Community policy 
in the MEPP: http//europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/ 
    The MEPP became an inclusive program for an overall model of integration and 
cooperation between the EU and the vast and complex Arab neighbourhood. In fact, 
although its functioning as a peace program managing, firstly, EU financial support 
through assistance to the Palestinian Authority is central to the MEPP, the overall 
structure of the MEPP is based on strengthening economic ties as a principal means of 
enhancing cooperation and inter-Mediterranean dialogue with all Arab project partners55.  
     Secondly, the aim of the EU project has been to favour the emergence of an economic 
free trade zone incorporating all the countries of a broader region from North Africa to 
the Middle East.56  Although such a region it is not homogeneous, the geographic 
proximity makes an approach considering MENA countries as a whole entity 
unavoidable to Europe.  
    This view helped shape a long-term security policy that assumes the importance of key 
element of local political economy along with regional politics in  approaching instability 
problems, by acting from inside and not from outside the region. EU policy has produced 
an alternative security strategy in joining geo-economic and geo-political factors in the 
core of the ME region57.  
     The faith in the strategic force of this kind of project came directly from the European 
long-term experience.  Since stability for Europe came through economic cooperation 
                                                
55 Within this last range of activities Commission Delegations have a direct role in supervising and 
implementing diplomatic relations with Mediterranean partners in the area.  Three are the institutions 
involved in the EU foreign policy, the European Council and the Council of the European Union with the 
function of decision-making and the European Parliament more functional for providing political impetus: 
http//europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/  
56 The MENA project includes around forty countries with 800 million people. 
57 Sven Behrendt and Ch.-P. Hanelt (eds.) 2001: Bound to cooperate. Europe and the ME.  
such a free trade zone transposed to the ME, this represented the opportunity to project a 
successful model for reforming political values outside Europe58.  
     Nevertheless, a real strategic force of the EU model lays in the possibility of including 
in the initiative key regional actors fundamental to security in the region59. The project, in 
this light, could also represent an important opportunity to gain benefits for Israel 
together with Arab countries60. 
    The Peace Process that began in Oslo made possible these developments favouring and 
strengthening the EU political role in the Mediterranean area and the ME.  This role 
became progressively oriented towards the projection of an integrative European model 
that used economic means to reach political aims.  
     In this regard, the growing economic power of the Union has proved to be the most 
effective means to promote its strategic influence beyond its borders. If it has been 
primarily through its economic resources that the EU has gained influence in the region, 
the policy promoted by the EC first and the Union after Maastricht has always been 
attentive to the major political issue generating instability in the ME.  
     Thus, in the historical contingencies more favourable during the 90s, the Union 
deployed the guideline elements of a long-term policy for security in ME whilst also 
enhancing its role in the region, by redefining the nature of the conflict; assuring support 
to Palestinian rights for self-determination; and playing its traditional diplomatic function 
                                                
58 Rodney Wilson 1998: Middle Eastern Trade and Financial Integration: Lesson from the European 
Unions Experience, 184-205. 
59 Behrendt and Hanelt (eds.) 2001: op. cit., 19. See also Emily Landau and Tamar Malz 2003: Culture and 
Security Policy  in  Israel,  at www.euromesco.net/euromesco/publications.asp 
60 See Shimon Peres with Aryeh Naor 1993:The New Middle East.   
in multilateral negotiations and connecting economic to political principles in order to 
promote a comprehensive peace process and a status of collective stability61.   
     Since the 70s, the EUs long term strategy in the ME has been based on the aim of 
reaching this point: the establishment of solid and closer ties with the Arab 
neighbourhood and the solution of the regional conflict that represented a major 
constraint challenging the political cohesion inside the Union by enhancing the risk of 
fragmentation among European countries.  
      For this main reason, a stronger political role for the Union in the region was tied to 
promoting a model of economic integration between MENA countries. The projection of 
this model also signifies the deepening of Union political influence in the region that 
would ultimately result in fostering emancipation from the US.   
    In fact, the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had an essential political function 
in defining the lines of a distinctive European foreign policy. As much as the Palestinian 
issue was at the centre of a comprehensive ME peace process, possibilities to solve the 
European dilemma in the region were enhanced. In the aftermath of the second Gulf war, 
the EC-EU partnership with the Arab world became a practicable program in the climate 
of détente that spread after the Madrid initiative.  The model for regional integration had 
a hidden significance -because of alternatives to the US historical role- the political 
concept of stability and security showing the strategic nature of the interests targeted by 
the Union with respect to the growing importance of the Mediterranean neighbourhood.  
                                                
61 See, above all, the initiative of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Peace and Stability (within the Euro-
Mediterranean Conflict Prevention Centre EMCPC ): Roberto Aliboni 2000: Building Blocks for the 
Euro-Mediterranean Charter on Peace and Stability, at www.euromesco.net/euromesco/ publications.asp; 
Stephen C. Calleya 1999: The Establishment of a Euro-Med Conflict Prevention Centre, at 
www.euromesco. net/euromesco/publi_artigo  
     Finally, through this view, a common sphere of political interests is configured 
between the Union and the ME.  The model of regional integration came to represent not 
only the opportunity for gaining economic advantages, but of reaching stability and 
security in a way alternative to that assured by the presence of military forces and the use 
of force to solve regional crises. 
 
 
4. In the wake of the Third Gulf War:  New EU Interests in the ME 
      This section is concerned with the identification of a comprehensive range of interests 
binding the EU to the ME in that these interests have acquired a definite and vital 
importance with respect to the EU project for political integration. If one considers that 
for European mainstream countries, this process may correspond to a kind of supra-
national interest, the analysis should focus on those factors in the ME that are 
obstructive and limitative to such an objective62.         
    Considering that the effects of changes in the world system63 and the progressive 
advancement of the Union process64 have produced major changes in the quality of EU 
                                                
62 If we focus on factors stemming from external-relations as they can influence the creation of an 
European supranational entity it is also known that especially with regard to supranational foreign and 
security policy EU member-states support such developments sometimes in very different way: these 
variations are explained above all with differences in relative power capabilities and peculiar national 
interests in foreign policy. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 2004: Explaining Governments Preferences for 
Constitutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy, 137ss.     
63 In post-Cold War European-security, for instance, important dynamics of changes have emerged within 
the existing security structures: new programs (like the Eurocorps, and the Combined/Joint Task Forces) 
have been initiated following the changing landscape at eastward borders. Catherine M. Kelleher 1995: The 
Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, 54.     
64 Especially during the 90s after Maastricht (1993: institutional reforms), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997: 
enlargement to Austria Finland and Sweden), the Treaty of Nice (2001-04, eastward enlargement) and the 
initiative taken at Rome (2003, draft constitution and European Security and Defence Identity) the EU has 
showed to be constantly in a status of institutional progress and, nevertheless, in the need always to reform 
its own structure following the dynamics of its progressive enlargement policy: Mark Gilbert 2004: A 
external-interests, it is important to note that in some cases the EU project has enhanced 
the significance of certain issues, reducing in parallel the importance of others, and while 
it has even transformed the conceptual assessment behind some traditional strategic 
objectives such as that of security.  
     As discussed in the previous paragraph, the system of security promoted by the EU in 
the ME has been based on the projection of a model for regional integration through 
economic development and cooperation, instead of a hard security system grounded on 
military force. Even before the transatlantic crisis over Iraq reached a climax in 2002-03, 
some analysts pointed out the European Unions inability to translate its economic power 
into real political influence in the ME65.  
     In mainstream analysis, EU political weakness was explained by structural 
deficiencies due to the lack of an effective institutional mechanism for the development 
of a common foreign policy. By consequence and most important, the EU system proved 
not to have the capacity to form a military force in order to project its power outside its 
borders.  
     In this regard, guidelines of the Union policy adopted in the text of the Euro-Med 
project are emblematic of a political will that has been expressly devoted to avoiding the 
use of any terminology recalling issues of hard security, substituted by broad 
expressions such as political and security partnership.  The lack of a military dialogue 
within the Barcelona process is not coherent with the recent developments leading to the 
                                                                                                                                            
Fiasco But Not a Disaster. Europes Search for a Constitution, at 
www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj04-1/Gilbert.pdf.   
65 One of the last comprehensive works on the role of the EU in relation to the ME is edited by B.A. 
Roberson: the main thesis of the book sustains that this role has been expression of a specific power deficit 
in ME. However, by giving special attention to the economic futures that deeply characterise the relations 
between Europe and the ME, the book also confirms the relevance of these relations. B.A. Roberson (ed.) 
1998: The Middle East and Europe. The Power Deficit.   
declaration on a common security and defence policy of the Cologne European Council 
after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1997. The same cautious approach has 
been used to draft the Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean where no 
mention of military dialogue or other kinds of military measures can be found66.  
     Nevertheless, if security, in line with the EU approach at the Barcelona process, could 
never be construed as meaning "hard security", non-proliferation and self-defence are 
concepts contained in the Barcelona declaration.  
    Indeed, although the substance of the project is clearly intended to address problems on 
security issues and although a web of bilateral agreements exists, a major constraint for 
the advancement of a clear policy on hard security issues remains the existing ME 
conflict that hampers advances in possible multilateral military dialogue.  This applies for 
example to the case of Syria and Lebanon as partners of the project that cannot take part 
in multilateral military dialogues for obvious reasons due to ongoing disputes with 
Israel67.  
    The EU has progressively deployed an alternative strategy for security in the region 
focusing political efforts, above all, on the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 
the principal means to deepening political influence in the region. The use of soft power 
in promoting a model of regional cooperation has been central to the system of EU 
foreign relations and represented a viable solution to problems of collective security. This 
system, however, shows its main limit in the fact of not being sustainable in 
circumstances of deep crisis and open conflict, when military capability becomes a major 
instrument of power projection and deterrence. 
                                                
66 Martin Ortega 1999: Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: an unjustified absence, at 
www.euromesco.net/euromesco/publications1.html 
67 Martin Ortega 1999: art. cit., ibid.  
     Moreover, attempts at forming an effective and autonomous WEU military power 
would be highly problematic and seriously destabilize the terms of transatlantic relations.  
The American role in the development of a European defence force, has been decisive as 
much as ambiguous in supporting the endowment of modern military capabilities while at 
the same time, obstructing the emergence of a strategic power independent of the NATO 
system68.  
     The event of the third Gulf war and the status of instability enhanced in the region by 
the regime change in Iraq have undermined prospects for the success of the European 
strategy in accordance with the policy pursued during the 90s. Above all, the crisis and 
the following war have revealed existing divergences within the transatlantic partnership 
not limited to the definition of strategies, but also to the identification of priorities. For 
instance, among the EU objectives promoted by a solid German-France alliance, the 
political willingness to intensify relations with key ME countries such as Iraq and Iran69 
has progressively emerged as a guideline to addressing ME instability. Thus, leading EU 
countries have deepened the quality of their sphere of interests in the region and the 
Union has become politically active in some key-ME issues that traditionally have been 
under US supervision. Historically this phenomenon of emancipation is connected to the 
advancement of the European project of political Union. Since western European 
countries have reached a considerable level of economic and cultural homogeneity - 
especially with the introduction of the Euro currency in 2002- the priority of intra-
regional politics has been the creation of a supranational institution that could result 
                                                
68 Nicole Gnesotto 2004: ESDP: Results and Prospects, 23ss.   
69 Steven Everts 2003: Two Cheers for the EUs New Security Strategy, 6. 
effective in foreign policy70. Moreover, trends in European affairs have showed important 
developments in this direction.  The process of the European Capabilities Action Plan is 
envisaged to be expanded and transformed into a fully-fledged system for the 
harmonisation of military capabilities71. 
    Other important issues such as that of terrorism and Islamism have also become 
factors of concern in the European view of security with respect to the ME and have 
produced a major shift in the political focus from oil resources to these major issues72. 
     All these parameters of change, in any case, have just augmented the necessity of 
rebuilding and stabilising the nature of European-Middle Eastern relations and, thus, have 
increased the search for political alliances with key-Arab countries.  
 
 
 
Geography at stake    
                                                
70 The draft of the European constitution is the last and comprehensive initiative for stabilizing an effective 
European Common Foreign and Security Policy (Chapter II): The Union's action on the international scene 
shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own 
creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for 
the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law; even the existing jurisprudential system 
of the European high Court of Justice is a main indicator of the advanced level of regional integration. Last 
and major innovation is the Unions Foreign Minister, to be appointed by the European Council in 
agreement with the Commission President (also in charge of being the Commissions Vice-President). 
Moreover, the same article III provides for the establishment of a European Armaments and Strategic 
Research Agency. See Convention Meeting 2003: Institutions, foreign and defence policy, at 
www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/ and Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States 2004: Provisional consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
(Article III-193), http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/constitution/part3/title5/chapter1/index_en.htm 
71 In this respect, the future the Intergovernmental Agency in the field of defence capabilities 
development, research, acquisition and armaments will add real value to the progress of a European 
military power. Burkard Schmitt 2004: European Land Armaments: Time for Political Will, at www.iss-
eu.org/menue/fnewe 
72Ghassan Salamé 1997: Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, 30ss. 
   In the assessment of EU/ME relations, the geographical factor constitutes an important 
source of analysis. The geographic proximity of the two geo-political realities has 
produced a common background of deep historical relevance.  We may recall here the 
definition of the region itself - the Middle East - a definition relative to the Eurocentric 
view of the globe.  Conversely, to confirm the interplay within such a historical 
background that has interested the Mediterranean area as a whole, it is worth 
remembering that the appellative of Europe itself stems from a cultural mythology of the 
South that, with the given differences, refers nevertheless to a common substrate of 
Mediterranean civilizations73.  
     All in all, the importance of giving a name to a new geographic entity is part of the 
process of cultural conquest and, above all, it express the function of excluding possible 
competitors from the space of conquest.  In this regard, the USs recent project for a 
Greater Middle East74 by introducing a new definition for a geographic entity, proposes 
an Americentric view opposed to the Eurocentric Middle East.  
     Geographic proximity contributes to making the ME so important to Europe that its 
influence largely surpasses that exercised towards the US, in particular when such 
influence may produce negative effects.  
    Thus, although the geographic link has always induced a special dealing with the ME, 
especially in the course of the last decade, geographic proximity came to represent a 
specific source of concern for the Union, in particular for the governments of those 
countries facing consistent difficulties along the borders of South Europe.  
                                                
73 See Roberto Calasso 1988: Le nozze di Cadmo e Armonia.    
74 See Chapter III: 3.1 
     The evaluation of the importance of this aspect and its consequences led to a major 
change in terms of security matters.  This change has been particularly evident in the 
agenda of meetings of EU Foreign Ministers, which no longer focused on political-
military issues -as during the Cold War period- but were devoted to discussing problems 
characterising the regions on the periphery of Europe75.  
The Union has been concerned with border problems that became a common source of 
concern particularly with respect to ethnic conflicts. As trends in the late 90s have 
show76, as much as governments have produced repressive measures to face the 
uncontrollable flow of illegal immigrants and refugees, the social and political instability 
in the ME and Mediterranean area  risks destabilising European domestic policies based 
on democratic standards and common agreements77.  In parallel, repressive measures 
have enhanced the power of local criminal organizations78.  
                                                
75 After the end of the Cold War, instability for EU is represented almost by ethnic conflict and by a vast 
range of socio-economic deficiencies such as low economic growth, high debt, poor infrastructures that 
have concurred to shape a radically altered security environment producing specific elements of instability 
in the periphery of Europe. Cameron 1999: op. cit. 69ss.       
76 Elvira S. Mateos and Gemma Pinyol 2003: European Perceptions of Southern Countries Security and 
Defence Issue. A Reflection on the European Press, at  www.euromesco.net/euromesco/publications.asp   
77 The most high profile case of EU governments illegal action has been the main deportation, occurred in 
October 2004, of 1,000 people sent by the Italian government to Libyan authorities. The operation is part of 
a wider initiative that in the declaration of Italian ministry of Interior Pisanu permitts the repatriation to 
the countries of origin of many thousands of illegal aliens, of whom 4,500 headed for Italy (cited in 
Espresso 17 March 2005). Nevertheless, Libyan acceptance of deportees from EU members is not 
explained only by the fact that the country is not a signatory of the Geneva Convention, but above all 
because is an active participant -together with Morocco- to the bilateral German-Italian agreement reached 
in summer 2004, for which financial and material assistance is granted to the Northern Africa countries 
where special camps for deportees are settled. The policy of bilateralism for solving security problems in 
Europe is showing to over passing EU existing norms on asylum. See Liza Schuster 2005: The Realities of 
a New Asylum Paradigm, 1-25.  
78 Organized criminal networks, in the whole Mediterranean region, include local EU criminal groups like 
italian Mafia- that work in complicity with non-EU organizations and make increasingly lucrative business 
in southern european countries serving as preferential door for illegal immigration to Europe. Italy, for 
example, has become primarily a country of destination for trafficking in human being involved in the 
commercial sex industry, clandestine immigration, counterfeiting of documents and money, illegal 
currency export transactions, and trafficking in drugs and children.  John Salt 2000: Trafficking and Human 
Smuggling: A European Perspective, 31-42.  
    In this sense, the principle of security has been changed before being included in the 
draft of the constitution as an issue relevant to Union policy.  This change underlines the 
importance of social outcomes and the necessity of cooperating in order to face such 
challenges79. The quest for social stability in the neighbourhood became a compelling 
interest for domestic European security and an objective towards which the foreign policy 
promoted by the Union had focused its attention in order to preserve political stability 
among its members80.  
   The development of an interrelated security system between the two regions could not 
have the chance to advance without preserving circumstances of détente and peace which 
are the sole conditions allowing the Union mechanism to be influential in the region. 
Thus, since the overall capacity of the Union to be effective on security matters is heavily 
undermined by circumstances of conflict81. In the wake of the Third Gulf war, a 
paramount objective in EU foreign policy was identified with the need to maintain 
cooperation in the Mediterranean at a sustainable level especially for protecting 
peripheral borders of Southern Europe.  
     Social instability is a source of geo-political instability. Low performance in the 
quality of sovereignty powers allows the proliferation of illegal network activities and 
tends to extend their operational space at the trans-regional level.  
                                                
79 Politically it is the European Council the main body in charge of identifying the strategic interests and 
foreign policy. See Article III-193 (a): safeguard its common values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity:  Draft of the European constitution: Provision having general application: 
Provision Having General Application, cit. ibid.    
80 See The European Security Strategy 2003: A Secure Europe in a Better World, at 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.   
81 See the case of the Balkan crisis -even if geographically and historically influent for Europe - has been 
indicative of the EU inability to face international crisis directly relevant for the EU security in timely and 
decisive fashion:  Michael J. Brenner 1993: The EC: Confidence Lost, 24-43.           
    The prolonged war in Iraq is showing, for instance, the real geo-political vulnerability 
of Mediterranean countries as demonstrated by the terrorist attack that occurred in 
Madrid on 11 March 2004.  In his first video after 9/11, Bin Laden evoked Andalusia to 
express the rhetoric of re-conquest of lost territories82. In March 2004, the continuing 
status of war in Iraq, the Spanish participation in the US coalition and the coming 
national elections in Spain allowed Al-Qaeda networks to use Spain as an effective and 
sensitive lever in their strategy of terror83.    
 
Challenges to a European security strategy from the Iraqi crisis 
      The lack of a homogeneous answer of European countries to the Iraqi crisis has 
renewed scepticism about the possibility of framing a European strategy in terms of an 
effective European foreign policy in circumstances of crisis and conflict. Fragmentation 
in EU countries responses would indicate a lack of a common strategy in critical foreign 
policy issues.  
     Nevertheless, the EU is endowed with an institutional framework expressing the main 
lines under which national policies of European countries are in bona fide bound to 
cooperate. Thus, it would be a limitation not to consider the policies formulated in the 
official reports and treaty agreements that have marked the progressive advancement of 
the European Union towards the harmonization of both intra-regional and external 
policies.  
                                                
82 See The Middle East Media Research Institute 2004: The Full Version of Osama bin Laden's 
Speech,Special Dispatch Series - No. 811, at http://memri.org/archives.html 
83 See Jason Burke 2004: Iraq one year on, The Observer: 7 March.       
    Among these treaties, the draft of the constitution -as the last act still in fieri but 
comprehensive of previous steps - summarizes the basic principles on which the Union 
system intends to work as political entity.  
    The draft of the European constitution does not clarify goals and priorities for a 
common agenda in international relations and does not specify a character unique to the 
European political role in the global system84. This is, however, due to the nature of the 
constitutional treaty itself, whose purposes are not those of defying specific objectives 
and strategies but of regulating the use of means serving political participation. In other 
words, the text provides the conceptual tools indicating lines of action for which the 
Union is legally entitled to response to challenges posed by international crises.  
      Article III-193 (c) for instance, states that the preservation of peace, the prevention of 
conflicts and the strengthening of international security must be pursued in conformity 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to 
external borders85.  
      The concepts of peace and international security here are not identified as absolute 
principles formulated ex-novo by the Union.  Instead, they are presented as concepts 
relative to the purpose of existing international bodies and Union treaties with respect to a 
mechanism that allows political compromise and power balancing under multilateral 
negotiations.  
                                                
84  Cameron 1999: op. cit.  
85 Draft of the European Constitution: cit. ibid. 
      Consequently, the weakening of European Union political cohesiveness corresponds 
to the weakening of existing international organization86.   
    The refusal of Germany and France to take part in the US led coalition out of the UN 
Security Council approval appears in line with the policy promoted throughout the EU 
institution for which the UN is the preferred instrument entitled to settle international 
crises and eventually, to engage in military operations87.  
    This approach represents a constitutional result stemming from already consolidated 
national approaches in international crisis management. It is not a supranational 
imposition on national interests and, thus, when there is a breach of it there is also a 
breach in the national legal and political system.  
    A key country of the Union, as in the case of Italy for example, has assured the 
presence of its troops in Iraq by overcoming constraints posed by the national 
Constitution.  Here, the government did not have th legal power to go to war against a 
sovereign state in that the nation was bound by international treaties and bodies in order 
to settle international disputes88 such as the third Gulf crisis. Formally, the Italian 
                                                
86 It is important to our discourse remembering that European countries have intervened in Kosovo under 
the framework of NATO (being the UN Security Council at the first important stage of its crisis) with the 
perspective to consolidate a cosmopolitan principle that calls for the right to intervene in case of crimes 
against humanity; what is relevant to the analysis is to see that a paramount element in the strategy of EU 
mainstream countries vis-à-vis the challenge of international crisis is the necessity to act within institutional 
framework in order to preserve multilateral approach. Jurgern Habermas 2005 (2004): Der gespaltene 
Westen. Kleine Politische Schriften X (tr.ingl. The Devided Western), 75.   
87 Although the debacle in the Iraqi crisis, the EU strategy for strengthening the UN system (and vice versa) 
has continued with a specific focus on issues regarding crisis management leading to the  Joint 
Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management signed in 2003. Joint Declaration on UN-EU 
Co-operation in Crisis Management, New York September 2003, at http://europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_2768_en.htm  
88 Art. 11 of the Constitution : LItalia ripudia la Guerra come strumento di offesa alla liberta degli altri 
popoli e come mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie internazionali; constente, in condizioni di parita con 
gli altri stati, alle limitazioni di sovranita necessarie ad un ordinamento che assicuri la pace e la giustizia 
fra le Nazioni; promuove e favorisce le organizzazioni internazionali rivolte a tali scopi. (tr. in. Article 11 
Repudiation of War. Italy shall repudiate war as an instrument of offence against the liberty of other 
peoples and as a means for settling international disputes; it shall agree, on conditions of equality with 
other states, to such limitations of sovereignty as may be necessary to allow for a legal system that will 
government has therefore not financed an operation of war in the Iraqi territory, but is 
supporting an operation of peace in the framework of the legally ambiguous category of 
humanitarian intervention89.  
      Thus, in order to identify a core European strategy in Iraq with respect to the Unions 
official policy, it is necessary to focus on the German-France approach to the Iraqi 
problem in as much as this approach expresses the logic endowed by the EUs treaties 
and practices.  
     Characteristic aspects of this policy did not emerge as a new factor in the European 
agenda of 2002/03.  Since the development of the second Gulf crisis, strengthening the 
UN as a means to resolving international conflicts has been a paramount objective of 
European states, not least because of the need to contain possible developments in 
American unilateral trends after the demise of the Soviet Union.   
    The EU strategy of security adopted in December 2003 reconfirms, for instance, the 
appropriate ways in which the Europe can contribute to building a world that is more 
united, safer and fairer. A more united world can only be achieved through effective 
multilateralism. No single country is able to tackle todays complex problems on its own. 
International cooperation is a necessity. This is why the development of a stronger  
international community, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
                                                                                                                                            
ensure peace and justice between nations; it shall promote and encourage international organizations having 
such ends in view: av. at www.vescc.com/constitution/italy-constitution-eng.html) 
89 With 3000 soldiers the Old Babylon mission was operative in Iraq under the US-led Office for 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.  The Italian approach at the conflict, however, has not 
avoided consequences stemming from the real state of war and insecurity in the Iraqi territory for which 
Italian troops result ambiguously committed to engagements rules not compatible in practice with their 
tasks: harsh political debate over such rules, in fact, has followed the fight of Nassyria in summer 2004 and 
more recently to the accusation of the Italian general under trial for having target ambulance.  Italian 
Ministry of Defence 2003: Comunicazioni del Ministro della Difesa sullimpegno di un contingente 
militare in Iraq, at http://www.difesa.it/Ministro/Compiti+e+Attivita/Audizioni/Comunicazioni.htm; 
international order remain among the principle strategic objectives of the European 
Union: strengthening the United Nations Organisation is a European priority90.        
     In the second half of the 90s, in parallel with the progressive weakening of the UN 
system, economic engagement of the Unions countries within the MENA region has 
grown considerably together with the advancement of MEPPs initiatives. Looking at the 
nature of EU/ME relations, commercial interests have been of increasing importance.  
Trends shows that trade relations with ME partners have reached even higher levels than 
those of the US since when, from the mid-90s, EU countries have started to import 
double the amount of oil than the transatlantic partner91.  
    The sale of military and civilian goods, to the purchase of oil supplies, makes trade the 
principal means of assuring the intra-regional stability key to the advancement of the 
Union project. Moreover, while the level of competition became enormously suffocating 
because of the entrance of other out-of-area key powers (as Chine and Asian countries92) 
in the region, the Unions need to maintain stable market relations with ME countries has 
become a matter of survival not strictly in the light of individual national interests, but 
more specifically with respect to the EU project aimed at maintaining a stable balance in 
European economic growth. The balanced grow of economic capability is an essential 
factor without which the political objectives of the Union have no chance of continuing.  
    In the specific case of the EU project the role played by outcomes of political economy 
are a fundamental means for the balancing of intra-European politics and the projection 
of political power as a global player outside regional borders.  
                                                
90 Javier Solana 2004: art. cit. ibid. 
91 Phebe Marr 1997: The United States Europe and the Middle East, 74-103. 
92 The acceleration of the process of global integration has enhanced the complexity of trade relations in 
ME and explains Chine and India increased level of trade with ME. 
    In summary, the nature of EU/ME relations expresses a main concept formulated in the 
EU security strategy for which the internal and the external aspects of security are 
fundamentally linked. 
   Divergences that emerged between the US and the German-France alliance on how to 
approach the Iraqi crisis mirror the importance of these aspects in building a realistic 
game for which the Union sought to protect, if not to enhance, its new role in the region 
by searching a more balanced partnership with the US.  
     Iraq has been central to this emancipation strategy. In fact, while the US was 
deploying coercive diplomacy and a sanctions policy to isolate Iraq and Iran93, EU 
mainstream policy favoured constructive engagement with these countries through 
economic relations and deepening political influence in the regional system of power.  
    Specific trade policies of the EU towards regional partners such as Iran, for instance, 
led American legislation to issue the Iran-Libya Sanction Act in 1996 directed against EU 
trade initiatives94.  
    Elements clarifying the Iraqi case became evident after 1998 when France, in 
particular, started to call for softening sanctions against Iraq within the UN framework.  
    Considering the political relevance of the Union at the time of its highest level of 
engagement in the region through the promotion of the EuroMed-MEPP strategy, the 
perspective of reopening trade relations with Baghdad must be seen together with the 
possibilities envisaged by the EU policy to extend diplomatic relations inclusive of key 
regional actors fundamental to the security of the region.  
                                                
93  See the dual containment policy: Chapter II   
94 US House of Representatives: Iran-Libya Sanction Act of 1996 Congressional Report, 18 June, at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm 
     In 2002 the EU Council called for swift progress in association agreements with 
Lebanon, Syria and Egypt95. The aim of the Council was to reinforce the role of the 
European Union as a regional actor and widen its room for manoeuvre  to play a 
significant political role in the area.  
      Moreover, preferential relations with Iraq could become a concrete nightmare if and 
when the regime in Baghdad would opt for the use of Euro currency instead of US dollars 
to sell Iraqi oil. Saddam announced the switch in oil sales from dollars to Euros in 
November 2000. The regime's decision was intended to answer to Washington's hard-line 
on sanctions while encouraging Europeans to challenge it96.  
     Automatically, transatlantic divergences on how solve the Iraqi problem were 
translated into the institutional crisis that has progressively annihilated the UN system. 
Simultaneously, the Iraqi problem revealed its real nature, in which a regime change in 
Baghdad, an issue that was still under the control of a multilateral approach during the 
second Gulf war, lay at the heart of the problem. 
    In a certain way, the more European policy was withdrawing support from the 
American embargo and sanctions policy, the more the specific objective of regime 
change became central to the US view for the solution of what, in Washington, was 
perceived more and more as compelling the Iraqi problem. In this light, rather than 
definitive Iraqi disarmament, it seems that regime change in Iraq has been the long-term 
objective for limiting EU mainstream countries aims at engaging constructive relations 
                                                
95 Council of the European Union 2002: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Adoption of the EU 
guidelines with a view to the fifth Conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/intro/gac.htm.  
96 The steady depreciation of the dollar since 2001 (euro gaining 17% against dollar) allowed Iraq and the 
Oil for food reserve fund profiting the same percent value since the switch. See W. Clark 2003: The Real 
Reasons for the Upcoming War With Iraq: A Macroeconomic and Geostrategic Analysis of the Unspoken 
Truth, at  www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/cur_policy/iraqcurrencyregime.pdf   
with Iraq because of the possibility that such relations would boost the relevance of the 
EU political role in the whole regional system of power.   
    This reasoning raises two considerations. Firstly, normalising relations throughout 
trade with Iraq meant giving the country -governed by a regime hostile to the US- the 
chance to improve domestic capabilities and to enhance the possibility of projecting its 
power at the regional level, not without great concerns for the US and its allies in the 
Gulf.  
     Secondly, the aspect at the stake in transatlantic divergences about Iraq and the 
respective strategies for regional security, also reflects the asymmetric division of tasks 
between the US and the EU.  While the Union was acquiring political benefits from its 
double policy of trade and diplomatic relations with the promotion of an inclusive 
approach towards reproving those countries contained by American foreign policy, at 
the same time, the US was still carrying the major burden of military expenses for 
maintaining the system of security in the Gulf.  
    It is evident that if the US administration would have preferred to share more 
budgetary responsibility with the Union, European mainstream countries -strengthened 
by a discrete successful policy in ME- would also have preferred to share more 
responsibility in decision-making extended to security matters in stricto sensu not only on 
budgetary issues.  
    Indeed, the American unilateral approach represented the only way to face the burden 
of this asymmetry, allowing it on the one hand, to pursue the main objective of the war -
the change of regime- and on the other, to share military expenses by keeping control of 
strategic leadership at the same time.  
    This perspective explains why, although European countries have always been 
dependent on a US military presence in the Gulf, an overall EU strategy was interested in 
enhancing EU political power in decision-making.  This aim was primary in leading the 
German-France alliance to refuse support to US security policy in the region.  
    EU policy-makers indicate this asymmetry of tasks through a traditional concept in IR 
calling for a more balanced relation with the transatlantic partner97. Equally, EU chances 
to be effective as global player on the basis of political and economic projects promoted 
in regions vital to European security depends on a more balanced transatlantic partnership 
(that is, with a sharing of decisional responsibility for the EU). The EU, despite the 
violence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has continued to fulfil its commitment in the 
region to the point that the level of financial commitment in the MEDA project increased 
from 26% in 1995-1999 to 37.6% in 2000 and 53.1% in 200198. After the EU had 
invested financial and political resources in its policy in the region, the US strategic 
objective of regime change in Baghdad would have introduced conditions of deep and, 
above all, prolonged instability in the region, seriously challenging the promotion of an 
effective EU foreign policy for the long term in the ME.  
   In fact, while the EU was stressing the importance of maintaining the momentum of the 
Barcelona Process at a time of political tension in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
destabilization of a key country like Iraq  above all throughout territorial fragmentation 
and ethnic-religious criteria99- signified halting Union aims in the region.  Thus, a main 
challenge of the third Gulf war has been the regime change option especially because 
                                                
97 In the words of Solana if the transatlantic partnership is defined as irreplaceable is also true that the 
effectiveness of the alliance depends from a more balanced relation. Solana 2004: art. cit., ibid.   
98 Council of the European Union 2002: cit. 9. 
99 See below chapter III, the terms of the new Iraqi Constitution: 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue4/jv6n4a1.html   
the presence of foreign troops in the country is perceived as a factor challenging the EUs 
main interests for stability in the ME100. The conjunction-timing between the failure of 
peace talks in the final status negotiations of the Oslo agreement at Camp David  and 
increasing tension within the UN on the issue of Iraq may suggest the existence of a 
political connection between the two issues.  
     Indeed, the crisis of opposition between the French-German axis and Washington did 
not prevent the US administration from using its political and military power to act 
unilaterally. Nevertheless, it enhanced the diplomatic costs of the operation and above all, 
assured European mainstream countries of the relative political advantages gained from 
part of the Arab community.  
     Moreover the lack of homogeneous support for the US initiative showed the 
importance of the European experience in dealing with regional actors, when the US 
found major difficulties in receiving support both inside the Iraqi territory and on the 
level of regional politics. In the case of Turkey for instance, the influence of mainstream 
EU political standing has affected the decision of Ankara to maintain a neutral position 
that, in practice, resulted in a refusal to support US military intervention101.  
                                                
100 In the case, as events have showed the war became extremely bloody, both for the invading forces and 
Iraqi civilians. The war conducted for replacing Saddams regime, far from being a mean to impose 
stability, has produced harsh internal conflicts over power and national resources leading the country into a 
status of civil war: see especially The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) 2005: Human Rights 
Report (November 1  December 31), av. at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2005/1231unami.pdf 
101 Ziya Önis and Suhnaz Yilmaz 2005: The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or 
Continuity? 
    The association made by American opponents to the war between the challenges 
encountered in Vietnam and in Iraq, recalls an aspect inherent to a wider risk of imperial 
overstretch102 in the face of which European policy has sought to gain political benefits.  
     Hence, if the Bush Junior administration considered that the asymmetric share of 
decisional power is justified by the fact that the EU has little to offer militarily,103 it is 
also true that European model of intervention in crisis management will have great 
relevance in the stabilisation and reconstruction of post-war Iraq104. As much as US 
policy-makers agree on considering the EU interest in playing such a role independently 
of whether Washington involves them in the policy-making process or makes important 
concessions to win their support105, mainstream European countries may also have 
refused to participate in the military operation in Iraq based on the same consideration.  
EU involvement is essential to the task of reconstruction and peace keeping106, even more 
so after the UN diplomatic and monetary crisis.  
    Having considered these points, the last important factor in defining EU interests in the 
ME lies in the view that mainstream EU countries have of the US leadership in the 
region. Since both France and Germany came to represent a real political power within 
                                                
102Kennedys theory of historical decline of great powers inherent to the risk of imperial overstretch. Paul 
Kennedy 1988: The rise and the fall of great powers.      
103 For this reason the US should determine its Iraq policy alone: Charles Krauthammer 2002: The Myth of 
UN Support, The Washington Post: 4 October.  
104 See the model for reconstruction of the post-war Iraq: 
www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/after/2003/04governiraq.htm; However, in contest of insecurity 
and civil war the European model cannot work as proved in the failed experience in Afghanistan where, in 
fact, limitations placed on the peacekeepers provided under a NATO umbrella contribute to lack of inter-
operability between forces. The ad hoc manner in which the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
has moved outside Kabul highlights this further, with each country-led Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) a fortress unto itself. This is partly due to the UNs coordinating role and the sheer scale of U.S. 
military and development involvement. A European model could not only help strengthen coherence but 
also influence the role of PRTs. See International Crisis Group 2005: Rebuilding the Afghan State: The 
European Unions Role, at  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.htm 
105Robert Kagan 2002: Iraq: The Day After, The Washington Post: 21 July and William Safire 2002: In 
Material Breach, New York Times: 28 October. 
106 International Crisis Group 2005: art. cit. ibid.   
the core of Europe107, a latent interest of this alliance is the acceleration of the historical 
process for decreasing American leadership, starting with the promotion of a 
differentiated-obstructionist policy.      
      
 
5. Conclusions: Building the Power of Identity through Alternatives on Security 
     The present chapter sought to define a range of European interests in the ME in the 
light of those elements of novelty characterising both the nature of the European regional 
system and the international system following the end of the Cold War.  
     We first clarified that, although the EU is not a national actor it is, nevertheless, an 
existing and self-determined global actor. As such, it is endowed with both economic and 
political capabilities to reach its goals and interests in world politics. In this regard 
however, we have posed the problem of how the nature of these interests can be 
qualified, especially when an analysis focuses on foreign policy issues. The analysis has 
referred to a constructivist theory to provide an answer that could include aspects of both 
material and ideal capabilities.  
     An element characterising the EC-EU behaviour since the end of the Cold War has 
been the aim of shaping a European political identity on the basis of foreign policy 
matters.  
      This process is in nature long-term, and based on continuity and reflexive 
mechanisms for developments. It founds its basic qualitative meaning in the production 
of self-identity through a steady strategy of alternative solutions to ME critical outcomes.   
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of strong regional cooperation.  
     For this reason, a mainstream EU strategic objective has been that of re-shaping the 
concept of security vis-à-vis its transatlantic partner.   
     In order to draw the line of this progressive development the analysis has focused, in 
particular, on specific political outcomes emerging during the second and the third Gulf 
crises. Positions assumed in relation to these outcomes, however, were in in line with 
previous attempts at constructing a European political identity, such as the Schumann 
Paper, London Declaration and even the Euro-Arab Dialogue108.  
     All these steps have been directed toward the same political objective: decentralising 
political tension from the core Arab/Israeli-US block -highly problematic for the political 
unity of the community- towards the redefinition of the nature of the conflict on the basis 
of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian national identity.   
    Within this long-term process the second Gulf crisis has represented a turning point for 
overcoming a European major dilemma: the risk of fragmentation and the containment of 
external pressure and challenges vis-à-vis the transatlantic ally.   
    In this respect, we have argued that an opposing stance against the policy formulated in 
Washington was not, at that stage, a concrete objective of the Community. Given the 
weakness of the EC political framework under a deep and prolonged US political 
influence and military leadership within the transatlantic alliance, we have presumed that 
EC founder-members were conscious that a regional framework could not provide them 
with the political strength to directly assume an opposing role against the US.   
     In force of a realistic evaluation, the EC faced the second Gulf crisis not with the aim 
of initiating a crisis with the US. Instead, a predominant concern in Europe was that of 
                                                
108 See above: 1.2, Significance of the ME to a European Political Identity. 
consolidating a cooperative-transatlantic way for dealing with the ME and its status of 
structural instability.  
    This aim implied investing political resources in a long-term security strategy in the 
ME whose one important purpose was to contain the hegemonic tendencies of the sole 
remaining superpower in the international environment capable of acting unilaterally.  
   For the same reason, a concrete objective of European mainstream countries since the 
second Gulf crisis was to limit these tendencies by bounding the ally politically to the 
legacy of international military operations under a multilateral approach109. 
      An important aspect emerging from the analysis, thus, is that the second Gulf crisis 
has been a turning point in the perception of priorities in IR shifting the focus from a 
general economic involvement with the ME towards definite political aims in the region 
and in the system of international relations.  
     In fact, although inter-regional frameworks of cooperation on economic and 
diplomatic fields were created since the 70s, just in the event of the second Gulf crisis 
European countries have reiterated and fostered a distinctive approach towards the ME 
politics leading to concrete political achievement during the 90s. Hence, beyond the 
domestic factor of fragmentation, the crisis and the diplomatic standing of mainstream 
European countries have initiated a path to important developments for the role of the 
Union in the Mediterranean and the ME region.  
   The EC diplomatic standing and the subsequent financial tasks assumed by the EC 
during the war, showed that direct opposition to the US strategy of intervention was not 
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an objective but instead, that the shaping of a preferential political understanding with 
Middle Eastern partners110.  
     Politically speaking, this diplomatic meaning has been mirrored by the centrality of 
the Palestinian issue attributed to the general status of instability by the French standing 
during the crisis. Again, the nature of the ME conflict and the understanding of the causes 
of regional instability were reiterated as essential aspects in the definition of a European 
identity, promoting alternative solutions for regional security in the post-Cold War era.  
The political standing towards this issue has served as an effective means of projecting an 
alternative power in world politics and seeking emancipation from a solely economic role 
as it was imposed during the bipolar system.  
    A true strategy of emancipation had to pass though the construction of a political 
resolution of the factors of instability in the neighbouring region since these factors 
represented a serious challenge to European political stability itself. Although two main 
crisis in the 60s and 70s are commonly considered important because of their economic 
impact on the EC, a deeper understanding of inter-regional relations is made possible just 
in the light of the political challenge represented by the ME conflict to European 
Unity111.    
     For this main reason, during the Cold War a major dilemma in Europe was balancing 
the interests in transatlantic relations and the effects of ME instability. The Israeli-
American answer at the Schumann Paper is an emblematic example of the tension 
existing in the EU-ME-US triangle112. This tension has kept European countries divided 
between economic and political interests, thereby limiting progress in the legitimacy and 
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strength of the regional institutional framework.  The 1990-91 war demonstrated that 
with the end of the Cold War the European project for economic and political union was 
at risk of fragmentation if confronted by a situation of conflict and, vice-versa, in a 
favourable position when dealing with the situation of peace process management. 
Hence, the second Gulf crisis can also be seen as a factor that historically has enhanced 
the necessity of advancing a stable political identity in Europe.  
     Overcoming this dilemma became central through the instrument of long-term 
initiatives for regional cooperation and integration, a necessary answer as an alternative 
to short-term military initiatives highly costly for Europe in political terms.  
    This perspective gave substance to a full characteristic EU policy in the ME with the 
primary advantage of building a valuable political identity in the post-Cold War era.    
    Financial assistance for the promotion of regional integration through EuroMed 
initiatives- has been used to emphasise same general objectives, including the creation of 
a stable mechanism of regional integration and cooperation aimed at granting a system of 
inter-regional security.  
      The EU policy has produced an alternative security strategy in joining geo-economic 
and geo-political factors in the core of the ME region. The model for regional integration 
has a hidden significance -because in contrast to the US historical role- this political 
concept of stability and security showed the strategic nature of the interests targeted by 
the Union with respect to the growing importance of the Mediterranean neighbourhood. 
Most importantly, the real strategic force of the EU model lies in the possibility of 
including in the initiative key regional actors fundamental to the security of the region. 
     All in all, with the reunification of Germany, the second Gulf crisis and the 
subsequent advancement of the process of the European Union, there has been a 
progressive change in the quality of European-Middle Eastern relations. 
    The establishment of the Union,113 far from being just a mere institutional achievement 
has changed the view of its members-states and has introduced new political priorities.  
   During the 90s, the nature of inter-regional relations between the EU and the ME has 
widened not only in terms of intensity but above all, in terms of quality.  
   In summary, a multifaceted character of such relations with respect to a complex set of 
issues from economics to politics has emerged in the course of this analysis: the 
significance of the ME in the shaping of a supranational interest for political union in 
Europe; the importance of political economy in identifying a starting point in the 
European development of a long-term foreign policy114; the relevance of a European 
political tradition serving the projection of a European model of regional integration; and 
he progressive construction of a European identity through the transformation of the 
concept of security.  
    With specific reference to this last issue, as discussed above, risks stemming from 
instability in the neighbouring region have driven Western European powers more 
decisively in the direction of a stable institutional framework in order to overcome 
difficulties and obstacles posed by the EU structure split between the fragmented 
European Council of Foreign Ministers and a weaker European Parliament.  
                                                
113 Although resistance to economic and political union the historic treaty of Maastricht was signed in 
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conditions. (Successor to the Common Market launched in 1958 and the integrated customs union of 1987. 
If EC members proved to be divided with respect to two basic issues; compact commitment on monetary 
integration by decades end and transfer of portion of national  sovereign power to authorities in Brussels) 
members states had to overcome divisions. See Walter Goldstein 1992:  Europe after Maastricht, at 
www.foreignaffairs.org/19921201faessay5907/walter-goldstein/europe-after- Maastricht.html.   
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     Since the end of the Cold War, at a time when military power seemed to lose its 
significance in the politics of international relations, the EU as an economic global player 
acquired strength in pursuing a differentiated political approach in the ME. A properly 
contradistinctive aspect has been to advance a global perspective of ME problems in such 
a way that economic development and regional cooperation in the region should not be 
separated from security issues115.  
     The economic giant started to deploy a strategy driven by political values under which 
the EU-ME relations, although always in line with economic means, had to be oriented.  
    Moreover, if it is true that the ME was crucial to Europe stability, other concerns of a 
vital nature emerged within European borders. Such concerns were almost related to the 
new global environment of the 90s: the institutional developments of the EU, the 
prospects for managing the eastward enlargement, and last but not least, the colossal Euro 
monetary policy, were principal issues dominating the EU agenda. For these reasons, 
some analysts have argued for a shift of attention from the ME towards East-Europe and 
domestic issues. Certainly the bigger the European Union has become, he more the space 
of problematic issues has widened too. What cannot be shifted, however, is the dimension 
of geography of neighbourhood that ties Europe as a political continent to the ME and 
North Africa as regions at the borderline of essential geo-political functions. This geo-
political function can show either powerful or weak sides of the same face. What really 
makes the difference is the political landscape of power relations and instability versus 
balancing growth and stability. Security in the ME mirrors a key aspect of the perception 
of self-identity in Europe and shared knowledge. Within this knowledge driving the 
projection of an alternative model of security outside EU borders is the transformation 
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and sharing of new meaning that is important because illustrates the power of a common 
evaluation of reality and finally, the understanding of solutions and expectations.   
      Given that the present war in Iraq with the specific goal for regime change has 
created the conditions for a long-term status of instability, challenges to a European 
strategy from the Iraqi crisiss are intuitively clear.  
   The constructivist effect stemming from the ME appear evident, firstly, as a means to 
protecting national identity and secondly, as a source driving the development of the 
European project toward the creation of a more definite strategy in both regional and 
foreign policies. 
    We have found that the projection of an alternative model of security in the ME has 
been at the top of the foreign policy agenda. This ongoing initiative has been formalized 
throughout the well known EuroMed initiative.    
 Thus, the EUs external relations have focused mainly on the South Mediterranean and 
ME regions considered vital to the geo-political landscape of the old continent. Region-
building in the Middle East was viewed as a long-term process that must be based on a 
new balance of interests, above all, between transatlantic partners.       
 
 
 
Chapter II  
 
The US Paradigm of Global Hegemony:  
Contradictions of Security 
 2. Introduction. Effects of systemic changes: Reassessing the US Leadership   
    The present Chapter focuses on the construction of a new world order doctrine and its 
progressive deployment since the end of the Cold War in the light of the US policy 
adopted in the ME during the two main Gulf crises of 1990 and 2003.   
     Following a neorealist perspective, we assume that in the case of a state actor such as 
the US, hegemonic behaviour and enlarging alliances are two principal means for 
promoting changes in the state of the system to the advantage of national power116.  
    Political outcomes, on the one hand, are helpful in explaining attempts to maintain a 
hegemonic role in world politics starting by relevant changes occurring in the system of 
alliances of the ME since the second Gulf war.  
    A focal point of the analysis however, is the role of ideological power that has been 
attributed to the concept of security following the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
construction of a new order in the system of international relations. 
      As Waltz argues, security is the instrument for the maintenance of a certain order117. 
With respect to this view of what security means, a crucial interest for the US has been 
the world-order theme understood as the maintenance of international security with 
concern for the state of the system.  
     Hence, in the following sections, the analysis intends to underline the interactive 
relationship between changes at the systemic level and changes in the concept of security 
since we presume that the rhetoric and establishment of world order doctrine has to re-
address this last concept and the means to exercise it.  
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     With specific reference to the ME, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has given the 
US more room for manoeuvre in deploying a strategy of security without fear of 
competition from the former political and military antagonist. American policy makers in 
the 90s have debated basic questions on how to advance national goals and when to use 
force to protect national interests in the new international environment.  In official 
discourses, the goal of containing the threat of Russian expansionism left space for other 
concerns, among which the threat of proliferation and sharper economic competitiveness 
were viewed as central issues118.  
     If with respect to the post-Cold War system, different paradigms were provided with 
different explanations in the academic field119, the assumption at the base of US foreign 
policy has remained that idea that international engagement was necessary in maintaining 
the role of leadership if US interests around the globe were to be preserved.     
     Ideologically speaking however, this role has been endangered by the ideological 
collapse of the Soviet threat that served as antagonist-order in the logic of the bipolar 
system. All the same, the threat represented by the antagonist also had a functional 
significance in keeping the Western alliance reasonably solid and relatively predictable. 
For instance, while exercising hegemonic behaviour, a superpowers goal is to limit the 
rivals possibilities of expansion and altogether maintain the leadership role in the 
spheres of military-security and political-ideology inside its own coalition.  
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    Thus, while the Cold War, throughout the policy of containment, Western allowed the 
US to maintain its leadership on political and strategic issues among Western powers, the 
end of the bipolar antagonism opened the path of a crisis within the Western system of 
power together with its main ideological and institutional instruments.  
    A deep crisis in the concept of order based on the Cold Wars alliance system has 
progressively shaken the terms of transatlantic partnership especially when the alliance 
was confronted with ME key issues for the stability of the region, such as the case of 
Iraqi and possible solutions after the dual containment policy.  
    In this regard, we intend to verify if the dual containments policy can be better 
explained following the perspective of out-of region dimensions represented by the 
transatlantic partnership.     
   More specifically, it is important to outline an existing relationship between the state of 
a long-term instability in a key country such as Iraq, and a policy of continuous 
expansionism pursued by the US.  The ideology of exceptional measures for the 
maintenance of the security of the state of a democratic worldwide system, for instance, 
provides solid ground for such analysis.  
   This policy, nevertheless, has to continuously confront its legitimacy to act in the 
region with the European ally especially since the EU, as seen previously, intensified the 
quality of political interests in the region.  
   A neorealist insight would underline that in a multi-polar order, one great power can 
eliminate other states by defeating them in war. Considering that in the case of the 
transatlantic alliance this option is remote, other means of intervening in order to re-
confirm and re-establish a leadership role must be taken into account.  We argue that the 
means envisaged by the US in reassessing a leading role in world politics are: (a) the 
ideology of legitimacy to exercise military power and (b) the strategic control of energy 
resource transportation.  
    The relevance of ideal and material capabilities are equally matched in the outcomes 
related to the development of the third Gulf crisis.  
    In the words of Waltz wars that eliminate enough rival great powers are system-
transforming wars120.  
     The perspective adopted in the analysis recognizes both the second and the third Gulf 
wars as system-transforming wars.  However, it intends to demonstrate that by examining 
the ideology and the politics of the US during the 90s, the identification of the rival is 
to be found in the emergence of the EU as a global actor and the prevention of 
differentiated opportunities constructed by this actor in order to consolidate preferential 
relations with key players in the ME.  
       In this reasoning, there is a need to define the term rival before framing an 
analysis. We introduce a category that intends to overcome limits posed by a theory 
reducing the concept of ally-rival to the necessity of death and life, as with Schmitts 
category of friend-enemy121. In Schmitts concept, what it is analysed under the realm of 
politics becomes a matter of purely existential concern, in that the rival-enemy can 
pragmatically kill anyone.  
    The crisis mentioned above instead reinstates the ideological and political meaning in 
the definition of the ally-rival category because, although the material possibility of 
killing is at the centre of the outcome of a war, it is always by a matter of ideal perception 
                                                
120 Waltz 1979: op. cit. 199. 
121 Carl Schmitt 1996 (1932): The Concept of the Political, 88ss. 
that actors operate a choice in the definition of what can threaten their survival. That is 
why it is fundamental to our analysis to gain an insight into the US political and 
ideological reshaping of the concept of security as an answer to the construction of 
alternative security policies stemming from a deeper involvement of the EU in the ME.   
 
 2.1 The crisis of energy resources as a means for leadership and the Second Gulf 
War  
   Since the development of the modern mode of production, oil and gas resources have 
been central to the assessment of interests enabling alliances between leading world 
nations122. Not differently from other Western powers that have colonized the region 
since 1918, the US administrations also have considered the ME and the Gulf region vital 
to the preservation of national interests. The description made by the US State 
Department in 1945 of the Middle East for example, defines the region as a stupendous 
source of strategic power in relation to its oilfields123.  
    In the case of a nation-state that was acquiring the status of superpower, a paramount 
objective in foreign policy has been to use the value of energy resources in order to 
guarantee the leadership in the game of alliances in international relations.  With the 
Truman doctrine, the US has undertaken strategic and military responsibility in securing 
all Western interests in the region vis-à-vis the antagonist superpower124.  
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   The legitimacy of this responsibility, however, entered into crisis, as discussed above, 
when the Soviet threat to Western interests was formally over.  
   Nevertheless, the Gulf region and the political alliances with nations bordering its 
coasts have continued to represent a source of strategic power in granting the US a 
leadership role in security and military issues. 
    In the wake of the second Gulf crisis, officials of the Bush Senior administration 
pointed out the necessity of preserving -economic- national interests related to regions 
oil reserves.  They explicitly referred to the Gulf resources as important factor in the 
evaluation of the Gulf crisis that was threatening these interests125.  
    Indeed, oil has been central to the US view of the second Gulf crisis. However, reasons 
for undertaking military intervention cannot be reduced exclusively to economic interests 
because military dominance is not necessary to secure the flow of oil at a reasonable 
price126.  
    What cannot be underestimated however, is the relevance of political alliances with 
main oil producers not lastly because such alliances are a source of mutual interests and 
help maintain stable prices in connection with planned production.  This is a factor that 
can be used as a lever in the context of high political tension as it was demonstrated, for 
example, on the occasion of the threat of an oil embargo in 1973127.   
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     We may recall Gramscis definition in which the concept of hegemony indicates the 
capacity to exercise the role of leadership, which is finally the result of a status of 
alliances that does not allow political competitors to reach the power (block system)128. 
The consolidation of political alliance and military hegemony in areas on which countries 
rely for their economic -and political- stability is a source of intra-alliance authority and 
deterrence that enables a superpower to pursue a strategy of what we can call necessary 
hegemony.  
     We can talk of the strategic value of US economic interests in the Gulf in this sense.  
However, with the end of the bipolar system of power, the logic for securing oil and 
energy resources to the west has lost its terms of reference and function as a means for 
exercising political leadership within the Western front.  
     Hence, the 90s began with a crisis in the Gulf and with the US Presidency announcing 
a new world order129.  Yet, if the aims of the Bush Senior administrations policy cannot 
be considered new as such130, what were relatively new were the context and 
possibilities of action given to the victor of the Cold War, especially with respect to 
Soviet ex-allies present in the ME.    
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     Together with the demise of Soviet influence, the strength of the Iraqi/Syrian/Russian 
alliance also came to an end.  As Saddam Hussein noted in a famous speech given to the 
Arab Cooperation Council in Amman in 1990, the collapse of the Russian Empire would 
enhance the strategic power of the US in the region orienting US efforts toward the 
control of Gulf natural resources131.  
    During the same speech, the revival of elements of pan-Arabism is relevant not 
because of the immediate and realistic feasibility of the ideology, but because of the 
questions hidden behind the reasoning: all of us are strong as long as we are united and 
all of us are weak as long as we are divided.  
       In the very simple search for redefining the logic of alliances in the region, there is 
the quest on the part of a weak actor for a system that can grant security for ex-Soviet 
allies possibly under a leadership assuring at least national survival. In fact, the 
bargaining position of Iraq was different from that of Syria at the time of the Taef 
accord132. The regime in Baghdad had lost, above all, its political relevance in the US 
policy for supporting the regime as an instrument of deterrence against Iran133.     
   Behind fears for oil reserves, American policymakers were concerned with avoiding the 
two principal countries of the region opposed to the US -Iraq and Iran- from reaching a 
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politically relevant position in the shaping of new alliances, in particular, with out of 
region powers that were likely to emerge in central Asia such as that effectively instated 
in Afghanistan with the Taliban regime in 1992134. 
    Nevertheless, in the specific case of the Iraqi regime whose political tradition is 
grounded on a laic form of sovereignty135- European mainstream countries would have 
remained the preferential out-of-region auditors and allies.  
    Such an alliance could have undermined the US role of leadership in strategic and 
security matters.  In the wake of the new world order a weak Iraq searching for support 
in new alliances could represent a threat to the US politics of hegemony in the region.  
    In the event, the objective of the second Gulf war was not yet the change of regime in 
Baghdad, but the containment of a threat until such a time when the global circumstances 
and new regional alliances would have permitted a better solution to the problem.  
     The second Gulf war, therefore, was organized in order to also serve this long-term 
goal. For the first time since the beginning of the Cold War,  the American administration 
was able to pool together an international coalition against Iraq under the aegis of the US.   
    At the same time, the scheme of military intervention produced the extraordinary result 
of reversing the alliance system in the ME by bringing Israel and Arab states together on 
one side against a common enemy136. The military intervention against Iraq in 1991 
softened the terms of regional fragmentation an old dilemma for the US in the region137- 
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player.  
  
2.2 From containment to enlargement   
      The identification of a common threat in the region has been central to the American 
approach to ME politics not only in the exceptional context of the multilateral coalition of 
the second Gulf war but, above all, in the policy pursued in the aftermath of the war.  
     The formal failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process at Camp David gave the 
green light to reopen a new round of instability in the region which ultimately led to the 
second Intifada in September 2000.  
     However, long before the Intifada stared, the US administration had already defined 
the dual containment strategy presented in 1993, in which Iraq and Iran were identified as 
principal enemies in the region: As the sole superpower, the United States has a special 
responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective 
pressure we maintain alliances and deploy military capabilities sufficient to deter or 
respond to any aggressive act.. We seek to contain the influence of these states sometimes 
by isolation The United States is also actively engaged in unilateral and multilateral 
efforts to restrict their military and technological capabilities138.  
    The dual containment policy proved essential to following the line of continuity 
marked by American administrations in the 90s until the strategy entered into a new 
phase in 2003. The strategy, above all, sought to redefine a global system of alliances 
                                                                                                                                            
regional peace process, for example, was strongly supported and initiated by Nixon and Kissinger. Michael 
C. Hudson 1996: To play the Hegemon: 50 years of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, 329. 
138 Anthony Lake (Advisor in the Clintons Administration) 1994: Confronting Backlash States, 45-55.  
under US leadership: There are few "backlash" states: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and 
Libya. They lack the resources of a superpower These nations exhibit a chronic 
inability to engage constructively with the outside world, and they do not function 
effectively in alliances139.   
     The American policy of the 90s, far from aiming at pursuing regional stability, had the 
specific objective of enhancing general conditions of uncertainty especially in the borders 
of the region throughout the substantial pressure exercised by the sanctions policy against 
Iraq and the progressive weakening of the Saddam regime140.  The steady pressure 
exercised against the Iranian regime was also an important factor here. 
    In both cases, the mainstream EU countries willingness to normalize relations with the 
two regimes was obstructive to the US policy of isolation.     
     Moreover, inherent to the containment policy is the outcome regarding military 
resources important to deploying the strategy on the ground and, thus, underlining key 
factors driving the dynamics of the extension of support and alliances in the region. After 
the Desert Storm operation,  while containment intensified the need for a stronger 
military presence in the Gulf, traditional US allies in the region were facing domestic 
economic difficulties especially as a consequence of the war expenditures141.  
     In that context, the US focused its policy on the necessity of extending support in 
order to face wider military posture and expenses.  This led to the joint contribution of 
Egypt, Turkey and Israel, although their support was softer than that given by the 
                                                
139 Lake 1994: art. cit. 50. 
140 Eric Watkins 1997: The Unfolding US Policy in the ME, 1-14.  
141 Austerity programs were introduced by most of Gulf States and particularly by Saudi Arabia. Elaine 
Sciolino and Eric Schmidt 1994: Saudi Arabia, its Purse Thinner, Learns How to Say No to United 
States, New York Times: 4 November.  
GCC142. The extraordinary result of bringing together Arabs countries on one side and 
Israel on the other under US leadership was not an extemporaneous objective limited to 
the 1990-91 war emergencies therefore.  
     The war has been the exception initiating a gradual and steady plan for enlarging the 
alliance front in the region against Iraq - and not secondarily against Iran. Thus, the status 
of containment in the post-war context has granted the maintenance and intensification of 
the same principle at the basis of American internationalism after the end of the Cold 
War: redesign a new space of alliances and power relations in a bigger region, from 
Egypt to Turkey in one direction, and from Afghanistan to Iraq in the other.  
    In this regard, although the pursuit of the dual containment policy had to face 
difficulties especially with respect to budgetary issues, it has functioned as a successful 
framework for intensifying Israeli-Turkish military ties in particular between 1996 and 
1997143.  
    Indeed, mainstream EU countries have especially criticized the dual containment 
policy, underlining the costs and risks in pursuing a policy destabilising the whole system 
of alliances, and that finally had to be measured by the relative interests of regional key-
actors144.  
    While the EU was advancing its project of eastward enlargement, the European 
unhappiness for the American policy of regional destabilization in the ME reached a 
                                                
142 This policy was initiated soon after the end of the Gulf war by the President ME advisor Martin Indyk. 
Martin Indyk 1993: The Clinton Administration Approach at the Middle East. 
143 Marr 1997: art. cit. 77.       
144 See for example the most difficult position of Egypt, whose willingness to enhance its role among Gulf 
States was also limited by the reluctance to pursue a strong policy weakening Iraq vis-à-vis Iran. Z. 
Brzezinski, B. Scowcroft, R. Murphy 1997: Differentiated Containment, 20-30.      
climax when it became evident that the time for a multilateral approach of post-Cold War 
politics, granted by G. Bush Senior in 1990, was over.  
    With respect to the US aim of weakening the Iraqi regime, the sanctions policy has 
been at the core of intense criticism both in Europe and also in the US. In particular, the 
American school of realism has explored the problem from two perspectives, one 
examining the necessity to cut high budgetary expenses for maintaining the policy, and 
the other concerning the risk of further alienating governments, leaving the regime in 
place however145.  
     Moreover, since the mid 90s, economic sanctions became increasingly costly 
especially with respect to diplomatic pressure that US policy strongly supported by the 
UK- has encountered in world public opinion. Dramatic consequences derived both from 
the use of uranium during the war and the prolonged economic embargo on civilians 
deprived even of basic medical equipment146 have not produced a softening of the 
American approach towards the containment policy however. Even the attempt to reduce 
the impacts of the embargo through the Oil for Food Program was revealed to be a 
scandalous failure147.  
    On the contrary, the containment policy by weakening Iraq above all weakened the 
power of the UN and prevented the multilateral body from being effective in the 
management and solution of international crises, a task for which the organization was 
                                                
145 Richard N. Haass 1997: Sanctioning Madness, 6.   
146John Pilger 2002: The new rulers of the world, 51ss.  
147 Involving both UN staff and European politicians, moreover, the U.N. Oil For Food program suggests 
that there was never a serious possibility of getting Security Council support for military action because 
influential people in Russia and France were getting paid off by Saddam: The Washington Times Editorial 
2004: The U.N. Oil for Food scandal, Washington Times: 22 March at http://www.washtimes.com/op-
ed/20040321-101405-2593r.htm Washington Post 28 January 1999.   
supposed to be not just the preferential instrument, but which served as its key reason for 
existing.148  
    While in 1998, UNSCOM had officially declared Iraqs biological and nuclear 
weapons program dismantled,149 the UN, which was entitled to govern the tool of 
sanctions, became ungovernable after a series of high-profile resignations150 gave way to 
the final earthquake in 2002-3.      
    Considering that during the Cold War, the US was able to maintain a certain 
predominance in the politics of the Security Council151, it is worth noting that the 
progressive or better the retrogressive- role of the crisis inside the UN institution 
evolved in parallel to the progressive escalation of American unilateralism that ultimately 
characterised the nature of the Third Gulf war.  
    The UN crisis is relevant especially because it frames the core elements of continuity 
in the US strategy from the second toward the third Gulf war, particularly in relation to 
the interests of European mainstream countries vis-à-vis their approach to an inclusive 
solution of the Iraqi problem.  
                                                
148 The UN crisis and the harsh debate on reforms are still open: after the Millennium Declaration (2000) 
the United Nations World Summit (September 2005) intended to review progress including, among others, 
the new issue regarding the UN reform that previously General Secretary Kofi Annan already had called 
for in the report In larger Freedom. The outcome document is considered very weak under many issues: 
Proposals to widen the Security Council are blocked because no one can agree on who should join and 
what happens to the veto. Plans to strengthen the right to intervene to prevent genocide are being resisted 
because of fears that the US would use them to invade wherever it pleased. Clare Short 2005: Depression 
and Mistrust Prevail at the UN, The Independent Thursday: 15 September..   
149  Pilger 2002: op cit. 59.  
150  Pilger 2002: op. cit. ibid. 
151 For a realistic approach at the UN charter and its powers system see A. Rosss analysis of the Charter 
contra an idealistic-normative tradition: Carl Landauer 2003: Antinomies of the United Nations: Hans 
Kelsen and Alf Ross on the Charter, 767799. During the Cold War USSR's patterns of obstructionism 
through veto system did not impeded a certain predominance of the US politics in the Security Council; see 
in particular the UN approval of the intervention in Korea with which the UN endeavours the US doctrine 
of containment. C. Bown and P. J. Mooney 1987: Cold War to Détente 1945-85, 46-56.   
     When France, representing the political interests shared by European core countries in 
1998, began intensifying requests for softening sanctions against Iraq, it was clear that 
the objective was to normalize relations with Iraq.  From the EU perspective, such 
relations were important not just for commercial reasons, but also in terms of political 
benefits and contextual stability essential to the Union project in the region.  
    With respect to the growth of transatlantic divergences and political competition 
especially in the management of security issues in the ME - an important aspect has been 
the definition of a kind of special national interest, which emerged in the US rhetoric and 
practice during the period between the two main wars against Iraq.  This interest involved 
the consolidation of exceptionality as a rule granting the US the possibility of 
withdrawing from any multilateral agreement152, because it obstructed the traditional 
strategy of enlargement.  
    In this light, the war against Iraq in 2003 cannot be considered solely as the evidence 
of a change of the dual containment strategy, but rather its intensification and subsequent 
end, for which the definitive elimination of the regime and, in parallel, the intensification 
of pressure against Iran became a solution to the political competition with the role of the 
EU in the ME.  
     Finally, in both cases, divergences with EU countries became indicative of an 
important degree of competition not only with respect to the means (for very different 
traditions of political schools) but with respect to the aims of relative geopolitical 
priorities for expansion.  In the environment immediately following the end of the Cold 
                                                
152 The US has withdrawn from ABM Treaty in 2001, from the treaty establishing the International 
Criminal Court in 2002 and the Bush Administration, in particular, has rejected the convention on the 
Prohibition of Landmines, refusing to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts: www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/icc0506.htm 
War, an isolated but still potentially powerful Iraq searching for new support was viewed 
as a challenge to the US aims of redistributing alliances from the ME to the Eurasian 
region. At the beginning of the 21st century, a fragile Iraq weakened by almost ten years 
of sanctions and bombings also became a threat to US national security. Following the 
logic of deterrence in the use of force, one may consider that if the regime in Baghdad 
would have had military capabilities to the point where it became a serious challenge to 
the US, there would not have been the possibility of engaging in military intervention 
inside the Iraqi territory.  
    Not surprisingly, official explanations of the Bush administrations main goals in Iraq 
have appeared contradictory. The US President and the Secretary of State C. Powell took 
the line that fulfilling UN resolutions for Iraqi disarmament would also change the nature 
of the Iraqi regime153 while senior American officials, including Vice-President Richard 
Cheney and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, showed great scepticism that 
weapons inspections could ever provide enough assurance of Iraqi disarmament to make 
an invasion unnecessary154.  
    For the Iraqi regime the fact of being too weak in practice while being potentially a key 
ally for out of region players, put the regime in a highly unfavourable position from the 
perspective of the new world orders objectives for enlarging the US sphere of influence 
from the ME to Eurasia.  
                                                
153 Bush speech at Cincinnati, av. at http://news.cincinnati.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article.htm; See also Colin 
Powell 2002: Disarmament, Not Husseins Removal, Is Top U.S. Priority on Iraq, The Washington Post: 
20 October. 
154 In August 2002, Cheney argued that A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of 
[Saddams] compliance with UN resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide 
false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in his box (from Cheneys speech to the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, in  In Cheneys Words: The Administration Case for Removing Saddam Hussein, New York Times: 
27 August 2002); similarly Rumsfeld questioned whether inspections could ever contain Iraqs pursuit of 
WMD (testimony to the Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, 18 September 2002, quoted in 
Anthony Lewis 2002: Bush and Iraq, 4-6. 
      
 
2.3 Geopolitics of the Third Gulf War: Establishing a New World Order   
    At least three main classes of explanations are given in identifying the reasons for 
which the US administration opted for military intervention against Iraq in March 2003.   
(1) The first theory explains the war as necessary in answering to the global threat of 
terrorism. This explanation refers to official discourses that, especially after September 
11, characterize declarations and documents produced in the framework of the American 
national security policy. At the beginning of 2002, Iraq was identified as part of a red 
wire connecting Iran and North Korea in the axis of evil155. Just after the war started and 
one year after the attack of September 11, a first document was produced identifying 
three global challenges to US national security: terrorist organizations, the threat of 
WMD and the challenge represented by Rogue States156. In summary, the war against 
Iraq became, in this view, unavoidable because Saddam Husseins regime was considered 
a source of support for the activities of international terrorist organizations threatening 
US national security, such as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda network 
involved in the Twin Towers attacks. Therefore, the (supposed) acquisition of WMD by 
the regime in Baghdad was central in the evaluation of challenges to US national security 
represented by the Iraqi regime. While this theory is relevant with respect to the 
ideological values that characterise the soul of American internationalism after the 
                                                
155  See the Bushs speech on Axis of Evil: President Delivers State of the Union Address (January) 2002, 
av. at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html 
156 US National Security Strategy (September) 2002: Rogue states doctrine, at 
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html; commented by John Ikenberry 2002: Americas Imperial Ambition, 
44-60. 
demise of the communist threat157 it lacks concrete adherence to the facts however.  Even 
considering the always ambiguous gap between the quality of information provided by 
national security institutions and the identification of aims in national security158, the 
supposed ties between Saddams regime, global terrorism and the attacks of September 
11 have undoubtedly remained the object of supposition159 while evidences for the 
presence of WMD in Iraq has never been provided160. All in all, a kind of strategy for 
overextending media information has gained a certain success in creating confusion as to 
the evaluation of the realistic threat when the question of proof against the Iraqi Regime 
came into focus. This perspective of analysis offers the opportunity to look at one issue, 
among others, which is important not firstly for the outcomes related to the status of 
international law but also to the strategic meaning of the US policy of interventionism.  
     One of the principal aspects stemming from the circumstances, in fact, is that the third 
Gulf war opened a crisis in the practice of the jus ad bellum.  The right to attack a nation-
state in self-defence has been adapted to the Bushs administrations need -and 
                                                
157 For a clear prospect of this ideological substitution communism/Islamic threat see the Thatchers article:  
Margaret Thatcher 2002: Advice to a Superpower, The New York Times: February 11; Toby Harnden 
2002: Thatcher urges Bush to 'finish business of Iraq', The Daily Telegraph: 12 February, at 
http://www.news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml   
158 The misleading use of erroneous information has produced one of the most serious crises for the US 
Presidency: see the CIA leak scandal Gate Previously same kind of scandal had invested the UKs 
leadership that, however, has been able to overcome the parliamentary crisis. The September Dossier Iraq's 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government The scandal, nevertheless, sow 
the BBC journalist involved in the affair loosing his life: Searle Sennett, Stephen Frost, David Halpin 2005: 
Our doubts about Dr Kelly's suicide, The Guardian: 27 January; Joseph C. Wilson 2003: What I Didn't Find 
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159 Among others, see the misuse of evidences made in the book The War against America: Saddam 
Hussein and the World Trade Centre Attacks, supporting the theory that links Saddam to the attack of 
September 11, reviewed by J. S. Yaphe 2004: Iraq Considered, 295: Laurie Mylroie, The War against 
America: Saddam Hussein and the World Trade: A Study of Revenge, HarperCollins 2001. 
160 To the CIA gate is connected the Nigerian Affair with which the US administration together with the 
Italian security services- is involved in production of false documents in order to prove Saddams attempts 
at acquiring from Nigeria the necessary instrument for WMD. See the series of articles issued between 
September and December 2005 by Panorama and La Repubblica, in particular: Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe 
DAvanzo 2005: Roma sapeva dal 2003 che non cerano super-armi, La Repubblica: 1 Novembre; Bonini 
and DAvanzo 2005: Nigergate, riparte linchiesta, La Repubblica: 8 December. 
advantage?- to territorialize a kind of asymmetric war (for which high military 
technology is opposed to unreachable networks) that could not be territorial because of 
the nature of the groups acting through trans-national network systems161.  
    These groups, in fact, remain non-state actors without aspirations for territorial 
sovereignty, and this substantial point makes them and their aims very different from 
resistance movements historically tied to specific territorial identity and acting under the 
goal of national independence.   
    Indeed, the identification of a sovereign regime on an equal basis with the activities of 
non-state actors has also favoured the media policy that the Israeli PM A. Sharon has 
pursued with particular success in the politics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, leading 
to the progressive isolation of the Palestinian leadership during the second Intifada162. 
Nevertheless, if there was a tie between the Saddam regime and non-state actors, this was 
limited to the dynamics of regional politics and the specific case of financial support 
given to Palestinian resistance movements especially in the course of the first Intifada163.   
(2)  The focus on the context of ME politics introduces the second class of explanations.  
Here, on the one side, the security of Israel is seen as main reason for intervening against 
Iraq, in that the Saddam regime is one of the historical enemies of Israel in the region.164 
                                                
161 See Habermas 2005 (2004): op. cit. 87ss. 
162 And, of course, to the weakening of its party with its laic tradition; The Israeli strategy for isolating 
Arafat and weakening the political force of the PNA by the use of media propaganda has started since the 
negative development of the Camp David negotiations after which the responsibility for its failure has been 
in toto attributed to the Palestinian leadership: see Helga Baumgarten 2003: The Myth of Camp David and 
the Distortion of the Palestinian Narrative.   
163 Iraq until 1982 was included in the US State Departments list of states supporting international 
terrorism because of its ties with non Islamist Palestinian nationalist groups. After the uprising of the first 
Intifada (December 1987), funds to Palestinians were pledged by all Arab governments as political result of 
the meeting of Arab FMs in Tunis on January 1988. Lamis Andoni 1988: Solid Arab backing, 7-8.  
164 Dore Gold 2004: Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War, at 
http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-25.htm. 
On the other side, the pressure exercised by Jewish lobbies inside US domestic politics165 
is also considered as a leading factor in the war.  
    Both of these perspectives one regional and the other domestic- produce elements 
enlightening the significant conjunction of US and Israeli national interests166 rooted in 
the history of the Jewish State since the shaping of a defined foreign policy looking at 
tied relations with the US as a principal out-of-region power indispensable to the survival 
of the nation in the ME167.  
    This analysis, nevertheless, is supported by historical patterns: the second Gulf war 
halted the flux of financial support arriving from the Gulf region and deprived the 
Palestinians of their remaining, principal supporter still left in the region after the 
Egyptian-Israeli bilateral agreement at Camp Davis in 1979168. Subsequent to the 
weakening of the regime in Baghdad, the overall situation facilitated the opening of the 
peace process leading to the Oslo Declaration of Principles that was particularly 
                                                
165 Jewish-Americans count the 30% electorate for presidential elections; however, the most interesting 
factor is the emerging of a political force represented by the new alliance between the Jewish and rightwing 
Christians. Tony Smith 200: Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American 
Policy.             
166 A recent study of  John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt 2006: The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, av. at www.lrb.co.uk.   
167 After the end of Israeli-URSS countries relations  such as Czechoslovakia- Ben Gurion was the first to 
open the path for a privileged relation with the US (Rabinovich Itamar 1991: Early Arab-Israeli 
negotiations). With the end of the Cold War and after the second Gulf war, the substance of the Israeli-US 
alliance is not changed although the perception of common threats in the region induced to different 
terminology as stated by the Israeli Gen. Shlomo Gazit, former head of Military Intelligence and West 
Bank Administrator, in 1992: after the Cold War Israel's main task has not changed at all Its location at 
the centre of the Arab Muslim Middle East predestines Israel to be a devoted guardian of the existing 
regimes: to prevent or halt the processes of radicalization and to block the expansion of fundamentalist 
religious zealotry: quoted in Noam Chomsky 1996: The Middle East Settlement: Its Sources and 
Contours, in Power and Prospects, 165.       
168 The Gulf War severely weakened the PLO already suffering from having lost financial and diplomatic 
support from the USSR; Gulf monarchies expelled more than 400,000 Palestinian workers, whose 
remittances to their families in the territories and refugee camps had been essential to Palestinian economic 
life. Paul D'Amato 2001: U.S. Intervention in the Middle East: Blood for Oil, in  
www.isreview.org/issues/15/blood_for_oil.shtml.  
favourable to the Israeli side169. Although the theory rightly assumes that the elimination 
of the Saddam regime was a common objective of the national security policies of both 
Israel and US, there is no need to assume that the conjunction of national interests also 
determined a superpowers choices to be dependent on a relatively weak actor whose 
political strength is, on the contrary, tied to the alliance with the US and not the 
opposite170.   
(3)  A third explanation is provided by the traditional imperialistic school -as well as its 
post-modern branch- assuming that control of Iraqi oil resources is the principal goal 
driving the American policy of military intervention in Iraq. This kind of analysis, 
however, by reducing the aims of the third Gulf war to the control of Iraqs energy 
resources is simplistic and misses, above all, the important focus on the strategic global 
issues characterising the system of international relations especially after the crisis of the 
Soviet sphere of alliances. Nevertheless, the relevance of Iraqi resources has to be kept in 
great consideration if framed in the range of means with an essential role as a source of 
national (for the Iraqi capabilities) and global power (for US leadership).   
     Although each of these theories provides the analysis with elements that may have 
played a role in the making of US politics leading to the occupation of Iraq in 2003, they 
do not offer alone the possibility of coordinating a set of factors characterizing the 
meaning of the third Gulf crisis. Such a theory would connect these recent events with 
those that emerged previously under a homogeneous theoretical framework considering 
                                                
169 For harsh critic to the map of the Oslo Peace Process see Edward Said 2000: The end of the Peace 
Process Oslo and After.  
170 Israels choices, for instance, are not always in line with US interests and preferences in specific contest 
critical for the success of American policy in the region: in particular during the second Gulf crisis, when 
Saddam opted for political linkage of Gulf-Arab/Palestinian security - the massacre of the Temple Mount 
(8 October 1990) enlightened a source of persistent tension in US-Israeli relations. See Avi Shlaim 2001 
(2000): The Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab World, 476ss.     
of two different levels of analysis, regional/global and ideological/strategic. This 
approach would explain a fundamental linkage between ideological and material 
outcomes through the identification of geopolitical interests. In this way, the range of the 
US interests in the ME are defined with respect to a space of power having reached a 
form in which the four traditional sources of national power (economic, political, 
ideological, and diplomatic) are all considered and homogeneously integrated.   
    The importance of space, in fact, is central to our discourse because it includes a fifth 
element that deeply characterises the dynamics of global politics since the demise of the 
Soviet empire.  Instead of nuclear ages futures, the relevance of the geographic factor is 
revived in light of its relation with the emergence of new political entities, both national 
and regional. This is particularly evident from the fact that with the emergence of 
independent political spaces in central and west Eurasia the purely realistic game of 
alliances has regained vitality.  Moreover, with the attempts to shape a EU political 
identity enlarged to its eastern borders, factors of political antagonism between global 
players has also reappeared, together with competition over strategic goals for the 
expansion of the respective spheres of influence.  
   
The new world order: Economics 
     At the end of the 90s, experts of EU-US relations focused attention on the unequal 
division of roles and tasks that was growing between transatlantic partners in the ME. For 
instance, the situation saw European countries increasing their profits from trade relations 
with the region, while the US was assuming major responsibility for defence by covering 
the costs of military presence in the Gulf171.  
     The total amount of US commercial interests with these countries was lower than that 
of the Union countries.  In 1995 for example, while Western Europe imported 5.5 million 
barrels of oil daily (bpd) from MENA countries, the US imported 1.8 million bpd.  
European trade with the Middle East also exceeds that of the US.  EU exports amounted 
to 18% of all its exports to developing countries while US exports amounted to 8.8%172. 
       Given this disparity, bringing advantages to the EU and placing burdens on the US, 
some analysts predicted that the American administration would have called for security 
costs to be shared with the EU to a greater extent173.  
     Yet, facts have demonstrated that while the EU advanced requests for more sharing in 
decision-making on security issues174, the US has clearly shown its preference for 
keeping decisional control over strategic matters, and being able to rely on its own 
supremacy in military capabilities that allow unilateral action175.  
     This choice, however, considerably increases the burdens of military expenditures and 
consequently, also negatively affect the US national deficit.  In 2004, after one year of 
war in Iraq, the US trade deficit reached the historical high of 5.3 % of GNP176.  
                                                
171 For the costs of military presence in the Gulf see Martin Van Creveld 2006: Costly Withdrawal Is the 
Price To Be Paid for a Foolish War, at http://www.forward.com/articles/6936.        
172 EU imports from the region represents 15% of imports from developing countries, while US imports 
represented only 6%. Data from Europe and Israel: Where Politics and Economics Do Not Meet, at 
www.adl.org/international/EU-2-EuropeMiddleEast.asp. 
173 Marr 1997: art. cit. 98. 
174 See France in the UN: above Chapter 1: 4, Challenges to a European security strategy from the Iraqi 
crisis.  
175  American troops in the Gulf are structurally organized for the eventuality to act alone: Department of 
Defence 1997: Annual Report to the President and the Congress.       
176 Equal to 618 billion of dollars, while in the same year the balance also reached the 3,6% of GNP. The 
US deficit, to which experts refer as the twin deficits (trade and balance of payment) has become 
structural to American economy that, in practice, is based on the subsistence of financial international 
    In parallel, the Euro-dollar war has become the mirror where the structural weakness 
of American system of production is reflected not only at the expense of the European 
economy, but even at the challenge of intra-European political dialogue for shaping a 
stable system of welfare within the Union177.  
    Indeed, if American national security policy after September 11 and during the war in 
Iraq have considerably enhanced the costs of the military budget on the one side,178 on 
the other, the striking deficit making the dollar so weak on the international market is the 
easiest answer to affording military expenditures by maintaining a good standard of 
living and ultimately, by placing the burden of real production on European Union 
countries179.  
    This strategy is not without risks because the survival of such a system depends on 
the continuity of international investments which is making the US economy more and 
more dependent on Chinese and Japanese investors and governmental banks180.  
                                                                                                                                            
investments. Nevertheless, Bush administration has inherited a exceeding balance from his predecessor 
Clinton. See Ibrahim Warde 2005: High Price of the Cheap Dollar, Le Monde Diplomatique: March 2005.     
177 American analysts have transported the core of the debate about dollars weakness from economic 
issues (inherent to a problematic American economy) into choices of political economy that Union 
countries are warmly suggested part to take: The long term solution to this (the strong Euro) is for these 
countries to move to a privatized, fully funded pension system  and abandon the public sector pension 
systems originally invented by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who now threatens to damage 
Europe in the 21st Century by this invention as much as he damaged it in the 20th by his other invention of 
a militarized German super-state: Washington Times 2003: 21 December, at www.washtimes.com/upi-
breaking.   
178 Costs of the war are increased especially by the costs fo r reconstruction, estimated at $30 billion 
dollars: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2003: Potential Cost of a War With Iraq and Its 
Post-War Occupation, at www.foreignpolicy.com. 
179 Warde 2005: art. cit. 6.  
180 A further stage characterizes the international economic structure emerging in the 21century: Asian 
giants such as China and India are threatening preferential western market of oil in ME. With respect to 
these changes, the US economy result more and more dependent from external economic trend especially 
from Chinese and Japanese policies: the capacity to conduct war unilaterally in case of fierce competitive 
circumstance may result essential to US national interests. The objective is to replace in the future the 
shortage of financial capital that till now Asian economies have provided to cover the growing American 
deficit caused by the discrepancy between low capacity of production and high rates of consumption in US 
society. Assured by foreign economies the flow of capital to US, for its nature, is already instable and not 
automatically under US control. Warde 2005: art. cit. 7.   
    However, these risks seems more apparent than real and they open the margins for a 
balanced -although under many respects ambiguous- relation with a global competitor 
such as China which is the other important player on the East side of the Eurasian game 
of alliances after the EU on the west.    
   It may be said that the structure of the American economy is not that of a traditional 
economy of production but a model of military economy organized in such a way as to 
serve the necessity of using the powerful military machinery as an instrument of power in 
the planning of a global strategy of hegemony while the traditional system of production 
is left to other economies.  
     
The concept of order. Politics  
    In modern political thought, the concept of order is related to the concept of 
sovereignty. National sovereign power is founded on the relationship between space and 
people inside determined territorial borders; the stronger this relationship is, the more 
stable the sovereign power. The third Gulf war has deepened a kind of crisis that, by 
directly affecting the relationship between the Iraqi territory and its people, it indirectly 
affects the concept of sovereignty in international relations. Two elements concur in the 
nature of this crisis: the change of the Iraqi regime as a specific aim of the third Gulf war 
and the American politics of unilateralism.   
    The structure of American military forces in the Gulf was set to provide the capability 
to act unilaterally if necessary181. The US, in theory and practice, is the only country that 
can lead military intervention unilaterally.  If the US administration had the specific goal 
                                                
181 US Forces Defence Department Report 1997 quoted in Marr 1997: art. cit. 74.     
of dismissing the regime in Baghdad acting against the principle of sovereignty182, 
unilateralism was the only way to reach this aim.  
   The third Gulf war serves to consolidate the US position in the new world order based 
on the centrality and authority of its role as the sole superpower capable of acting 
unilaterally after having carried out a series of military interventions in this direction.  
    Although neoconservatives in the US explain that invading Iraq is a first step towards 
creating a democratized and better Middle East183, the illegitimate and unilateral war is 
a way, firstly, of consolidating the legitimacy of a unilateral approach when the 
circumstances of self-defence were not in place, and secondly, of weakening the 
multilateral instrument of the UN in which the veto system outside of the Cold War bloc 
became an obstacle to US interests.  
     Thus, hegemonic behaviour, especially through the future of unilateralism, 
characterizes the aims of the intervention in Iraq in March 2003.  
 
The concept of order. Ideology 
      The decision to solve the Iraqi crisis with military intervention was put into practice 
after a long diplomatic battle at the UN (1998-2002-2003). In the end, in order to answer 
to the absence of evidence motivating military intervention against a sovereign state, the 
US administration produced a package of ideological arguments serving a new policy of 
pre-emptive-automatic intervention, also used in the related cases of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. A formal policy was presented only in 2004, that is, three years after September 11.  
                                                
182 Different are the circumstances of the intervention in Afghanistan, for which the US could provide the 
international community with more defined proves that allowed the US the practice of its right of defence. 
See Habermas 2005 (2004): op. cit. 43.  
183 A good example of neo-cons thinking about the issue see: Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack 
2002: The New Transatlantic Project, Policy Review, October/November. 
    The doctrine of pre-emptive war introduces a new codex of jus ad bellum the rules of 
which are difficult to imagine at the disposal of any other nation out of the military 
support and political approval of the ideological father of the doctrine.  The expression 
with us or against us184, in fact, runs in parallel to the basic source of the pre-emptive 
norm for which the principle has became kill in order not be killed, a reversal image of 
a social norm calling for do not kill in order not be killed.  
     The order established by the doctrine of preventive war is, therefore, selective and 
hierarchical in practice185. Its theorization calls for an unconventional war against an 
unconventional threat and, indeed, is the cornerstone reversing the power relations with 
other global actors and components of the IR structure.  
     The XXI century American ideology for world geo-political supremacy has to pass 
through the annihilation of the UN balancing role and the restoring of a full and factual 
balance of national powers.  This comes together with the containment of the regional 
hegemonic tendency of others and the prevention of new alliances hostile to US interests.  
     In this respect, by citing military intervention in the arbitrary evaluation of threat and 
its elimination as the main reason for the preventive war allows an aggressive policy 
justified by the search for new ideological spaces of national survival186, a strategy that 
brings to mined the bellicose narrative in the pre-World War II period in Europe187.   
                                                
184Bushs speech at the UN, January 2003: av. at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news /releases/2003/ 
01/20030128-19.html 
185 In the analysis developed by the Historian and Political Scientist Emmanuel Todd the US social 
structure shows itself to be progressively oriented toward a oligarchic order and inequality system; in his 
theory this domestic phenomenon has great part in explaining the US progressive withdraw from 
multilateralism and the search for a special position within the system of IR throughout unilateralism and 
militarism. Emmanuel Todd 2003: After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order, 33.     
186 National values are extended and applied to universal dimension.  
187 Although to westerns European- experience it may appear excessive, the American preventive war has 
facilitated a widespread view in the Arab world of an existing analogy between Bush juniors and Hitlers 
approach at relations among nations. A series of articles issued by Egyptian mainstream and not- press is a 
     It is possible to see, in fact, some structural similarities of world politics between the 
post-Cold War period and the pre-World War II period, that is, when the failure of a 
multilateral framework and the emergence of a too- powerful nation broke up the system 
of balance between European states-empires.  The main characteristic of our 
contemporary circumstances, however, is that the space of the conflict is rigorously 
transported outside of Western borders.  
    From this perspective, it is also worth underlining the presence of the anti-Semitic 
elements dominant in the ideology of self-defence and pre-emptive war during both 
periods -first the Jewish-Hebrew and then the Arab-Muslims188- serving as a source of 
political power in building the alliances system and retaining a dominant position within 
it189.  
    The relative innovation of US strategy in promoting a new world order, therefore, is 
not the identification of terrorism as a threat for global security190 but the use of ethnic-
religious futures to construct an internationally valid ideology because without sovereign 
borders and thus it results functional to assure a system of tied alliances extendible to all 
fronts of world politics, including those countries also ruled by Islamic government  such 
as, for example, Pakistan.  
                                                                                                                                            
comprehensive example:  comparing  U.S. President George W. Bush's policy to Adolf Hitler's Nazism: 
Amin Huweidi (former Egyptian Minister of War) 2003: Nazism Threatens the World Anew, Al-Ahali: 
February 3; Kamal Abd Al-Raouf 2002: Rumsfeld is a new Hitler, Al-Yom: August 17; describing the 
treatment of the Al-Qa'ida and Taliban prisoners as worse than prisoners under the Nazis see: Anis 
Mansour 2002: America is Worse than Hitler, Al-Ahram: January 26, at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi/.     
188 The perception of Islamic activities connected with the religion or with intra-minority relations (such as 
charity networks) gives space to the most common anti-Semitic topics (as the danger of being conquest by 
them, the growing power of Islamic networks that works as reach lobbies etc): Exemplar compound 
of the use of these anti-Semitic propaganda see Orianna Fallaci 2002: Race and Pride.      
189 For the political role had by anti-Semitism in the Third Reich policy of expansion and hegemony by 
requesting allies to submit at the same ideology and laws see Hannah Arendt 1991 (1963): Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, 299ss.   
190 For example, during Reagans presidency terrorism has been also central issue in international security. 
However, for the well known contradictions in Regans fight against the Evil Empire see Eqbal Ahmad 
2001: Terrorism. Theirs and Ours, Open Media Pamphlet Series, Seven Stories Press, New York.    
     Nevertheless, an absolute novelty of the approach lies in a synthesis of different 
traditions of American foreign policy. Under the Bush Junior presidency, the US policy 
refers, in theory, to the liberal school of Wilson tradition and, in practice, acts in line with 
the neo-conservative approach to international relations191.  
     Thus, the US administration has re-articulated an American doctrine of foreign policy 
since 1993 when the doctrine of enlargement and re-regulation was announced192. This 
approach was based on the view that the doctrine of containment should be followed by 
the doctrine of enlargement: enlargement of the world's free community of market 
democracies.  
     In that the US was the victor of the Cold War, enlarging democracy came to qualify a 
paramount American interest essential in the restructuring of the international relations 
and alliances system after the collapse of the communist block.  
    Shared interests for democratic values, political freedom and free markets are the 
complementary level of the political ideology on which alliances with other Western 
powers are historically grounded since the beginning of the Cold War, through the 
strategy of containment applied in the ME with the Truman doctrine193.  
   Under many regards, principal outcomes of the Cold War are still in place especially 
with respect to an ideology based on the spread of traditional free market and democratic 
values complemented, nevertheless, by the new futures inherent in the logic of pre-
emptive war.  
                                                
191 The problem for the Bush junior administration was that it thought and acted like Nixon, but borrowed 
the rhetoric of Wilson and Carter: Joseph S. Nye 1992: What New World Order?, at 
www.foreignaffairs.org/1992/2.html. 
192 Statement of the National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's, September 1993. 
193 The necessity to contain Soviet tendency to expansionism as it is well known was first formulated by 
Kennan. G. Kennans Telegram to President Truman and the president speech on US leadership of a free 
world on 12 March 1947.     
     On the eve of the invasion of Iraq, in February 2003, the US presidency set out the 
ambition to spread democratic values in the Middle East.194  After the first two years of 
military occupation of Iraq however, results confirmed the preponderance of the so-called 
democratic paradoxical phenomenon195.  
     The substance of such a paradox concerns not only the radicalization of those 
phenomena that were intended to be neutralised, but even the emergence of undemocratic 
standards within Western political and jurisprudential system.  
     This contradiction is properly reflected in and expressed by the complementary 
doctrine of the state of exception synthesizing a characteristic future in the construction 
of the new world order under a mechanism that tends to establish a permanent relation 
between necessity as a source of law enabling political action.  
     The state of exception has been put into practice with the American 'military order' 
issued in 2001  the Patriot Act- and 2006196. These military exceptional measures 
provide legal ground for subjecting non-citizens suspected of terrorist activities to 
indefinite detention and military tribunals. Together with the systematic use of torture in 
the Abu Ghraib Prison197, the Guantanamo model creates a new category of detainees 
classified as legal under the war on terrorism while international law is seen as being 
                                                
194 A presentation of the salient aspect of the programme of democratization was previously reported by 
Victor Davis Hanson 2002: Democracy in the Middle East: Its the hard headed solution, The Weekly 
Standard: 21 October. 
195 In an article on US strategy, Sherle Schwenninger, co-director of global economic policy at the New 
America Foundation, pointed out that "the essence of US policy over the last three decades has been 
adversative to Arab democracy and self-determination". Sherle Schwenninger 2003: Revamping American 
Grand Strategy, at www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-3/ Schwenninger.html.  
196 October 26, 2001 and. The new aspect introduced with it, thus, is the creation of individual-entities that 
could be neither named nor classified by the Law, because excluded from the status as Prisoners of War 
defined by the Geneva Conventions, they do not correspond to any jurisdiction set by American law and 
are radically eradicated of any legal status. For Agamben this is the most recent of state of emergency 
measures that open a no-man's-land between the political and the juridical. Giorgio Agamben 2005 (2003):  
State of Exception, 1, 3-4. 
197 See Red Cross report on Abu Graib tortures avail. at ww.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/redcrossabuse.pdf 
Abuse Of Iraqi  POWs By GIs Probed   
incompatible with national security objectives198. A special program for selected 
prisoners was approved in Washington in 2001 during the war in Afghanistan and, most 
importantly, activated through logistic support in different countries199.  
     The measures undertaken during the state of emergency are built on the claim of legal 
power of sovereignty but in actual fact, the state of emergency is fully understandable as 
a political phenomenon stemming from political crisis200.  
     Since it produces an exceptional suspension of the law, formally, it is a phenomenon 
instating a legal void in order to face certain critical circumstances in the realm of 
politics.  
     In the state of exception a basic problem concerns the limits between the realms of 
legal and political orders that come to be confused under their functions and purposes. In 
the political disorder of the state of exception sovereignty finds its source of power within 
a legal void.  
   The Italian philosopher Agamben, in this regard, sees the contemporary world order 
through two basic relational paradigms, one indicating a status of progressing global 
civil war and the other the state of exception corresponding to a predominant model of 
sovereignty that came to characterize a constant pattern in systems of democratic 
governance201.  
                                                
198 Memorandum issued by the US Department of Justice in 2003 and published one year later, on 9 June 
2004: available at www.wallstreatjournal.com 
199 US Defence Ministry and National Security Advisor: see Seymour M. Hersh 2004: The Gray Zone, The 
New Yorker: 15 May.  
200 The exceptional measures undertaken during the state of emergency are the result of periods of political 
crisis and for this very reason must be understood through the terrain of politics rather than through the 
legal terrain: Agamben 2006: State of Emergency: Lecture given at the Centre Roland-Barthes, Universite 
Paris VII, Denis-Diderot, av.  at http://www.generation-online.org/p/pagamben.htm  
201 Today, in the face of the continuous progression of something that could be defined as a "global civil 
war," the state of emergency tends more and more to present itself as the dominant paradigm of 
government in contemporary politics. Agamben 2005: op. cit., 2, 4ss. 
     More specifically, Agamben defines the state of emergency as the predominant and 
characteristic un-legal means used in our contemporary politics made up as a contest of 
global civil war: in other words, a general situation in which the exception became the 
rule.  
     What becomes even more relevant is that a characteristic of the current application of 
the state of exception doctrine includes the necessity of imposing it on all belligerent 
nations involved in the war.  This is a main political meaning of the state of exception 
that recalls the introduction of special laws during the Nazi strategy of expansionism as a 
means of enlarging alliances202 and, thus, defining the enemy and friend.   
      Indeed, two characteristics for which the doctrine is effective include the fact of being 
widespread in space and prolonged in time in opposition to a formal necessity of 
exceptionality and provisional measures as it was in the roman Iustitium.  
     What is a predominant future in the ideology of the new world order doctrine 
therefore when confronted with the Agamben approach?  
     A permanent status of emergency shapes the overall order and, in substance, it is the 
ruled anomy void of law- that creates the nomos -order.    
    The basic function of actions made within this new space of disorder can be 
explained, in turn, using a third category of violence which Benjamin calls "pure" or 
"revolutionary203. It is a violence that is exterior to the legal order and incompatible with 
its purposes, having neither the finality of stating conserving the law.     
                                                
202 Harendt 1991 (1963): op. cit., 74ss. 
203 Walter Benjamin 1921: Critic of violence, at www.generation-online.org/p/fpagamben.htm.  
    The proper characteristic of this violence outside the law is that it deposes it and by 
doing so, the purpose is to begin a new historical epoch204.  
 
2.4 Conclusion. The use of exceptionality in the US paradigm of the new world order 
     In this section we have sought to redefine and analyse the ME security policy adopted 
by the US in parallel with the construction of a new world order doctrine.  
    One main aspect regarding the role of the ME in US hegemonic aspirations since the 
90s world order, has been that factors of predictability in the regional and extra-regional 
system of alliances granted by the east-west confrontation205 were nullified by the 
collapse of the ideological threat together with predictability in the terms of transatlantic 
relations.  
     The hypothesis aimed to link the emergence of a crisis in transatlantic alliance and the 
redefinition of an ideological and political order since the collapse of the Soviet threat to 
Western interests in the ME.       
    In that the defence of energy resources was a central theme in justifying a role of 
leadership in military issues and the decision-making process, the maintenance of such a 
role for the US reached a first stage of the crisis in 1990.  
     Contrary to what would have been a logical decrease in the importance of security 
issues, the concept of security, instead, has regained importance under the shaping of 
ideological and political aims.   
                                                
204 Agamben 2005: op. cit. 53. 
205 The prevention of regional actors from reaching dominant position was also part of the Cold War 
system: see the role of Egypt during the first phase of the east-west confrontation in ME and the threat 
represented by Egyptian led pan-Arabism to western interests in ME during 1956-67: Mansfield 1992: op. 
cit. 245-79.       
     The concept of security played an essential part in the world order ideology by 
providing new meaning to the categories of enemy and threat, on one side, and 
legitimacy and sovereignty on the other.   
     The concept of security, here, has included important political aspects among which 
the fact of being itself a source regulating intra-alliance authority and the deterrence of 
extra-alliance relations.  
     The political weakness of the Iraqi regime at the end of the Cold War introduces a 
basic reason for which Iraq became a key country in the security of the region under the 
US perspective of a new world order. Throughout the dual containment policy, 
Washington has granted the isolation of a potential threat whereby the meaning of threat 
must be understood in the development of the enlargement policy that has followed.       
      Hence, the status of instability related to the Iraqi problem that has dominated the 
ME from the second to the third Gulf war functioned as a source of reasserting the US 
role of leadership.  It was therefore beneficial to the enlargement of the US sphere of 
influence. In this regard, the construction of new coalitions such as the intensification of 
Turkish-Israeli relations- and the status of containment in the post-second Gulf war have 
granted the maintenance and intensification of the same principle at the basis of the 
American unilateralism after the end of the Cold War: redesign a new space of alliances 
and power relations in a bigger region, from Egypt to Turkey in one direction and from 
Afghanistan to Iraq in the other206.  
     At the level of transatlantic relations, the containment policy was detrimental to the 
EU because the containment, by weakening Iraq, above all weakened the UN and 
prevented the multilateral body from being effective in the management and resolution of 
                                                
206  See below: Chapter III. 
international crises: a task for which the organization was not only supposed to be the 
preferential instrument, but on which its very existence was based.  
   The analysis recalled three mainstream explanations for the US occupation of Iraq in 
2003, including the official discourse regarding the global threat of terrorism, the 
relevance of the ME context and the Israeli-US alliance, and the control of Iraqi oil 
resources. Nevertheless, we have used a geopolitical framework with a historical 
perspective to analyse fundamental futures emerging in the three realms of politics, 
economics and ideology in explaining the third Gulf war.  
    The importance of the concept of space was found in the linkage between ideological 
and material outcomes and, therefore, the extension of new geopolitical interest from 
national to global national interest. A kind of special national interest, thus, has 
emerged from US rhetoric and practice during the construction of the 90s world order and 
the two Gulf wars.  The primary characteristic of this global interest is given by the 
consolidation of exceptionality as a rule granting the US the possibility of enlarging 
national sovereignty powers. The US progressive withdrawal from multilateral 
agreements is an instrument that has progressively served to the empowerment of the 
global national interest. 
    A principal aspect stemming from the practice of exception, for instance, is that the 
third Gulf war has opened a crisis in the practice of the jus ad bellum: the right to attack a 
nation-state in self-defence has been adapted to the American need to territorialize a 
kind of asymmetric war for which high military technology is opposed to unreachable 
networks that could not be territorial due to the nature of the groups acting through the 
trans-national network system207.  
    These groups remain non-state actors without aspirations for territorial sovereignty, 
and this substantial point makes them and their aims very different from resistance 
movements historically tied to specific territorial identities and acting under the goal of 
national independence.  
     The third Gulf war and actions within it, on the contrary, are significant because of the 
exceptional nature of the legal terms on which the war was justified.  
     Hence, the new codex of jus ad bellum defined under the pre-emption strategy is 
selective and hierarchical because it is based on the imperative with us or against us.  
     This is why the construction of a category of enemy that could fit the post-Cold War 
order has proved to be essential in the deployment of a new political paradigm for the 
construction of coalitions and the legitimisation of military interventionism.         
    The analysis referred, for instance, to the fact that as much as anti-communism was not 
an end in itself but a means to maintaining an order208, the progressive identification of an  
Islamist threat assumed the same function in the new world order doctrine.  In this 
regard the political function of properly anti-Semitic futures during the establishment and 
enlargement of the sovereignty space of totalitarian regimes in Europe, is a very useful 
comparative element that brings to light the political meaning of specific special 
measures adopted by the US presidency within the framework of the state of exception in 
the course of the Afghani and Iraqi wars.        
                                                
207 See above: 3.  
208 Waltz 1979: op. cit. 200. 
 Within the structural similarities of world politics between the post-Cold War and pre-
World War II periods, a dominant aspect regarding ethnic-religious futures in order to 
construct an ideology internationally valid both because without sovereign borders 
assuring a system of alliances extendible to all fronts of world politics. 
    What it follows is a phase of enlargement: enlargement of the world's community of 
free market democracies as on of the principal outcomes of the Cold War was still in 
place especially with respect to an ideology based on the spread of free market209and 
democratic values. Through the logic of pre-emptive war therefore, the process of 
enlarging democracy qualifies the global national interest essential to the restructuring 
of hegemonic aims.   
     While the nature of the war is exceptional, permanent effects of the third Gulf war are 
globalised at the level of quality, space and time. The phenomenon of the democratic 
paradox is well known having negative effects on those countries where democracy is 
supposed to be spread.  What is at the stake in our analysis is the second level of the 
paradox for which the ideology of global democracy implies the ramification of 
undemocratic standards within the Western constitutional and jurisprudential system. 
This process confirms that the definition of the nature of the state depends on the means 
used to deal with challenges posed to the state of the system. 
    In this perspective, it is clear that the 2003 war is serving the transformation of the 
state of the system through the suspension of democratic principles and standards simply 
because these cannot allow a process of transformation outside the culture of multilateral 
compromises. The transatlantic crisis, in this regard, is no more about means of politics 
                                                
209 See Chapter IV for the conclusive remarks related to the economy of the Third Gulf war in transatlantic 
perspective.  
than it is about the nature of politics, and together with the nature of politics, comes the 
nature of sovereignty.    
     From an ideological perspective, the idiom "world order", especially with respect to 
its actual ideological components, remains indicative of an ambiguous project comprising 
two very different ideological concepts: one self-determinant and it refers to freedom-
democracy shaping a constitutional order, while the other results deterministic because it 
refers to powers-relations for establishing an outsider constitutional order. 
    The new world order ideology is introducing a transformation of three basic categories: 
the identification of the enemy; the construction of the friend; and the legitimacy of 
sovereignty. The global national interest aims to save the nation as a constituent power 
for global sovereignty and no longer as a constituted power of representative sovereignty.  
This entails a basic change in the nature of power enabling sovereignty. This change is 
mirrored, in fact, in the change that occurs in the construction of the source providing 
legitimacy to go ahead with war, from the realm of legacy to the realm of political-
ideology.   
     This has been the result of a long-term process.  With the third Gulf war in particular 
and to a certain extent with the intervention in Afghanistan210- the doctrine of world order 
has revealed the substance of its geopolitical meaning as a result of the policy of 
containment as an exceptional measure and the ideology of order set since 1990-91, 
including the definition of enemy and threat.    
                                                
210 The war in Afghanistan was fought without NATO but by "floating" coalition "of the willing" (German, 
French, Italian), introducing a model for future conflicts "that will," according to Rumsfeld: "evolve and 
change over time depending on the activity and circumstances of the country". Coalitions members could 
not share decisional responsibility neither on military or political matters. Given the actual status of 
instability in the country is still under questioning the US and capability to translate its military power into 
a political success.  
     As much as the ideological shaping of a new world order has been central to the US 
view of world politics, the ME has been central to this doctrine serving the deployment of 
the special measure of containment targeting the two Middle Eastern regimes. In fact, 
although the expression new world order was first coined by G. Bush on the occasion 
of a regional crisis, according to the US President, the war in the Gulf implied a broader 
view of a world order that expressed the larger goals important for public support when 
a liberal democratic state goes to war within the fundamental shifts in politics, that is the 
end of the ideological communist threat211.  
     This sentence clearly synthesizes a key point of analysis: the most important future of 
the period defined under the doctrine of new world order is not the status of war in itself 
but the condition of legitimacy necessary to the structure of international relations after 
the ideological collapse of the category of the enemy. The US as a victor of the Cold 
War, lost a main reference of legitimacy justifying military interventions in foreign 
countries and a leadership role in global security supported by a solid transatlantic 
understanding. 
   That is why in the wake of the second Gulf war, the expression also indicates the 
necessity to reach consent with Western allies in forming a multilateral coalition against 
Saddam. After the war, however, the central aspect of the doctrine has remained the 
necessity of legitimizing the system of sanctions that has targeted leading ME regimes 
and Arab countries including Libya at detrimental to ME-EU relations212.  
                                                
211 Toward a New World Order", Bushs speech to the Congress (11 September 1990): Eric A. Miller and 
Steve A. Yetiv 2001: The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview 
in Transition, at http./unitedelite.net/bush.html 
212 This western-American approach characterized by the use of diplomatic coercive measures against ME 
countries has produced the growing feeling among Arab populations that the new world order is aimed 
against them. Mohammed Sid-Ahmed 1994: Toward a Floating World System: An Arab Reading of a 
World in the Making, 258ss.        
     Finally we focused on what Agamben defines as the strategy of exception in order 
to find a central aspect in the realm of contemporary politics drawn by the practice of US 
foreign policy and the establishment of the new world order doctrine.  
    A critical question stemming from Agambens identification of the state of exception 
as grounded on the roman institution of Iustitium is, obviously, about the nature of the 
purposes:  why the new world doctrine needs a space of legal void in order to assert a 
state of security.  
      We presume, first and logically, possibility for enlargement is based on the existence 
of a void. The ideology of a legal order based on the instatement of a void space in the 
law itself mirrors the logic of pre-emptive war on global terrorism serving as 
instrument for political power in order to extend the space of governance.  
     The enlargement is a phase that follows the creation of a void, for it pre-emption 
recalls the etymology of making empty before (pre-emptere). In this sense, the state of 
exception is fully a strategy of hegemony that inactivates itself when the stage in the 
degree of hegemony enters a new circle: the ideological narrative of pre-emption make 
void first- covers the function of founding a new circle in the shape of the order which, in 
practice, refers to political reality.  
     Second and conceptually, the exception is necessary when this space of enlargement 
intends to go outside the national border of sovereignty, that is, to add a global dimension 
at the national realm. This can also explain a future of the dual structure of an existing but 
suspended constitutional law together with the instatement of a state of exception, 
following a paradigm that, as it is well known, has characterized the constitutional and 
political nature of modern totalitarian regimes213.  
    The state of exception, therefore, is essential in the paradigm of the new world order 
because it functions for the introduction of changes in the system by deposing the 
existing law and creating a void in the jurisprudence. The void allows to the resolution of 
political crisis by means that lie beneath the realm of force. In other words, exceptional 
measures need a rule outside of where they exist.  Since the institution of a new codex of 
law would need a constituent process, a permanent state of exception does not aim to 
substitute the existing law, but to coexist next to it. In this light, the politics of 
unilateralism could be the sole possibility of engaging in a change of sovereign regime as 
a specific aim of the third Gulf war.  
    Finally, we may see how the ideological construction of a world order doctrine serves 
as a political instrument for a global dimension of the US geo-political interest. 
    The war on global terrorism offers the unconventional ground on which the US 
approach to international relations has organized its ideological power in order to extend 
the space of its military posture in key-countries from the ME to central Eurasia countries 
-within or outside of the NATO framework- vis-à-vis political competitors such as the 
EU, or former antagonists such as Russia. 
    The third Gulf war is the emblematic passage of this approach to IR and introduces a 
set of outcomes from which it is possible to see the strategic goals of the US in world 
politics, especially with respect to the greater Middle East project.  
 
                                                
213 Agamben study on the distinction between formal dictatorship and historical totalitarianism underlines 
the political significance of the state of exception as a special instrument of government in modern 
dictatorship:  Agamben 2005: op. cit. 48ss.      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III 
 
The Significance of the Eurasian landscape 
 
  3. Geopolitics of new world order        
     A key outcome related with the political-ideology of the new world order consists in 
the relevance given to the geopolitical factor, in  which American view of its post cold 
war role is framed within a sphere of influence encompasses to the entire world. This is 
reflected in maps issued by American policy-makers whereby the geography of the world 
is defined by the political orientation of individual nations, which they group in 
democratic and not democratic nations214. To a certain extent, the redefinition of this 
global sphere of influence mirrors a crisis inherent in the relationship between territory 
                                                
214 Freedom House produces the Map of Freedom in which the advancement of American geopolitical 
expansion was represented by 88 countries defined to as free, 55 as partially free and 49 as not free 
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and political order under defined borders on which the modern concept of sovereignty is 
grounded.  
      The progressive deterritorialization of the political space of sovereignty runs in 
parallel to the emergence of other spaces of power through which global sovereignty is 
exercised by the superpower. According to this paradigm of global sovereignty, there 
are three main spaces of power: military power, technology, economy and 
communications215. Non-state actors, lacking the capabilities of a nation state, are unable 
to compete with the superpower in the first two fields.  Together with the construction of 
ideological values however, they can be effective thanks to communication networks and 
profit gained from financial markets216. 
     In this international environment however, the superpower retains a certain supremacy 
in all the four spaces of power.  It is especially through the possibilities provided by its 
military capabilities that the relation between geography and politics is also established a 
capability that the EU for example is yet to develop.  
     The effective supremacy in this sphere of power grants the US the basis for 
unilaterally assuming the right to promote and defend democratic values outside its 
borders of sovereignty as a form of national interest, thereby excluding other global 
players from autonomously advancing their goals and interests in the same space of 
power217.  
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      The geopolitical value of the Eurasian region has re-emerged as a central issue in 
world politics together with the strategic function of the Greater Middle East project that 
has became essential to the US vision of a global strategy following the military 
occupation of Iraq in 2003.  The ME corresponds perfectly to the concept of rimland 
around the central area of interest218  the heartland being Eurasian ex-Soviet countries - 
where the US has enlarged and reinforced its military-strategic alliance during the period 
of the dual containment policy.  It has done so by strengthening the role of Turkey-Israel 
relations vis-à-vis Iran, the other principal competitor in the rimlands border, with a 
view towards central Asian countries.  
     While the US primary interest in the area lies in the possibility of expanding and 
consolidating US global hegemony, the strategic value of the rimland mainly derives 
from its function as an area of containment, and as a military foothold.  As such, control 
of this area may also bring with it supremacy over the heartland.  
    In this regard, Brzezinski has introduced a new definition of the ME, which he refers to 
as the Eurasian Balkans219, underlying the importance of the region with relation to 
Eurasian politics following the demise of the Soviet empire.  
 
3.1 The Greater Middle East: The Global Source of Strategic Power 
                                                
218 In the words of Spykman: Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; Who rules Eurasia controls the 
destinies of the world. With regard to Mackinder the father of the geopolitical analysis based on the 
division between hearthland powers and sea powers  Spykman has overcome this division focusing, 
instead, on the centrality of rimlands control in the shaping of alliances sistems. Nicholas J. Spykman 
(1944): The Geography of the Peace, quoted in Douglas E. Streusand 2004: Geopolitics Versus 
Globalization, 36ss. 
219 Zbigniew Brzezinski 1997: The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.  
     This paragraph seeks to analyse the major strategic goal of the third Gulf War as the 
creation of a wider geopolitical entity that, far from being a homogeneous cultural reality, 
is intended to serve as an enlarged space of alliances supportive of US global hegemony.  
    Such a space runs from central-east to western Eurasian countries, passing through the 
Middle East.  
    The corridors of a vast pipelines map that run from Afghanistan and that seek to reach 
a contended pro-western Turkey220, run through both Iraq and Iran which include key 
portions of territory essential to connect Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries.  
    Iraq in particular is essential to establishing strategic control over the entire Eurasian 
region.  
    Achieving this end requires a system of containment that limits an effective Iranian-
Russian alliance. In parallel, the ideological value of this objective lies in the 
reorganization of the western system of power between the US and the EU under 
American military leadership.  This leadership role is legitimated by the continuous state 
of preventive war against global terrorism, identified as the armed expression of political 
Islamism which aims to assume the status of sovereign actor in nation-state system.  
    The term backlash states" has been used to express this new range of threats towards 
American interests, as a response to which the United States had to devise strategies to 
contain and eventually transform rogue regimes221. The aim of the dual containment in 
the ME policy was to create a favourable balance of power in the region by relying on 
America's strengths and those of its allies222.  
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     Nevertheless, although Iran and Iraq were considered to be particularly troublesome 
since they not only defy non proliferation exports but border the vital Persian Gulf, a 
key point has been the potential of their geo-strategic power in conjunction with new 
spaces of influence that have emerged in Eurasia: The end of the Cold War and the 
emergence of newly independent states in eastern Europe have the potential to enlarge 
dramatically the family of nations now committed to the pursuit of democratic 
institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the 
promotion of collective security, but which choose to remain outside the family but also 
assault its basic values223.  
    Therefore, the GMEs projects foremost political advantage stems from the enduring 
status of a world emergency that allows the US to maintain its strategic supremacy 
among western powers in the post-cold war era, by securing the geographical means by 
which to transport energy resources. 
    
 
 
 
Reality and Contradictions in the Greater Middle East project  
    The invasion of Iraq has followed a Greater Middle East project presented for the first 
time in February 2003 as an unofficial working paper for the G8 summit of June of the 
same year224. The document introduced a comprehensive vision of a new region 
identified under the name of the political space (the Middle East) where American 
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leadership is, to a large extent, already consolidated, and announced the extension of this 
space of power (Greater).  The title of the document  The G8-Greater Middle East 
Partnership - intended to present the project as a joint Euro-Atlantic venture. The 
project recalls the existence of initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and 
the US Middle East Partnership Initiative that, although rivals on the ground, are 
presented by the project as if they were complementary. Thus, with the underlying aim of 
reorganizing western initiatives under the US umbrella, the project refers to the necessity 
of developing a common plan for reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq based on 
multilateral efforts. War and the reconstruction of both Afghanistan and Iraq are 
therefore presented as part of the same policy.  
     The initiative also proposes the creation of a Greater Middle East Development Bank 
to work towards the economic transformation of the new region, similar to the process 
undertaken by the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe225. In 
substance, the initiative promotes the creation of a free market zone, hardly a new  trend 
in the history of ME in that Arab countries have promoted several of these in the past, 
facing numerous obstacles in the process.  As with the numerous attempts at political 
union that have been undertaken in the region, especially under the Pan-Arabism 
ideology, initiatives towards economic integration have also encountered serious 
difficulties, primarily because of the structure of domestic production which, at the 
present time, remains unfavourable to the development of intra-Arab trade226.      
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      Due to the various political and economic structures of all the countries included in 
the region, criticism of the difficulties encountered by the GME project have tended to 
focus primarily on the definition of a region that does not exist. According to the 
project, the new region should include a vast range of countries from North Africa to the 
Persian Gulf227 although there is no geographical nor cultural justification for such a 
grouping228. The problem with the projects definition, however, lies not only in the 
aspect concerning geographical delimitation but especially in the requirement that the 
projects regional partners should be agreed upon its objectives and on the policies 
adopted towards achieving these.  
    For instance, since the state of Israel is geographically and politically part of the 
region, the feasibility of the GME project is necessarily conditioned by the future 
development of the ME conflict. However, the project puts forward the integration of 
Israel into the region without mention of the Palestinian issue. Thus, a key factor 
influencing the success of the project implies a realistic solution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, on which the whole idea of regional integration is dependent. The relationship 
between the conflict and the evolution of the project, therefore, is an issue essential to 
redefining a common strategy of the western front. This is not a new factor in the 
structure of the region and any strategy that seeks to promote stability in ME must clearly 
confront this main constraint229.  
                                                
227 With respect to the Atlantic view of the project a consensus is reached over the inclusion of Morocco, 
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     A new element has emerged in the nature of the conflict however, stemming from the 
dynamics of the initiative, and which arguably began with the occupation of Afghanistan.  
This dynamic is the mechanism of a project that tends to  merge specific, complex 
problems under a wider system of classification in which the unique nature of the ME 
conflict is labelled as another threat of global terrorism. In this regard, some American 
and Europeans analysts believe the greatest danger for Western society is the threat of 
Islamism outside the West230, yet this theory was undermined by the attacks that took 
place in the heartland of Europe231.  Instead, the principal reason for promoting this inter-
regional network of relations is to address all the root causes of terrorism and regime 
instability that are viewed in relation to the fundamental crisis of modernization in the 
whole Arab world.  This crisis is characterised by a lack of political freedom, corruption, 
economic stagnation, the absence of the rule of law and reliable legal systems, 
inappropriate market economies, insufficient education systems, and gender inequality232.  
In the face of such an immense task (from the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, to the process of modernization of the Arab world, to the threat of global 
terrorism) an important question arises: why the necessity to enlarge the sphere of causes 
by enlarging the ground on which the problems spread? Indeed, the real problem in 
analysing the Greater Middle East project is that its range of objectives is simply too vast.  
    While apparently ignoring the incongruence related to the complexity of the ME and 
the Arab world, the GME project nevertheless seeks to create a region where an opening-
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system strategy based on institutional structures, governed by a joint Western 
cooperation, is applied. The grouping together of North African and Middle Eastern 
countries as MENA for example, is a reminder of an already-existing European project 
which was the result of a long-rooted interregional dialogue based on a cooperative, not a 
pre-emptive approach with Near and Middle Eastern countries. Thus, the first interesting 
feature of the American initiative lies in the attempt at embracing soft-power rhetoric and 
mechanisms in rivalry with EU expertise in order to shape an artificial geo-political 
entity.   
    The GME directly involves the redefinition of the trans-Atlantic partnership in terms of 
a new assessment of sectors of political influence. Although the initiative seems 
unrealistic, it is relevant in the sense that it has revealed the lack of homogeneity between 
transatlantic partners on the issue. In relation to the GME strategy, the most crucial 
question to be addressed is not about defining the nature of the main problem to be solved 
(i.e. if terrorism is the result of social inequality or a means to maintain social inequality; 
if terrorism is based in asymmetric conflicts that stem from social and political 
inequalities, but which is also explained by failures in international policies).   
    The most important issue, as in the case of the fierce transatlantic dispute over Iraq at 
the UN, is that the project covers the struggles for power over political leadership 
between the EU and US in East Europe, starting with the consolidation of hegemony in 
the rimland by the use of means that deepen the policy gap between leading EU countries 
and the US.  
      The purpose of the American initiative, therefore, is not a realistic appraisal of the 
project, but rather an attempt to address the divergences in the transatlantic sharing of 
tasks, particularly enhanced by French and German aspirations for more proactive role in 
decision-making regarding political and strategic issues. Above all, this objective may 
find a major reason in containing those countries such as Germany and France, whose 
opposition to the invasion of Iraq boosted their respect and credibility in the Arab world. 
The project might serve as a mean to compromise the relations between European 
mainstream countries and the forces of change in the region, which consider the former 
important allies. The consequence for Europeans would be to lose much of the political 
capital earned through their limited support of Arab rights and miss a historic chance for 
partnership with the forces of change in the region233.     
    Even more striking, while the GME objective of regime change in Istanbul and 
Baghdad gave the green light necessary for advancing American strategic positioning in 
the region, the political purpose of the US administration is to bring the EU nearer to the 
US Middle Eastern policy concerning the management of post-war Iraq. This involves 
the redefinition of the transatlantic partnership in the context of a new ME with a new 
Iraq, and the role that should be played by the western partners in the region. In 
particular, it seeks to avoid conflicts of interests that are likely to emerge between the 
Gulf Cooperation Council and the Barcelona Process, complicating the delicate issue of 
stabilising and rebuilding Iraq234, the most relevant issue for a European Union policy in 
the ME. Competition between the EU and US in the Greater Middle East has emerged 
several times since the 90s -either directly through the EU or through the individual 
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attitudes of key EU members states235.  As such, the results of the initiative are interesting 
in that they use the opportunity to re-establish transatlantic relations as a cornerstone of a 
world order whose focus is a new geo-political entity that ultimately seeks to merge the 
politics of the ME with those of the Eurasian region into one strategic block.  
 
3.2 The Middle East as the Geopolitical Rimland of Eurasia  
     Throughout history, the Eurasian region has always been a centre of political power 
contended by the Great Empires.  
    After the demise of the Soviet Union, a new aspect has emerged however: for the first 
time, an outsider power has begun to deploy a strategy for assuming the leadership of the 
grand chessboard or world's axial supercontinent236. Brzezinskis theory posits the 
search for global dominance as the rationale behind the US interest for hegemony in 
Eurasia, in that the US is the first and last truly global superpower.  
     The region,  in turn, can be considered as the worlds geo-political centre bordered by 
three current regional-leading players, the EU-Germany, Russia and China237.  
     The vast area of ex-Soviet influence - which is still in the process of domestic post-
communist reforms and the focus of intra-regional conflicts238 - came to represent an 
important source of global power for which a complex system of alliances remains 
uncertain.   
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    The relevance of this fluctuating system of regional politics in Eurasia is enhanced by 
the presence of existing or planned corridors for the transportation of oil and gas from 
East to West, from Afghanistan to the Balkans, and most importantly,  from East to Far 
East especially through the corridors connecting Afghanistan to Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan to Turkey and Kazakhstan to China (see map, fig 1).  
    The pipelines map illustrates the strategic importance of transportation corridors in line 
with a shift of attention from oil production systems in the ME to resource transportation 
corridors in central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans239. Any oil and gas supplies that 
lessen the political risk associated with OPEC-ME240 can be considered a critical new 
source of strategic power making Eurasian politics central to the American search for 
global hegemony.    
     After the fall of the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan and with the occupation of Iraq in 
particular, the ME has acquired a new political and strategic meaning fully explained by 
the American project for a GME that makes the ME the political paradigm for the 
redistribution of power in Eurasia.  
     Russia and Iran represent the two regional players key to the formation of such a 
strategic map, where coordinated economic interests intersect with the competing 
political interests of local and powers outside of the region.  
 
The Role of Iran  
    While the US has opted for a policy of containment against countries such as Iran that 
are opposed to US regional policy, it has also shown itself willing to form ad hoc ties 
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with these key countries that.  This highlights that despite the growing constraint of 
American pressure in the region, such countries are still important points of reference in 
the regional balance of power.  
    Due to geographic and historical reasons for instance, Irans regional and inter-regional 
policy has the greatest advantage in connecting ME and central-east Asian politics. 
Together with China, Iran has frequently voiced opposition to the US military position in 
Central Asia and the two countries are cooperating against US strategic interests there241.  
    Even more important is the recent India-Iran alliance that gives India ''the right to use 
Iranian military bases in the event of a war with neighbouring Pakistan, in exchange for 
India providing Tehran with military hardware, training, maintenance and modernization 
support''242.   
    Yet, the issue central to Iran remains the political role played by domestic politics in 
Iraq. The historical visit of the Iraqi PM Jaafari to Tehran in 2005243 underlines the 
fundamental importance of the creation of a quiescent Shia government in Iraq that can 
act at best, as mediator of American interests in the region.  At worst however, it can also 
serve as an unmanageable ally of the new, hard-line Iranian presidency244 looking to 
escape regional isolation and containment. Reactions in Washington have been critical of 
the Iraq-Iran initiative. 
    A Shia block outside of US control is a difficult challenge to the American 
management of a post-Saddam Iraq governed by an ethnic-democratic system of 
representation.   
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    The meeting in Teheran apparently went beyond political matters and served to 
confront prospects for connecting the two countries with a corridor for the transportation 
of oil from Basora to Abadan245.  
    Basoras historical role is well known as being that of a key centre of both economic 
and strategic importance in that it serves as Iraqs only access to the Persian Gulf.  
    The city and its surroundings are also well known for their role in the making of the 
Iraq-Iran war when the district of Basora became a crucial point of military 
confrontations246.  
    In turn, Abadan - with its oilfields such as Kharramshahr and Ahvaz - was a major 
strategic objective leading Saddam Hussein to initiate the war against Iran in order to 
expand Iraqi control of the att al-Arab, which lies between the two countries247. 
    The significance of a Basora-Abadan linkage is not limited to the sphere of economic 
relations however. The political relevance of the city was demonstrated when Basora 
became tragically famous in 1991 during the Shia revolt against the regime that spread 
throughout the south of Iraq.  As the  main  of the revolt, the city was subjected to 
massive repression by the regime248.  
    The deal for the construction of a Basora-Abadan corridor, if based on American 
guidance, still represents a risky in the development of the relations between the Shia 
components of the two countries. Above all, such a possibility can also place Iran in the 
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new light of a regional power as the real and undesired political victor of the Third Gulf 
War.   
   Alternatively, the new Iraq might play the role of a Trojan horse vis-à-vis the Iranian 
system of government based on the strict application of the velayat e-faqih. 
  Indeed, the model of a Shia laic exercise of sovereignty established in multiethnic 
Iraq is one of the greatest challenges to Iranian domestic stability249.  
   Reactions of American officials at the attempt to establish ties with the Iranian 
government are thus, are even more understandable in that the initiative was made during 
one of the most critical circumstances for the meaning and success of the US-led war in 
Iraq, i.e. before the final approval of the Iraqi constitution250 and during the delicate 
planning phase of the multi-forces exit strategy.   
    This overall view can also be confirmed by the compliance that Irans former 
leadership showed in support of the American objective of regime change.  This is 
evidenced in the decision to grant the Iraqi Shia representative in Tehran, Baqir al-
Hakim, the freedom to deal with the Americans for the establishment of a democratic 
post-Saddam Iraq prior to the decision to invade Iraq was made official251.  
     However, although Tehran has shown a preference towards real politik as the example 
above illustrates252, the post-third Gulf War Iran opted to display the political capacity to 
confront American pressure by announcing the re-opening of the nuclear centre of 
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Isfahan before the US-backed mediation of UK-France-Germany could succeed in the 
advancement of negotiations253.  
    The EU-3Gs proposal was finally refused by Tehran. To a certain extent, the issue of 
the proliferation program has become the sole lever of deterrence that Tehran has against 
the US politics of isolation and the occupation of the Iraqi territory. 
     The need to confront this isolation has forced Iran to look for alternative possibilities 
and build out-of-area coalitions that can compete with the US, as in the cases of China or 
Russia.  
 
The Role of Russia 
    On the level of inter-regional politics, relations between Iran and Russia became a 
source of balance against US interests in Eurasia, particularly with regards to Iraq.  
Russias support of Irans proliferation program254 is highly problematic for American 
diplomacy255 and not just because must protect the terms of alliance with its regional 
allies such as Israel, which has become the principal political subject of Iranian nuclear 
threats256.  
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     The American strategy of destabilization of traditional settings, which began with the 
occupation of Iraq, is not limited to the ME in that one of the principal strategic meanings 
of the GME is the expansion of US influence deeper into central Asia and west Eurasian 
countries.  
    The continuing status of emergency in Iraq allows the US administration to station 
permanent forces in Central Asias ex-Soviet countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia257 
where, moreover, a strategy of democratic destabilization took hold during the course 
of the Orange Revolution258.  
     Nevertheless, together with Turkey, the two countries also signed the Turkey-
Georgia-Azerbaijan anti-terrorist pact in 2002, in the framework of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline project to which the US has given discreet support259. The Eurasian 
map for resource transportation is therefore following the deployment of military forces 
and the building of political alliances, against which Moscow and Teheran emerge as 
poles of opposition against the US, albeit to differing extents.  
     Yet, since the US is likely to retain bases for air and ground forces in Iraq260 this will 
grant a strategic position from which to consolidate its power in Central Asia at the 
expense of Russias regional aspirations. The purpose of these bases lies in maintaining 
and augmenting force deployments throughout southern ex-Soviet countries and 
reinforcing them from Iraq or vice-versa261.  
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      Moreover, the Iraqi resistance against American troops has also become a source of 
instability for Central Asia and the Caucasus262, threatening Russian political capability 
to be influential in the region through traditional and often repressive pro-Russian 
leaderships.  
     Indeed, the war in Iraq already has weakened Russias strength in the region. President 
Putin has the difficult task of mediating between domestic pressure exercised by foreign 
policy and military elites that dislike American military access to Central Asian 
countries, and the presidencys policy of cooperation with the US.  
     This policy was initiated after September 11 and aimed, above all, at bringing the US 
nearer to Russias interests to preserve some security control in its former areas of 
influence.  
     In fact, while the US is prolonging its deployments in Eurasia, Russian economic 
policy is seeking to maintain preferential agreements with the weakest countries in the 
region, as the new gas deal with Turkmenistan indicates263. Moscow has intensified 
pressure on Turkmenistan to conform its exports of natural gas to Russian preferences in 
order to realize its goal of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) cartel for energy 
resources under Russian leadership264.  
                                                
262 Kazakhstan, but above all in the Ferghana valley including Tajikistan, Khirghizstan and Uzbekistan: the 
revolt in Uzbekistan against Karimovs regime take place between  12-16 May 2005. Jeremy Page  2005 
(20 May): Troops end Uzbekistan revolt and detain rebels, at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-
1620110,00.html  
263 With the highest rate of unemployment of the region, Turkmenistan is however rich of natural gas. Igor 
Torbakov 2003: Russian-Turkmen Pacts Mark Strategic Shift for Moscow in Central Asia, at 
www.eurasianet.org. 
264 Oil and gas sector is the crucial sector of Russia's economy, providing almost 40 percent of Russia's 
hard-currency earnings and the basis of its foreign trade surplus. Ariel Cohen 2003: The Putin-
Turkmenbashi Deal of the Century: Toward a Eurasian Gas OPEC?, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, at  
www.ln.mis.ru/website/dip_vest.nsf  
     Significantly, natural gas has acquired a renewed importance next to oil  and nuclear 
energy - especially since western countries have adopted a more balanced policy towards 
diversifying their energy resources in an attempt to circumventing he instability of oil 
markets instability265.  Indeed, the US is supporting Moscows search for alternative 
energy resources266.  
     The CIS however, is a Commonwealth project framed in the regional coalition of the 
Collective Security Treaty, for which Moscow has already grouped together Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Byelorussia, where it has deployed or reinforced its 
military presence267.  
    Yet, the American military status from the Caucasus to central Asia is no less 
important than the Russian presence, with US troops positioned in Georgia,  Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (and obviously, in Afghanistan)268. The course and outcome 
of the third Gulf War therefore, is tied to an intensification of a US-Russia struggle for 
influence over the military and political destiny of Central Asia and the Caucasus269.  
    Nevertheless, the reconstruction of is also Iraq central to Russian national interests and 
consequently, to the future development of Russia-US relations.  
                                                
265 Since 2001 when the military presence in the Gulf started to affect sensibly oil market price (adding $14 
bd) western analysts renewed the debate about the structural instability of energy supply and the necessity 
to find alternative ways such as the massive use of wind turbine. Nevertheless, this option enlightens both 
advantages and costs: above all because it implies expensive economic resources in the West front and, not 
lastly, would dramatically reduce the role of an essential market-resource in the ME front. See Simon 
Jeffery 2001: Military presence in Gulf 'fuels oil price', The Guardian: 30 October.  
266 Nick Mikhailov 2002: Russian pipelines set for expansion, 62-8. 
267 Russian troops were redeployed in Armenia since 2002 and are still present in Georgia and Abkhazia; in 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan renewed bilateral treaties grant Moscow the use of local basis for Russian 
military and reinforced posture in Tajikistan while has anticipated the US in occupying the aero-basis of 
Kant in Kyrgyzstan. Blank 2003: art. cit. 57ss.         
268 US basis in Caucasus and Central Asia 
269 Igor Torbakov 2001: Moscow Seeks to Take Advantage of Iraq Conflict to Reassert Its Leadership in 
CIS,  at www.eurasianet.org   
    Since the beginning of the third Gulf crisis, Moscow has tried to rely on the UN's 
power both to project its own influence inside the multilateral mechanism and to 
constrain and limit American unilateralism270.  
    Firstly, fro the Russian perspective  as with that of the EU, France and Germany - the 
UN should have had the role of arbiter in any use of force by the US. The UN, in fact, 
would have assured that the US would not disregard other national interests so that 
Russian preferences would also have to be considered, especially with respect to post-
Saddam Iraq271.  
     Even though the crisis over Iraq was likely to increase, from 1997, Russia has opened 
important deals with the Iraqi regime among which the most significant remains the 
lucrative accord obtained by the Russian Lukoil Company for the investment of billions 
of dollars in the south of Iraq272.  
    Russia has tied the future of an important part of its national economic interests273 to a 
regime that most probably would not have had the opportunity to meet the terms of these 
engagements.  Yet these investments in Iraq remain a valid bargaining chip with the US 
for the role Moscow wishes to retain in post-Saddam Iraq and in the new world order274.  
                                                
270 Ferguson 2003: Russia: UN Should Have Central Role in Iraq, The Russia Journal: 11 May, at 
www.russiajournal.ru/news/cnewsarticle.  
271 Furthermore, the UN system offers the possibility to be integrated in what Russians call 'Western 
Civilization'': Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova 2002-2003: America, Russia and Europe: a Realignment?, 
129. 
272 $ 6 billion for research in West Qurna-2 one of the major Iraqi oil fields; more lucrative accords were 
also signed after the Lukojl affaire. Afp 12/12/2002 ///  
273 Oil and gas sector is the crucial sector of Russia's economy, providing almost 40 percent of Russia's 
hard-currency earnings and the basis of its foreign trade surplus. Michael Wines 2002: Tempted by Oil, 
Russia Draws Ever Closer to Iraq, New York Times: 3 February.  
274 This expression before the American leadership has been used first by the Russian Presidency in 1990 in 
occasion of the Stockholm Summit.   
     The same bargaining game involves the controversial issue of Iraqi debt to the Soviet 
Union and to Russia, amounting to some US$30 billion, a debt that has become almost 
unrecoverable since the long period of embargoes that followed the war275.  
     Indeed, the prolonged instability in Iraq raises the costs of reconstruction and delays 
Iraqs return to the market which represents is the one possibility for reviving the 
countrys national economy.  
    At the same time, Iraqs return to full production and to the global market raises 
concerns in Moscow regarding the downward pressure on oil prices which is detrimental 
to the Russian economy276.  
    It is therefore worth noting that the US has initiated one of the most important deals 
with Russia for the sale and transportation of Russian oil to the US market277, an historic 
deal that passes through Croatia and the Atlantic would tie the national interests of the 
two former enemies and would recover at least part of Iraqs debt to Russia.  This would 
provide the Russian economy with access to the most solid western market, whilst also 
marking a political victory for the Presidency.  Moreover, opening the US American 
markets to Russia would allow the US to diversify its energy sources.   
    All in all, the American unilateral war in Iraq is more than the result of a failed UN 
system. Politically speaking, it is the new lever for building alliances and establishing a 
system of ethnic-religious blocks favourable to a balance of power under US control 
                                                
275 Russia claims that since 1990 had lost about £30 billion: Wines 2002: art. cit. ibid. 
276 The risk explains the importance for Russia of investing in Iraq. See the opinion of Russian experts in 
www.stratfor.biz/story.ne 
277 The two main projects (in Murmansk of Lukoil and in Druzba-Croatia of Yukos: see 
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnr34460.htm) stem from the Houston Summit of October 2002: 
We welcome the first delivery to the United States of Russian crude oil in July, and the proposal to build a 
deep-water port in Russia for energy exports. The White House: Joint Statement by President George W. 
Bush and President Vladimir Putin on Development of the U.S. - Russian Energy Dialogue, November 22, 
2002 in  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/0021122.html.   
through a strategy of regional instability. The GME project has already begun functioning 
as a political framework for granting legitimacy to US strategic interests regarding energy 
resource transportation systems and the related issue of military security in the core of 
Eurasia. 
 
3.4 Some Remarks on the Regional effects of the Third Gulf War        
     One factor of the instability stemming from the war in Iraq is the progressive 
regionalization of the character of the conflict.  This involves the participation of 
independent fighters from other countries of the region  a phenomenon known as the 
second front problem for the US. In this regard the geo-political role of Syria in terms of 
its lengthy border with Iraq, together with its protracted and deep historical control of the 
Lebanese political landscape278. The recent Lebanese crisis, in this light, may reflect the 
challenge of extending the threat of instability to a country still under the military control 
of one of Israels most powerful enemies, Hezbollah, whose ties with Tehran would be 
likely to strengthen in the face of possible Israeli-US pressure on both sides..   
   The creation of a Kurdistan region institutionalized within Iraqi territory may soften the 
minoritys aspirations for self-determination, but it is also likely to deepen tensions inside 
Syria279, where the Kurdish minority represents a powerful lever in any attempt to 
destabilise the regime in Damascus by means of domestic pressure. 
                                                
278 Syrian regime, however, is showing the willingness to cooperate with American requests: in June 2005 
the government launched a series of reprisals against internal and foreign dissidents supporting the flow 
of fighters toward Iraq. See www.publiuspundit.com/ 
279 See the riots that kept the Kurdish city of Qamishli under the siege of national army in 2004. The 
Kurdish minority in Syria is subject to apartheid rules and political repression by Damascus government 
while its population occupies the strategically most important and richest portion of the northern region of 
the country. Trombetta 2005: Limes.  
     Finally, the relevance of the Turkish role in the new redistribution of power confirms 
the USs progressive aspirations toward newly independent Caucasian and 
Transcaucasian countries where Iranian cultural influence is traditionally rooted280. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions. The Paradigm of Ethnic Fragmentation 
       This chapter has defined the third Gulf War as a system-transforming war. Having 
considered the institutional and ideological crisis that occurred within the western system 
of power during the 1990s, the military occupation of Iraq by the US-led coalition is 
serving to redefine an American sphere of influence which has been extended to the 
entire globe. Changes in world power relations have amplified the geopolitical function 
of the ME and its structural tendency towards instability, serving to advance the 
American strategy for a new world order.  
      The demise of the Saddam regime led the country into a status of chaos that keeps the 
entire region in condition of conflict, instability and uncertainty. With the aim of 
promoting a paradigm of global sovereignty based on both ideal and material sources of 
power, the geopolitics of the third Gulf War illustrate the fundamental linkage between 
the ME and the Eurasia regions, through Iraq. From this perspective, this chapter 
considered the ME and Iraq as the geopolitical rimland bordering a newly independent 
political landscape in Eurasia that represents the real center of interests between three 
global players: the US the EU and Russia. Thus, the strategic relevance of the third Gulf 
War can be explained by viewing the politics of Iraq as a means to extend the influence 
                                                
280 Fred Halliday 1996: Iran and Transcaucasia, 35.  
of the US leadership deeper into the Eurasian countries, at the expense of both the 
Russian and European political roles there.   
   The analysis of the GME project, announced prior to the invasion of Iraq, has 
demonstrated the factual inconsistency of the project itself.  It nevertheless reveals the 
great significance of the political and ideological aim of reproducing an inclusive view of 
the region to compete with an already existing European projection of power in the ME 
and North Africa through the MENA initiative.  
    By using an ideology of democratic value together with military means, the Greater 
Middle East project means intends to establish a paradigm of ethnic fragmentation as a 
model of governance that allows the US to reassert political leadership and security 
hegemony over a vaster region than the ME.  
    For instance, the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, together with the 
growing pressure of the containment and destabilization of Iran, has alarmed Russian 
military elites due to the perceived threat to its own regional geopolitics of security281.  
    With respect to the GME project initiated with the occupation of Iraq, Russia and Iran 
came to share similar security concerns in that they were both militarily surrounded by 
US forces and politically isolated by the American-led coalitions, including key east 
European countries. The development of the war, in this light, is likely to lead to an 
intensification of relations between the two countries, especially if Russia is dissatisfied 
by the American redistribution of power in post-Saddam Iraq.  
                                                
281 In the words of the Russian military official Valerij Manilov  the occupation of Iraq would make 
easier for American troops already in Afghanistan, in Turkey and in the same Iraq surrounding Iran and 
then isolating Russia from the South of its borders. Quoted in S. Sumbaev 2002: Possible consequences 
for Russia of the US intervention in Iraq, in Krasnaja Zvezda: December.  
    The Turkish-Israeli-Egyptian alliance promoted by the US during the 90s282 has 
prepared the political ground for the US-led GME which is entitled to function in 
particular against Iran.  
     The progressive building of two blocs represents the salient aspect of the politics 
behind the third Gulf War and the GME project. This policy seeks to frame a system of 
alliances opposing Sunnis and others to Shia groups.  It was formulated following the 
American neo-conservatives assumption that the Arab world as political entity was no 
longer viable with the start of the second Gulf War, when regional cohesiveness was 
broken for the first time283.  
    An example of an ME-Eurasia linkage enhanced by the war in Iraq is illustrated by the 
coalition of interests between Sunni and Turkish groups, mirrored by the ideology and 
politics of one of the most active Islamist groups present in the Caspian region. The 
object of repression from states-governments  often ruled by pro-Soviet leaderships - 
Hizb Al-Tahrir is a Sunni force that refers to pan-Turkism ideology and calls for the 
reinstatement of the Caliphate system284. Ideologically speaking, it is not dissimilar to the 
role played by the fight against the hereditary form of sovereignty in the Shia philosophy 
of the Iranian revolution introduced by Khomeini285.  
                                                
282 See above: Chapter II.  
283Bernard Lewis 1992: Rethinking the Middle east, at 
www.foreignaffairs.org/19920901faessay5893/bernard-lewis/rethinking-the-middle-east.html  
284 It represents the bazaar class interests in a country, like as Tajikistan, still ruled by a strong centralized 
apparatus. The group -that has Palestinian-Jordanian origins- from Tajikistan became popular in all Central 
Asia countries after September 11 and the strong repression imposed by local government against political 
Islam. The history of Tajikistan during the 90s is exemplar: after the civil war following the demise of the 
soviet empire (1992-1997) the parliament was opened to political Islam (Party of Islamic Rebirth) but, 
however, the absence of concrete political achievements and the growing state-repression instigated the 
spread of clandestine groups that for their activities have often crossed intra-regional borders even to be 
present in Afghanistan. Vicken Cheterian 2005: US, Russia and China: the great game, Central Asias Five 
fragile states. Torn Between Nationalists and Islamists, Le Monde Diplomatique:  March.  
285 Sabahi 2003: op.cit. 75.  
    A similar standing of opposing blocks is that produced by the contest of the 
Russia/Chechnya and Armenia/Azerbaijan conflicts, where both Saudi-Sunni (pro-
Chechens) and Turkish (pro-Azeri) were involved against Russian interests. These 
conflicts are reminders of the importance of new projects for resource transportation that, 
next to the politics of the GME, serve to highlight its strategic relevance as source of 
global power.  
     Material and ideological powers together construct the global dimensions of the new 
world order pursued by the US to the exclusion of other global players, such as the EU.  
     The policy adopted against Iraq - as the first of the ex-Soviet allies to be targeted since 
1990 - intensifies the aspect of exclusion and exclusivity in the new geopolitical game 
and underlies the importance of enlarging the space of influence unilaterally in order to 
increase US global power.  
    The weakness of the regime in Baghdad since the crisis of Soviet influence stands at 
the same level as central Asian and Caucasian countries where a fierce struggle for 
domestic power is ongoing on between former ruling classes and Islamist forces286. In 
this contest of instability, the Iraqi regime was an obstruction to a policy of enlargement 
in Eurasia in term of its political weakness in the chain of alliances. Iraq represented a 
threat to being a possible regional player promoting special relations with outsider 
powers. In the words of Waltz, some states fight wars to prevent others from achieving 
an imbalance of power in their favour287.  
                                                
286 In May 2005 Andijon has been theatre of a harsh battle between protestors asking for the realising of  
Islamic militants jailed by the government and the police. The government has declared 173 people died, 
while eyewitness reports have suggested upwards of 700 protestors died. See 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/country_profiles/ 
1295881stm.   
287 Waltz 1979: op. cit. 204. 
    Finally, this chapter dealt with (a) economic and political interests which lie at the 
heart of the causal relationship between the occupation of Iraq and the prolongation of oil 
transportation roads passing through the ME as part of the GME project; (b) the level of 
geo-strategic objectives making the occupation of Iraq central to the GME plan in that it 
allows the US to enhance the American military status in the region and project its power 
into Eurasian territory in order to establish a security system in Central Asia countries 
under US supervision.   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Final  Conclusions 
 
The Third Gulf War 
 as a Reflection of Weakness in Sovereignty  
 
1. Comparing EU and US Paradigms of Power Projections in the ME    
   A common view among realist scholars sees the European agenda restricted to a set 
of economic interests.    
    During the Cold War the process of regional integration in Western Europe focused 
primarily on a model of balanced economic development that has been at the top of EC 
countries priorities since then. From the Suez crisis onwards, Western European 
economic interests have coincided with those secured by the US in the ME. EC founder-
members have broadly left the powerful victor of the Second World War the task of 
promoting initiatives and policies in the region, whether these involved trade sanctions or 
war. Thus, during the period of the East-West confrontation EC countries have generally 
opted for a policy of embedded cooperation with the US in the ME288.  
     Politically speaking, this choice has assured that EC countries have maintained some 
influence in the region under the common umbrella of a Western alliance, whose benefits 
are shared by transatlantic partners.  
                                                
288B. A. Roberson 1988: The Impact of the Superpowers on the Middle East, 23-35.   
    In a historical context dominated by specific factors of regional instability - such as the 
Israeli-Arab conflict - this policy of embedded cooperation has granted a system of 
Western security, which has given European countries the opportunity to invest resources 
in the development of the European project289.  
    In this regard, Kagan has defined the transatlantic partnership in the light of a 
functional division of tasks between the US and Europe for which the US has assumed 
the role of the guardian securing and granting European economic welfare. Kagans 
perspective, however, risks describing the transatlantic alliance as if its terms were the 
definitive and permanent nature of European-American relations.  
    For instance, it should be noted that other scholars have underlined the geopolitical 
relevance of Western Europe during the Cold War period for which the EC was at the 
center of equally fundamental interests for the US and USSR. In other words, this 
perspective tends to see the Cold War system more as tri-polar rather than bipolar as 
it allowed EC member-states to retain a certain strength in dealing with the transatlantic 
partner, as well as benefits for domestic welfare: Europe, leaving much of its defence to 
the Americans, concentrated instead on its own social stability and economic 
prowess290.   
    Thus, while losing a certain amount of geopolitical relevance, Western European 
countries have built a significant institutional framework in order to re-assess Europes 
role in the new world order, a framework that has been deployed in particular through a 
direct participation in ME politics.  
                                                
289Robert Kagan 2002: Power and Weakness, at www.policyreview.org/pastissues.html.   
290David P. Calleo 2003: Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU, 17-24. 
   An overall insight of transatlantic relations after the Cold War and throughout the two 
Gulf crises has shown that the nature of the transatlantic partnership came to be more and 
more dependent on, and qualified by the historical-institutional developments that began 
in Maastricht.  
     A constructivist approach is fundamental in underlining this aspect of change in the 
terms of transatlantic partnership and the progressive emergence of political divergences.  
     The ideological crisis stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed 
Western European countries to construct a new geopolitical role projected outside 
regional borders in a key region such as the ME, on which both the European process of 
regional integration and the new world order doctrine were dependent.    
     Just after the Cold War, Western European countries reached an important level of 
homogeneous welfare to which the reunification of Germany gave political stability next 
to economic strength291.  
    The construction of an emerging identity at the level of regional politics produced 
significant institutional change. Notably the reunification of Germany in 1990 together 
with the treaty of Maastricht in 1992-3, have changed the balance of power inside 
Western Europe.  Core EC founder-members that played a decisive role in the process of 
economic and monetary policy also became decisive in supporting a model of political 
integration based on a supranational form of regional sovereignty292.  
                                                
291 Germany had actually sought a special leadership role in the process: in 1992, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Kinkel stressed his country's unique responsibility, as the most populated and economically 
strongest country in Europe, "to send a signal of confidence in a common future to our still-hesitant 
partners; the German FM also claimed international responsibility for Germany especially between 1992-
93: Jeffrey S. Lantis 2002: Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since 
Unification, 61. 
292 With the treaty of Maastricht, signed on 7 February 1993, two new areas (the so called 
intergovernmental cooperation pillars) justice and home affairs and a common foreign and security policy 
were added to the existing EC structure: www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtext.html; 
    Thus, inasmuch as the nation-state has remained a key actor in the formulation of 
foreign policies293, convergences of mainstream national interests at the level of regional 
politics have increased the need to deepen the harmonization of foreign policies.  
     In keeping with the fact that external political issues are relevant a input for structural 
development, the ME in particular has always played a crucial role in the European 
project of regional integration and not just because of its wealth of natural resources294.   
   With respect to the process of regional integration, the analysis sought to identify a new 
range of EU interests in the ME through the strategies adopted to enhance and preserve 
them vis-à-vis the policy pursued by the transatlantic partner in the neighboring region.  
    In the construction of an identity to advance an EU geopolitical role, a main concern of 
mainstream European countries during the second gulf crisis was to contain US 
tendencies towards unilateralism.  This was done through strengthening the UN system 
and consolidating a multilateral approach that legitimized military intervention in the post 
cold war.  
The collapse of the Soviet bloc, together with the end of the second Gulf War produced a 
set of circumstances under which the US has started to change the terms of alliances in 
ME and enlarge its military coalition.  In parallel, the EU has concentrated its efforts  on 
redefining a political role and an independent sphere of interests with regional partners295. 
                                                
293 Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 2004: Explaining Governments Preferences for Constitutional Change in EU 
Foreign and Security Policy, 137-74. For (continental) institutionalist theory the process of regional 
integration reflects the same mechanism at the basis of nation-state building, especially with respect to the 
logic of treaty system.              
294 Indeed, western economic interests in southern regions reach of raw materials -such as the ME where oil 
was discovered in the late XIX century- have represented a primary source of interests in the age of 
colonialism driving the tendency to establish control over areas endowed with resources essential to 
western system of production. See Thomas Weiskopf 1974: Capitalism, Socialism and the sources of 
Imperialism, 57-136. 
295 See above Chapter I: Alternative Security Strategy.  
      The second Gulf crisis - despite a common view stressing the fragmentation factor as 
a predominant constraint for the effectiveness of a cohesive European foreign policy  
nevertheless opened the path for a distinctive European role in the region.       
    This new space included the need to assure and protect trading interests and market 
shares in the region, which have continued to be relevant to EU policy in the ME and 
North Africa.  
    The analysis, however, illustrates the strategic meaning that economic relations have 
for the construction of a new concept of inter-regional security.  
    A common European policy has been heavily characterized by economic commitment 
under the framework of the Mediterranean partnership.  The political involvement in the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process however, has also represented the driving force behind 
enhancing the EUs position vis-à-vis the partners in the EuroMed project. From this 
perspective, EU members interests in the ME cannot be reduced to economic affairs per 
se. The Union has, in fact, been gradually testing its post-Cold War role as dynamic actor 
in world politics by redesigning a political strategy of partnership with the MENA region 
that started with diplomatic participation in the MEPP, as a guarantor for the Palestinians 
side.  
     This development in EU-ME relations represents a stage in the emancipation 
strategy from the US security umbrella under which the EC, as a comprehensive 
community project, was locked during the period of the Soviet threat.  
     Indeed, a reversal in the quality of transatlantic relations is not surprising and has, for 
instance, been under discussion by prominent realist and neorealist scholars such as 
Kissinger and Waltz since the 70s, when the EC began to advance a primal system of 
intra-european coordination in foreign policy matters especially in response to the 
challenges stemming from ME instability which were critical to European interests296.  
    It is worthwhile citing the words of Waltz here on what the role of European countries 
should be from an American perspective: Although the US policy-makers may have 
worked for a united Europe few have considered its unfavourable implications as a great 
power297. This perspective, as it is well known, sees national-security as traditionally 
grounded in military capabilities and power relations, also characterising the nature of US 
hegemonic aspirations. Under the challenges of competition, the American Imperium, for 
Waltz, could not be constructed without a proper deal with the European issue. To 
address this problematic issue, Waltz stressed the importance of bringing European states 
separately under US influence298.  
    Most important to our analysis is the reason why the European issue has been 
perceived as a challenge. Although Waltzs reasoning uses realist concepts and identifies 
the possible-future enemy as a great-power, that is, an actor endowed with hard 
capabilities, his prediction nevertheless emphasizes the efficacy of purely political means 
for describing a threat stemming from the European Union: The principal pains of a 
great power  arise from the effects of policies pursued by other great powers, whether 
or not the effects are intended. That thought suggests that a united Europe would be 
troublesome299.  
    What to a neorealist perspective may appear a contradiction in terms of theoretical 
assumptions is instead clearly explainable using a constructivist analysis.  
                                                
296 See above Chapter I: Significance of the ME to a European Political Identity. 
297 Waltz 1979: op. cit. 202. 
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    Thus, if during the Cold War, the sharing of ideological values and main economic 
interests within the Western front constituted the basis for a compact range of mutual 
interests to defend in the ME, the EU sought to enlarge its sphere of political action with 
the shaping of a new world order that came to include specific strategic outcomes in the 
neighbouring region, such as political balance and security issues which had traditionally 
fallen under the military responsibility of the US leadership.  
     Since then, a distinctive European approach to ME problems has emerged and the role 
of the newly established Union deepened activities in matters of regional cooperation 
under an enlarged definition of security.  
     In this regard, it should be noted that the Cold War was not solely a system opposing 
the East-West fronts in the region.  As a bloc system the Cold War also had the function 
of preventing imbalances of power from emerging even inside the Western front. In the 
words of the American historian Gabriel Kolko NATO, from its very inception, 
served Washington as an instrument for maintaining its political hegemony over Western 
Europe, forestalling the emergence of a bloc that could play an independent role in world 
affairs. Charles DeGaulle, Winston Churchill, and many influential politicians envisioned 
such an alliance less as a means of confronting the Soviet army than as a way of 
containing a resurgent Germany as well as balancing American power supra300. After 
all, the European Community itself is an institutional framework that was created to 
safeguard a delicate balancing of national powers that re-emerged from two world wars, 
whose causes lay in the conflict of interests inherent to the system created by colonial 
empires.         
                                                
300 See Gabriel Kolko 2004: Iraq, The United States and the End of the European Coalition, av. at 
www.counterpunch.org/kolko1126.html. 
    The EU security strategy in the ME also included the necessity of stabilising 
relations with the US in the perspective of a harmonious sharing of influence in the area 
and, therefore, it had to be promoted in a way that would not conflict with those interests 
vital to the US.  
    Nevertheless, the period following the second Gulf war with the striking need to face 
the political and economic crisis in the ME also allowed Europe to facilitate the US 
position at the margins of diplomatic activities in some exceptional, but relevant cases 
such as the negotiations leading, first, to the Oslo Agreement and then to the Barcelona 
process. In parallel, US administrations during the 90s left the EU the task of redesigning 
the network of diplomatic relations in the region, while the American approach to foreign 
policy seemed to shift the focus of its priority from geo-strategic toward geo-economic 
activities, from ME to Far East301. This trend was reversed decisively again in 2003. 
However, this change in the American approach to the ME during the 90s is not radical 
or as definitive as it may have appeared, especially considering that from mid-90s 
onwards, American debates on foreign policy point out the necessity redefining it in 
favour of American leadership and augmented realism302.       
    Yet, one may ask if the EU and the US share a range of mutual interests in the region. 
During the first half of the 90s, both actors appeared to have a common view of strategic 
interests for which stability, throughout the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
was a main goal to achieve.  
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    Today however, this approach to ME instability seems much more in line with the EU 
preference for a soft power strategy than that which has been put into practise by US 
administrations over the long term, connecting (from 1990 to 2003) the military 
interventions of the second Gulf war with the sanctions policy against Iraq and the 
military option adopted in the third Gulf crisis.  
    In the course of this historical development, two categories of factors have emerged as 
constraints for redefining an EU approach to the regional politics.  One is related to the 
renewed role of the transatlantic partner, the victor of the Cold War, an increasingly 
stronger US in the region after the gap in power left by the collapse of the East bloc, and 
the other is related to the complex process of regional integration among European 
countries.  
    Not surprisingly, concerns for stability, whether they are perceived as focusing inside 
or outside European borders, became a common political dictate in the Union almost 
automatically.   
    Together with these circumstances, the asymmetrical division of tasks between 
transatlantic partners is a key factor in the development of two distinct and basically 
opposed paradigms of power projection in the ME. In fact, if the USs traditional role of 
leadership entitles it to provide most of the military capacity for deterrence, the EU 
projects its own role in the region as being the major trading partner of the ME.  
    As a result, the EU has become heavily dependent on the US security apparatus in the 
region that, during the last decade, became a key partner for European economic 
interests: As the competition for Middle Eastern markets between the States and the 
European countries intensifies this asymmetry has come to be increasingly resented on 
both sides303.  
    What emerges as a crucial point here, are the negative implications of instability in the 
ME for the EU, which is proportionally linked to the enhancement of an US political 
leadership justified by the instability itself.    
      The analysis developed the idea that transatlantic cooperation during the 90s was not 
really based on the identification of mutual long-term interests.  While stability in the 
neighbouring region is a compelling interest deeply tied to the success of the process of 
political union in an enlarged Europe, instability in the ME is also the instrument offering 
the US the means to reduce the European projection of political power and to enlarging 
its influence towards the Eurasian region.  
    Increased disagreements, therefore, have emerged over the assessment of regional 
threats to respective interests and appropriate means of dealing with them. The 
diversification of objectives in the first half of the 90s allowed an apparent level of 
transatlantic cooperation that finally ended when the Union policy became more directly 
interested in sharing decisional responsibility in the Gulf, in line with the multilateral 
instrument of the UN.  
    At the beginning of the third Gulf crisis, the EU had to face a new strategic dilemma in 
the ME because while the region kept its great economic relevance, it also became even 
more significant with respect to European geopolitical security.  
    From a European perspective the need to share political responsibility in the ME 
became essential to preserving political cohesion inside the Union itself, not only in the 
light of a Western European dimension, but especially in the newly enlarged Europe. The 
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prospect of eastward enlargement was declared in 1996 and the process itself coincided 
with tensions in transatlantic partnerships at the UNSC, ending with the decision to attack 
Iraq and the parallel enlargement of NATO.  
   It is, therefore, important to extend the meaning of the French-German alliance against 
the US policy to the outcomes that emerged during the second half of 90s and view the 
issue of regime change in Baghdad in the light of a Western European engagement for 
eastward enlargement.  
   With the advancement of the EU political project, the European view of an 
incontestable US leadership in world politics has changed304. The debate on whether the 
US is capable of eventually exercising such a role cannot dismiss what is in fact, one of 
its basic issues: terms and future developments in the transatlantic partnership have the 
power of affecting American possibilities to maintain a predominant role. Although based 
on powerful hard capabilities, in the long-run, American unilateralism if promoted 
without political support from a homogeneous European union would risk overstretching 
itself, directly affecting the ideal and not just the material sphere of sovereign 
capabilities.  
     We infer this prediction from a simple consideration of the concept of sovereignty in 
which, if it is true that it refers to the capacity of governing a space to the exclusion of 
others, it is also true that political next to military means play an essential part in the 
exercise of sovereignty, whereby the connection of these spheres of action is found in the 
power provided by the realm of legitimacy. In the long-run a world supremacy exercised 
without legitimacy will loose its main source of power.        
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2. Iraq, the US and the EU        
    The factor underlining the difference between the second and the third Gulf wars is the 
development of the two international crises, which sheds light on the specific aspects of 
the nature of the two wars.  
    In 1990, the crisis was opened by Saddams view of a post-Cold War order in the 
Middle East, a view that was translated into military action against Kuwait. The 
aggression of Kuwait was, indirectly, a challenge to the security system assured by the 
US in the Gulf305 and a direct violation of the system of international law under the UN 
charter.  In 2003, the crisis was brought to an end by military action against a sovereign 
nation -Iraq- in the absence of a proper casus belli, and against the whole system of 
international law.  
    An additional aspect, which is very much connected to the previous, regards the way in 
which the US faced the major political dilemma represented by the complex system of 
relations with Arab countries. During the second Gulf crisis, the Bush Senior 
administration needed to obtain at least partial regional legitimacy for deploying US 
troops and intervening in the area. Key-regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt 
and Syria were confronted both with internal hostility to the intervention of foreign 
troops against an Arab country, and at the same time, with the need to avoid suffering the 
negative consequences of a decision to stand against the US superpower without any 
other international power supporting their position.  
                                                
305 However, it is well known that unofficial sources refer how the US Ambassador Glaspie left Saddam 
understand that the US would not be concerned by an Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The point behind this 
question is whether Saddams major intention was an act of aggression primarily intended to challenge the 
US or just seeking to acquire more relevance in the regional contest.  See Transcript of Meeting Between 
Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (July 25) 1990, av. at 
www.totse.com/en/conspiracy/the_new_world_order/glaspie.html.  
     At that time, both the UN and the EC played a key role. For its part, the international 
community, through the body of the UN, provided an immediate solution to these 
political difficulties by providing the legitimacy necessary to justify the military 
intervention306. On the part of European countries, their involvement had the important 
task of managing financial issues and diplomatic relations with regional actors in order to 
pursue the overall strategy against Iraq307.  
    From this perspective, the structural weakness of the EC institutions in the 1990 Gulf 
crisis facilitated the prevalence of national interests among members-states. At that time 
however, at the level of transatlantic politics, fragmentation in Europe served as an 
instrument of flexibility in that face of US pressure.  
    The factor of fragmentation safeguarded prospects for the advancement of the 
European integration and the role of the Union in the ME in the post-second Gulf war 
period.  
    The condition for which European states have to be brought separately under US 
influence is a permanent factor of tension in transatlantic relations. Considering, with 
Waltz, that a European political union is a problematic issue to deal with, the process of 
the European Union that started after the second Gulf war represents a political obstacle 
to the USs maintenance of a new world order doctrine.   
   In particular, the analysis showed that the Iraqi issue has become central for the 
maintenance of a political lever of fragmentation that, since the country is located in a 
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307 European task, in fact, assured the Western alliance a successful dealing with Arab countries and, 
therefore, supported US administration overcoming difficulties in the regional dimension of the conflict by 
reducing diplomatic costs for the strategy of intervention. See above: Chapter I.  
key region for the political interests of the Union, could be used in order to assert the US 
leadership role and limit the Unions political role in the ME.  
    This reasoning is particularly significant if one considers that the MEPP process was 
working, from a European perspective, in order to settle the historical challenge 
stemming from the ME conflict, which was perceived as a factor destabilizing European 
cohesion in foreign policy matters with respect to the ME dilemma, in that it was trapped 
between the Arab and American-Israeli positions.      
    Conversely, in the wake of the third Gulf war, given the nature of the harsh political 
disagreement between leading EU countries and the US, reactions in the region have also 
been different than in the second.  
    The Main reason for both the Arab and European political standing has been the US 
strategic objective for regime change in Iraq and, as a consequence, the deepening of the 
US military position in the region in the light of a foreseeable status of instability in Iraq.  
    For instance, relations with Saudi Arabia were also further complicated by the 
discovery of financial links between charity channels passing through bank accounts 
owned by diplomats and members of the Al-Saudi family in the US and Al-Qaeda 
components involved in the September 11 attacks308. The monarchy, thus, did not miss 
the opportunity to reconfirm its support of the US ally, providing its own navies for the 
provision of oil to the US when Venezuelan strikes for oil transportation coincided with 
the Iraqi crisis309.  
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    Indeed, although some of the US military bases located in Saudi Arabia were removed 
in 2003310, the role of Saudi Arabia in containing the risks to oil markets derived from the 
general state of instability in the region, has been supportive of US strategy.  It is 
interesting to note that as much as the US economy is tied to Chinese and Japanese 
investors, since the beginning of the third Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia has opened important 
deals with South Korea, China and Japan providing more than the 50% of the energy 
resources of the Asian market311.   
    With regards to EU-US relations, the terms of competitiveness were enhanced in the 
contest for a freer multi-polar system since the first half of the 90s. 
    The 2003 transatlantic dispute has being considered as a reflection of different choices 
in foreign policy and strategic orientations after the terrorist attacks of September 11312.  
However, long before September 11, mainstream EU countries demonstrated a different 
view on how to approach ME instability, as in the case of the EU criticism of the dual 
containment policy and objectives.  
     For instance, great importance was given in Europe to the consequences of the 
American policy of instability introduced during a period of economic weakness in the 
region when austerity policies were adopted, especially among the Gulf States.  
    The economic crisis following the second Gulf war turned out to have negative effects 
on European trade interests.  In the delicate balance of European economic policies for 
the harmonization of national interests, the post -war crisis in the Gulf represented a 
serious challenge to political homogeneity.  
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Challenges and Cooperative Approaches. 
    The contest of the 90s witnessed, on the one side, the US laying the groundwork for 
pursuing a long-term strategy of military expansion while, and on the other, the economic 
consequences of this process falling on both regional and European allies.   
   It is in great part because of this asymmetric distribution of hard and soft power that has 
produced the deepest crisis since the end of the Cold War, between the American and 
European governments.  
     The American dual containment policy since the beginning of its formulation has been 
aimed at weakening the central power of the Iraqi regime, while reinforcing extended 
regional support for the US role of political and military leadership.  
    By opposing the regime change, mainstream EU countries sought to limit the 
enlargement policy initiated by the US, with the redefinition of alliances changing the 
whole balance of power in the region, especially with the intensification of 
Israeli/Turkish relations.  
     The sovereignty of the Iraqi regime became the determining factor framing the 
competition between the EU-US over relative political, security and strategic objectives.      
    The policy initiated by France at the UN for supporting the normalization -and 
integration- of Iraq in the regional system, represented a source of political power for the 
EU and its role in the ME. The progressive emergence of this political standing played an 
important part in the USs preference for the use of military means and the regime change 
solution.  
    Through the Franco-German alliance, the EU sought to shape its security and defence 
policy focusing on the two neighbouring regions vital to the advancement of the Union 
project: the ME and Eurasia.  
    Iraq and the ME have been a fundamental source of power for the European projection 
of a political identity outside its borders. 
     In the course of the analysis, we have often considered the relevance of the end of the 
Cold War as the historical event after which the terms of relations between leading 
Western powers changed significantly.  
    With the demise of the Soviet threat, such a change has been particularly favourable 
to  mainstream European countries Germany/France - that give input to the project of 
regional integration throughout economic means but with more definite political aims in 
intra-European, as well as in inter-regional relations.  
    During the 90s, the European agenda has been enriched by issues over security matters 
showing the changing nature of EU ties with the ME next to the Mediterranean region.  
   Moreover, the eastward enlargement of the Union announced in the middle of the 
decade has qualified an objective essential to Unions strategy with respect to a 
peripheral region that will come to represent a key aspect in the development of US 
foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. 
    Indeed, in as much as the formal end of the Cold War has not altered the substance of 
the USs tendency towards hegemony in world politics but has extended its possibility of 
action, the progressive consolidation of a European paradigm of power projection in 
peripheral regions such as MENA (with the MEPP) and Eastern Europe (with the 
enlargement) is the salient element of a new stage in transatlantic relations.  
    Iraq became the symbol of the changing nature of such a partnership vis-à-vis the 
US/EU geo-political objectives to expand their respective spheres of influence in a wider 
region that, after the US political discourse has been referred to as the Greater Middle 
East.  
   Due to its geographic location, Iraq can no longer be considered solely in the light of 
regional balance of power restricted to the ME.  
   No differently from the case of Afghanistan, and under many aspects even more 
emblematic, the country governed by an exhausted dictatorship became relevant as a door 
to the politics of the Eurasian-Caspian region where the game of alliances contested 
between Russia and the US- is still heavily challenged by the second country targeted in 
the dual containment policy: Iran.  
     At the height of the third Gulf crisis, the emergence of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis 
standing against the US plan for a radical change of regime in Baghdad exemplifies the 
core of our thesis: the third war against Iraq has the primary objectives of (a) containing 
the growing influence of the EU in ME and Eastern Europe resulting from the deepening 
of the EU process of political integration led by the German-France alliance; 
  (b) Reducing the possibility for the emergence of a stronger EU-Russia convergence of 
interests obstructive to a major US plan of enlargement in Eurasia.  
In this regard, we may note that the collapse of the Eastern order corresponds to the 
restructuring of the Western system of power, as shown by the crisis of the UN and the 
transformation of NATO from a defence pact into a political organization.  The reforms 
allow the creation of ad hoc coalitions for military intervention. The enlargement of 
NATO -1999- integrating Poland, Hungry and Czech Republic- enlighten another chief 
purpose of the post-Cold Wars phase of the organization, serving in particular the USs 
power projection in Eurasia.  
At the same time, the new strategic concept of NATO prevents the EU enlargement 
from being an effective instrument for consolidating the central power of core EU 
countries and, in particular, avoiding EU-Germany privileged influence in Eastern 
Europe including Belarus Ukraine and Balkan States.  
    The state of insecurity in Iraq and the increasing US military presence in Central Asia 
entitle the US to build a security system for which a main strategic purpose is to assure 
the control of a vast pipelines map connecting Afghanistan to the Balkans.  
 
3. Fragmenting and Connecting the ME to Eurasia 
   The strategic importance represented by the inter-regional routes for resource 
transportation explains US hegemonic aspirations in Eurasia and its policies with leading 
players in the region, such as Russia and the EU.  
    In particular, the ambivalent nature of Russian-US relations after the third Gulf war in 
which the two countries have shown the willingness to cooperate with respect to the 
management of resource transportation networks, mainly because they have come to 
share similar national economic interests, something that in last analysis, is unfavourable 
to the deepening of EU-Russia ties. 
    An important aspect in Russian-US relations lies in the progressive enhancement of the 
American military posture in Central Asia and the consequent limitation of Russian 
aspirations in the geo-politics of its own region.  
    However, this kind of relationship, although it seems to reproduce the patterns of the 
Cold War, does not exclude a cooperative approach to the central Asia security system in 
reality, above all because for both players, the antagonism of inter-regions political Islam 
came to represent the main source of instability for mutual strategic interests.  
   In this light, the GME discloses its functions as a genuine source for the redistribution 
of power among global players under the US favoured position acquired through the 
occupation of Iraq that has created a deeper connection between the ME and Central 
Asian politics.  
  Thus, it is in the development of ME-Iraqi politics that the global system of alliances 
has been shaped.  
  In the ongoing development of these new circumstances, Iran became politically 
relevant because of being a powerful regional player that is isolated in his own region 
however, and therefore, in a position to search for out-of-region allies, as the India-
Iranian agreement clearly indicates.   
   Moreover, in that the EU is not in the position to be militarily relevant, Iranian security 
concerns and the prolonged instability in Iraq also gave Moscow the opportunity to 
regain bargaining points with the US.  
    Yet, Irans defence strategy has first opted for a diplomatic coalition with the EU and 
Realpolitik choices in approaching the Saddam threat and Iranian leadership, in fact, 
has offered to cooperate with the US against the regime in Baghdad.  
   However, the third Gulf war has dramatically changed the conditions for establishing 
relations beneficial to Iranian national security concerns (such as with the EU) and has 
enhanced Teherans needs to face the risks of being politically isolated in the region.  
    This concern is grounded in the progressive establishment of ethnic-religious blocs 
favoured through the US building of political-military alliances in the ME and Central 
Asia, for which the GME project places Shia and Sunni groups in opposition, a 
fragmentation reinforced by a constellation of significant allies (Israeli, Turkish, Azeri, 
Chechens, Kurdish, etc.).  
   A line of military-strategic conjunction between the two regions, thus, is strengthened 
by an ideology of ethnic fragmentation reflected in the contest of Russia/Chechnya and 
Armenia/Azerbaijan conflicts, where both Saudi-Sunni (pro-Chechens) and Turkish (pro-
Azeri) were involved against Russian interests. The group Hizb ul-Tahrir, for instance, 
is a Sunni force that refers to pan-Turkism ideology and requests the reinstatement of the 
Caliphate system in the Caspian region.  
    Nevertheless, Iran has significant chances in the management of post-Saddam Iraq 
through the Iraqi Shia leadership, although this leadership whose security is tied to the 
US military presence in the country - may also represent a source of instability for the 
Iranian-Khomeini model of Shia government.  
    Moreover, the support of a Shia government in Iraq interested in maintaining good 
relations with the US, may play a fundamental role in the future management of politics 
in the Caspian region.   
    In a certain way, the role of Iraq in the GME recalls, mutatis mutandi, that of Germany 
following two world wars, when the German national entity had to be divided if Western 
Europe -at the expenses of its Eastern part- wanted to re-found its own regional identity, 
albeit from a new position at the margins of history and world geopolitics.  
   The strategy for controlling the German power as in Iraq today- was due to its key 
geopolitical position and national structure, two factors that were the principal source of 
contradiction between hegemony and balance in European politics. The division of 
Germany opened the way to a new balance of power among European nations leading to 
the EC-EU project313.  
     If in the US project of GME Iraqi territorial unity is officially assured, the strategy of 
ethnic-religious fragmentation through institutional reforms has already been projected 
into the Iraqi politics314.  This strategy is, of course, the source of balancing power among 
regional forces especially through the deployment of a systematic policy of constructive 
instability315.  
       Although the association of the two concepts of balance and instability may appear 
contradictory, the US ability to maintain its hegemonic role in the GME is tied to the 
political ability of keeping regional players unstable, as the containment policy docet.  
   Instability is the first phase allowing the building of new alliance blocs. It is precisely 
this point of the US strategy that underlines the fundamental aspect of the EU-US conflict 
of interests and identity projection in the ME.   
    All these circumstances highlight two general objectives of the US strategy in Eurasia-
Greater Middle East: the containment of Russia and Iran316 and the maintenance of a 
subordinated cooperation with European countries.  
    If renewed Russian attempts at pursuing an imperial strategy could be 
overestimated317, it is more realistic to consider the existence of converging interests 
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presence in Central Asia, which regards as a threat to its increasingly important interests there: see in the 
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between Moscow and core European countries for monitoring and limiting US 
aspirations of expansionism.  
    The crisis leading to the third Gulf war has shown that.  
    The US policy in Eurasia is driven by the aim of avoiding a stable relation between 
Russia and Western Europe throughout a strong policy of fragmentation in the rimland, 
where countries such as Iraq, and above all Iran, are also at the centre of US-EU 
divergences and competition.  
    In this light, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of old geo-political rivalries 
among old and new global players318. Thus, if the main antagonistic ingredients of the 
Cold War still exist, the US has promoted a policy of progressive alliance with Russia 
through NATO since 2002319. This policy has limited the freedom of the core Eurasian 
nation to deepen relations both with regional states320 and potential out-of-area allies  
such as Iran and, not secondarily, the European Union, for which prospects for cautious 
cooperation are welcomed in Moscow under the aegis of a Russian leading role: 
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     As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to 
determine and implement its foreign and domestic policies, its status and advantages of a 
Euro-Asian state and largest country of the CIS. The development of partnership with the 
EU should contribute to consolidating Russia's role as the leading power in shaping a 
new system of interstate political and economic relations in the CIS area [Russia] 
would oppose any attempts to hamper economic integration in the CIS, including through 
special relations' with individual CIS member states to the detriment of Russia's 
interests321. 
     Thus, a third and foremost important strategic objective behind the implementation of 
the GME project -as a basis for enlarging the American sphere of influence in Eurasia- is 
the prevention of closer EU-Russia ties that would be a real and powerful challenge to 
US policy for global dominance.  
    The so called stick and carrot strategy toward Russia, therefore, also allow the US to 
limit EU political freedom to promote members countries interests independently of a 
US-led security system in the vast oil and gas pipeline map of Eurasia that connects the 
Balkans and the GME322. The US strategy aims to extend its military position from Iraq 
to Ukraine and, in parallel, lend vigorous support to the newly independent republics of 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
    While Russias national power is overshadowed by regional instability323 and domestic 
economic weakness324, European countries have instead, the capacity to project their 
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influence especially through the economic power of the Union, together with a 
consolidated model of socio-economic development325. Economically, the EU has 
already initiated an active policy for the promotion of European-led agreements with 
Eurasian countries in order to assure a network of corridors for oil and gas transportation 
to the West326.         
    As announced by the severe dispute over Iraq in 2003, therefore, the most 
distinguished geo-strategic game in Eurasia is between the US and leading EU members -
such as Germany, that is, the European country the most interested, for geographical 
reasons and historical background, in the politics of Europes eastward enlargement.  
    The distribution of power that started with the definitive occupation in Iraq is decisive 
to global primacy.      
    The consolidation of geopolitical pluralism and the emergence of strategically 
compatible partners in the region, in fact, facilitate US political manoeuvring for 
preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition that could challenge the US's primacy in 
shaping a Greater Middle East security and economic system based on the creation of 
main ethnic-religious blocks.  
    Avoiding regional alliances unsupportive of American interests, therefore, has an 
important part in the US approach to the regional structure of power relations.  
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326 TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States), TRACECA (Transport 
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   The American view of the GME is pursued under the strategy of constructive 
instability327 with reluctant allies that can obstruct US hegemonic tendencies in core 
Eurasian countries.  
   The old dilemma in which a geographically isolated United States has to engage an 
international policy based on a system of alliances328 is, in some way, changing it status 
due to the gradual transformation of the US military force from a sea power  an aspect 
that played a key role in American intervention in the Second world war329- into a 
heartland power330.  The policy of American military force specialized in aero-naval and 
rapid actions (after which the troops usually leave the country331) has changed character 
during the almost three years of military occupation in Iraq.  
    Only a contest over local struggles for power could allow and justify the permanence 
of foreign troops in the core of the ME. Moreover, the redistribution of power in the 
whole region passes through the supervision of the Iraqi partition of political power.  
    The deep difference in the nature of military intervention during the second and the 
third Gulf wars reflects the progressive renewal of American strategic power that in the 
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329 See Roosevelts speeches at the nation about the importance for national security of controlling the sea 
and thus the necessity to intervene for a joint defence of US and Britain naval forces.    
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ME is supported by the logistic of traditional regional allies, and in the wider Eurasia 
region, by an enlarged NATO.  
   A geopolitical insight helped to see the link existing between regional and global 
factors explaining US politics. The main difference with the Cold War period is that the 
European Union, through its leading and stronger German-French front has inherited, 
mutatis mutandis, the Soviet Unions ideological potentiality of counterbalancing the US 
policy of unilateralism.  If, during the second Gulf crisis, Germany was still bound to 
opting for a weak and neutral policy332, in the course of the third Gulf crisis its standing 
has been politically determinant in shaping the historical conjunction of interests between 
France, Germany and Russia333.  
     The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has prefigured the salient element in the new geo-
strategic game among global players, in which the relevance of the ME is tied to the 
wider Eurasian region where the role of Germany and Russia are key factors in 
challenging US prospects for alliances in the region.  
     The fact that the US has focused attention particularly on the containment and 
prevention of this geo-political alliance -from France to Russia throughout east-Europe- 
is, moreover, evident from the USs overall policy of restructuring NATO into a political 
body and preparing it for eastward enlargement, i.e. the integration of three key countries 
of Central Europe Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic in 1999- which granted the US 
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the application of a geo-strategy preventing the EU/Germany from establishing privileged 
relations with its neighbours to the east334.  
    Al in all, a state of conflict based on ethnic fragmentation in the ME and Eurasia next 
to the importance of new projects for resources transportation summarizes the strategic 
relevance of the GME project as a source of global power.  
    Ideological and material powers are constructed together in order to instate the global 
dimension of the new world order, resulting in deep a contradiction with that pursued by 
the European Unions projection of power in foreign policy.  
 
 
4. Remarks on the Effects of the Third Gulf War on the EU domestic and Foreign 
Policy             
     In general, the EU has been weakened by the US tendency to enhance its hegemonic 
role in the ME-Eurasia region and in the search for undisputed strategic supremacy in the 
Gulf.  
    In particular, the role of Iraq has been crucial to the US attempt to reassert an 
ideological and pragmatic legitimization of leadership in transatlantic relations.      
     Two main effects stem from the US unilateral war in Iraq. 
     Firstly, the war has deeply destabilized trends of worlds economics especially in 
finance and trade. The developments of these two sectors since the beginning of the war 
have been particularly detrimental to EU domestic welfare and balanced growth 
especially because of the delicate momentum after the eastward enlargement. The 
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enhancement and protection of the US interests in the ME has corresponded with the aim 
to limit the growing economic-political power of the EU in the region335. 
    Secondly, the illegitimate nature of the war has drastically enhanced political 
fragmentation particularly in terms of the newly enlarged Europe. A remarkable impact 
of the Iraqi crisis has been to fragment the Union by weakening the cohesion and creating 
a new distribution of political and material power between Western and Eastern European 
countries.  
     The American search for supporting an illegitimate war aimed to produce a change in 
power relations favourable to the weaker European states seeking more political 
influence inside the Union. In this strategy of fragmentation, a crucial role was played by 
the 10 new NATO and EU Eastern members signatories of the Vilnius 10 declaration, 
an open letter of support to the US issued in the event of the transatlantic crisis336.  
    Under the definition of American policy-makers, the so called New Europe337 would 
have to be concerned with the hegemonic aspirations of Western EU core members and, 
for this main reason it supported the US interventionist policy338.  
    In other words, the fragmentation served an American interest to prevent and counter 
balance a European political power stemming from a consolidated Franco-German axis.  
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    The Iraqi problem has become a matter of domestic security for the EU because it 
has raised the costs of maintaining the sustainable development of a common strategy in 
foreign policies. 
   A deeper political integration in an enlarged Europe through the production of a 
coherent federal policy is a challenge to the USs search for global supremacy.   
   This challenge was envisaged by Brzezinski who qualifies it in terms of its geopolitical 
nature. As a strong supporter of a stable European-American alliance, the Anglo-Saxon 
analyst sees in the European process of enlargement a positive move in order to 
neutralize such a challenge and counterbalance its potential effects against the US 
strategy of supremacy. The inclusion of pro-American Eastern European countries would 
mitigate emancipation policies pursued by leading Western countries.   
   This analysis, made in the second half of the 90s, focusing on the role played by EU 
enlargement, is particularly relevant when applied to the cases of the Gulf wars and the 
politics of identity promoted by the EU in the ME during the 90s.   
    With the aim of preserving both the process of enlargement and that of political 
homogeneity in foreign policies, the Germany-France alliance opted for a limitation of 
the US legitimacy to act unilaterally. This objective was still latent in the course of the 
second Gulf crisis, due to the absence of an institutional framework among European 
countries. In those circumstances, moreover, the US administration also opted for a 
scheme of rapid intervention not aimed at destabilizing the Iraqi sovereignty.  
    An adverse consequence that continued to be felt by the EU in 2003 was the presence 
of foreign troops occupying the country and destabilizing the whole region.  
     In the wake of the third Gulf crisis, the Unions priority continued to bring negative 
consequences, as, on the one hand, the Union sought to preserve Iraqi sovereignty with 
regional stability and, on the other, it wished to reduce the potential success of American 
unilateralism.   
    Such kinds of interventionism promoted outside multilateral decision bring with them 
a set of risks for the Unions ambitions in East Europe-Eurasia and in the ME.  
    Insofar as these are regions plagued by economic instability and a difficult process 
towards a democratic redistribution of national power, the first and foremost challenge 
rests in the fact that a unilateral attack represents a dangerous precedent for the unilateral 
use of preventive force339.  
   While the US decision to invade Iraq unilaterally had definitely undermined the system 
of the UN Security Council, partially the EU has also lost an instrument for defending 
European interests as a homogeneous entity granting their countries a balanced system 
for resolving international crises.  
   The UN instrument could be effective especially because it assured a more balanced 
redistribution of tasks -and benefits- in dealing with after-crisis management and 
consequentially, had the essential function of safeguarding political engagement as a way 
of dealing with inter-European conflicts of interest.  On the contrary, unilateral 
intervention exposed the weakness of Europes common foreign policy and excluded 
European countries from influence in Iraq afterwards. 
    In turn  the weakening of the European institution however has corresponded with a 
fundamental strengthening of the European identity at least in the first stages of the 
conflict in Iraq. In this regard, a particular political effect results in closer ideological ties 
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between core EU countries and ME Arab countries opposing the US intervention in Iraq 
and widening the distances between Europe and Israel.  
    This result, however, has not reduced the negative effects stemming from the 
American inability to ménage and to contain the war itself.  The prolonged state of 
insecurity in Iraq emphasizes a Western failure extended to all Western actors. By 
consequence, the credibility of the EU and its effective capacity- has also decreased 
together with any power to pressurise Israel or Iran. At the same time, the EUs low 
credibility is reflected in the loss of trust and confidence on the side of the Palestinians. 
All in all, the intervention in Iraq has weakened the Unions policy of balancing interests 
for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and an overall capacity to project a 
political power in the ME. 
    The transatlantic rift on the use of force in the face of international threats also led to 
the emergence of a profound divergence of fundamental political values between two 
global camps, one of the core European countries promoting a European model for 
solving international crisis based on consensual process and multilateral legitimacy, and 
the other led by the US view of international relations projected towards hegemonic 
aspirations.  
   In substance, the line connecting US-Iraq-EU- indicates that divergences are shaped on 
how international relations ought to be conducted and defined.  
   On a global level, the occupation of Iraq has initiated the USs expansion of influence 
in Eurasia through the ten East European countries that gave their unconditional support 
to Washington.      
     Thus, the occupation of Iraq under the US military leadership is functioning as a 
political lever for enlarging military posture and establishing political alliances with 
countries from Eastern Europe to the Persian Gulf.  
    This insight into the relevance of the Eurasian landscape enlightens the shaping of a 
greater geopolitical space where the global dimension of the new world order is 
expressed by limiting all the rimlands competitors: Russia, EU France-Germany and 
Iran340.  
    In particular, the geographic and cultural proximity of the ME region to Europe makes 
the strategic concern for stability in the region a much more sensible issue for the EU 
than for the US.  
    For Europe, a state of conflict in the area is not disruptive just because of the direct 
effects on national democratic standards and the implementation of bilateral agreements 
for the solution of social challenges; but also for the vast range of indirect consequences 
that the destabilization of energy resource imports may produce for regional balance and 
stability and, therefore, for the future of the Unions political process.  
    Unstable economic trends next to political fragmentation have, indeed, restrained the 
advancement of the constitutional framework even in those countries such as France that 
represent the avant-garde of the European process of political union.  
    The case made by the failure of the French referendum for the approval of the EU 
constitution highlights a consistent part of our thesis. The failure of the French 
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referendum is the strongest signal of a political crisis in core European countries rooted in 
the recent and prolonged economic instability initiated by the war in Iraq with its 
consequences on global financial markets. 
     Moreover, while for both the US and the EU a vital interest to protect is the free flow 
of oil at reasonable prices, Europe is more dependent on Middle Eastern supplies than the 
US, the level of competition on this matter has assumed a global relevance since 
important Asian economies have entered into the market of the area.    
    All in all, the domino effect of the American policy of instability in the rimland 
region has crossed regional borders and is heavily affecting the political, economic and 
security system of the Union. After the attacks in Madrid and London, what has been 
definitively proved is that the European security system cannot face the threat of terror 
enhanced by the US preventive war unless a coherent policy of cooperation for regional 
stability is promoted with the active participation of ME countries. 
    The unilateral decision to attack Iraq in 2003 has not ended the US-EU alliance or, at 
least, has not completely removed the necessity for both the US and EU-France to 
cooperate on some important key-issues: during the development of the Lebanese crisis 
in 2004-05 (behind which, after Hezbollah, the targeted player was the Syrian regime) the 
resolution 1559 could not be proposed without a joint accord between the US and 
France341.  
     Nevertheless, American unilateralism, by weakening the sovereignty of a key ME 
country such as Iraq, showed that the balance of shared interests established during the 
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90s between the EU and the US in the region was apparent.  Alternative prospects for 
redefining a system of sharing tasks and spaces of preferential relations in ME represent a 
key priority for which an effective European policy in ME cannot have the chance to 
work.  
     From this perspective, our thesis underlines the political and ideological competition, 
more than with Russia, with leading European countries for which the US long term 
objective is to redesign the system of power relations in the ME, thereby limiting the 
advancement of the process of European Union. In such a system, the ME, since the third 
Gulf war, functions as keying in the chain of American global sovereignty deployed from 
the southern to the eastern borders of the Union through the Eurasian region.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Significance of the Research  
   The analysis indicated that regional institutions have a role in determining changes in 
the behaviour of national actors. I have considered the France-German refusal to go to 
war out of a legal framework as being a result of an advanced stage in the process of 
European integration.  
     The existence of a European Union institutional framework is the variable that has 
allowed the two relatively weak actors to reinforce a strategy of political emancipation 
through the direct refusal to cooperate with a leading world superpower. This refusal was 
aimed at isolating the US by delegitimising its role of political leadership. 
     The construction of a collective political identity in Europe and its enforcement 
through the establishment of an institutionalized regional entity -the EU- has 
progressively produced a change in the transatlantic alliance and in European national 
priorities.  
    In as much as the process of political disintegration in Eurasia has opened a new stage 
in the global order, the process of regional integration in Europe has also had the chance 
to be implemented together with a defined EU foreign policy that began with proactive 
participation in the ME politics during the 1990s.  
   Within this view of the world order made by a cyclic system characterized by process 
of regional disintegration and integration, system transforming wars, such as the third 
Gulf war, can delay -but not stop- the tendency shown by the actors of the system to 
produce and enforce collective entities based on shared knowledge of political thoughts, 
on the one hand, and shared level of material powers on the other.     
    The analysis showed the importance of examining how shared experience stemming 
from different traditions of political thoughts within the same regional contest reinforce 
the construction of distinctive answers contra leading superpowers that engage in 
unilateral oriented policies.  
   The re-conceptualization of power -through the political concept of security and 
legitimacy for example- is relevant because of the possibility to operate differentiated 
choices and promote alternative strategies weakening the political authority of the 
hegemonic actor.  
   From this perspective, the European logic indicates that security means the possibility 
of always having an alternative choice.  
   The flexibility of the EU institutional framework, although commonly understood only 
in terms of its weaknesses, has nonetheless been effective in allowing those nations in 
Europe to take an emancipated stand. This has been possible especially because they 
were basically the supporters of the process of political union that provided them with the 
political advantage of identifying their alternative choice to a collective response distinct 
from the policy pursued in Washington. This institutional umbrella has allowed them to 
avoid negative consequences, such as political isolation. 
   The ideological failure of the socialist order has produced a rupture in the predictability 
and identification of shared interests between the US and the EU.  
    In a previous stage of transatlantic relations, in fact, the existence of the Soviet Union 
could partly mitigate US hegemonic aspirations on the one side, and the EC political-
identity aspirations on the other.  
   Since then, two fundamental outcomes have characterized the transatlantic partnership, 
for which a constant tension between identity and hegemony makes the alliance at one 
time politically irreplaceable and ideologically weak.      
     Keohane, for instance, has used both concepts of realism and institutionalism, such as 
power and cooperation, to frame an analysis of what he defines the hegemonic 
cooperation in the post WWII era342. That perspective, however, was attentive to the 
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Doctrine of containment. By providing resources to recover European weakness the Truman administration 
relevance of economic futures for establishing institutions that enabled control of the 
world rule-making process and that have also played a key role in the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union during the 80s.  
    The overall approach of the research has shown that both neo-realism and 
constructivism are able to account for the shaping of the post-Cold War order and its 
future of ideological crisis.  The future of identity as a causal variable in the mainstream 
EU countries choices and the future of hegemony in the US unilateralism have been 
proved to be both complementary fundamental in explaining not only the nature of the 
crisis in transatlantic relations, but above all, the effects of this tension on a third contest.  
   A major crisis in the Western exercise of sovereign powers is expressed in the 
projection of two opposing paradigms for good governance in the ME.  
    In this sense, the clash is within the Civilization: within the stage of an historical 
moment throughout which two founding aspects of world civilizations as like as ideal and 
material powers are endowed by actors that are, nevertheless, unable to govern their own 
space of sovereignty.   
    In this sense, the Third Gulf war is an expression of a Western failure to reconcile 
collected ideal and material powers: efficacy of knowledge stays, of course, not in the 
accumulation itself but in the way in which it is used.         
   For this reason, a central point emerged in the analysis regards the misuse of the 
ideological realm of power made by the superpower in order to cover the gap of political 
legitimacy.  
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    As mentioned above, the progressive advancement in the degree of a constructed 
identity is a challenge to the exercise of hegemony.       
   The collapse of the Eurocentric world order has left a vacuum that all American 
administrations since Wilson have tried to conquest by the means of achieving the 
dream of universal pacification343.  
    As known, the ideology of freedom and wealth as founding assumptions of democracy 
and the free market economy entails the new world order doctrine. The spread of 
democracy -and not the application of democracy itself- as an expression of a neo-
mission civilisatrice indicates a totalitarian view of the world order whose principal aim 
is a collective nomos and destiny. 
   In the unilateral definition of civilization based solely on democratic standards for 
political life, there has been a substitution of religious concepts with laics categories that, 
however, have not changed their functioning as an instrument of hegemonic power 
instead of being a means for multilateral coexistence. The refusal of any different 
political system means, of course, denying the others basic idea and practice of co-
existence and collective on which individual existence depend.  
     Any doctrine of world order is based on the fact that equality of sovereign powers 
prevented the use of military methods of annihilation344. Changes in the quality of these 
powers, therefore, affect the system of the order.  
    In this regard, Schmitt notes that the transformation of military warfare from sea to air 
space armed conflict is a threat to the order because the character of modern air war is 
purely destructive345.   
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    If for Schmitt, war is a continuation of politics by other means, there should 
nevertheless be a nomos - a legal order in the making of warfare if states want be 
legitimated and peace enabled346. Most importantly, however, is that in order to enable 
the existence of a separated realm of warfare between European states, an absolute limit 
had to be established. That is an absolute division between Western and non-Western 
realms of violence347.   
    We see better now how hegemony has to pass through the fighting of wars whose 
character is to be out of the established legal order.  The enlargement of the space of 
sovereignty acts in the line of this absolute limit and by moving it the space of hegemony 
is enlarged and consolidated.   
    As the notions of civilized and non-civilized nations -introduced in the warfare 
system348- have left space for peace loving nations, a new category has also been 
introduced with the expression of terrorist.  
    Wars fought against terror are similar to wars fought against non-civilized nations. 
Their similarities lie above all in the quality of warfare methods and main purpose: 
colonial bombing and modern aerial technologies both have a merely destructive 
function349.  
    We encounter here a second fundamental character of the new world order: the 
construction of the category of the enemy whose function is, in the end, fully ideological 
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and quasi mythical, because enemy is an unidentifiable entity and there is no direct 
confrontation, but just the aim to destroy350.          
    The third Gulf war illustrates that the ideological paradigm based on the triangular 
concept of freedom-democracy-prosperity cannot tolerate real differences of beliefs 
and material interests.  
    What it is therefore important to analyse is the way in which changes can be promoted. 
Agamben concludes that changes are related to the possibility of breaking the link 
between the realm of violence and that of law, an action that will lead to a new 
condition351. By consequence, we may ask how is it possible to develop the conditions for 
breaking this link.  
    Part of the answer should be in the analysis of why and how this link has been 
established. We suggest that a key point lies in a change in sovereignty powers.   
   When the politics of sovereignty are incapable of producing answers to domestic 
problems and international relations became the primary source of legitimizing national 
sovereignty war becomes the means to understanding a world sociality of relations and 
regulating its forces by coercion.  
    A war such as the current occupation of Iraq indicates a deep crisis in the sphere of 
sovereign power. In this regard, in his harsh criticism of the liberal system, Schmitt 
compared the status of civil war in domestic politics to the status of war between nations 
in international relations352.   
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  Moreover, Schmitts criticism highlights the failure of reproducing a system in which 
political forces can compromise for strengthening a common good (which in his 
discourse was the state as absolute sovereign actor) leads necessarily to the isolation of 
the realm of political from any other fields of human activity; an isolation that, in his 
work, became defined under the anomos space where the source of sovereignty is found. 
This nature of the structure has its main meaning in the function of preserving and, at one 
time, being the finality of the political.  
    This understanding of political purposes cannot find links with other concepts that may 
stem from or below other realms of social life and are absolutely restricted to the radical 
concept of life and death.  
    Isolation of the political creates an autarchic vision where means and ends converge at 
the same point, justifying the necessity of acting for preserving a system whose main 
goal, as with a labyrinth circle, is to justify its own space and existence.   
    It is, thus, a very logical and natural development the emergence of a constitutional 
convergence between legislative and executive powers that, as we have seen, 
characterizes the state of emergency and the special laws of the Bushs administration.  
    In this world structure, two fields of power can be used as counter-powers, the space of 
economics and communications, because they are globalised spaces. The superpower 
controls the structures overall spaces of power, technology, military power, 
communications and economy, of course. Thus, in order to arrive at the core of the 
significance of the research, we may finally ask a political question who is the real 
enemy? Or we may also ask a merely philosophical question: what is the structure 
founded on?  
     The space of political power lies outside the key spaces of the global sovereignty 
paradigm. It is understood, in fact, just as an exception granted by special laws. The 
principle of exception instates a structure from which the space of politics results in 
suspension and crisis.     
   In these systemic circumstances, the category of enemy is defined by an exercise of 
force as a lever for justifying and strengthening the existence of the military power and 
force itself.  
    One may argue that the third Gulf War -as much as the second- is a source of securing 
economic resources to the hegemon and that this kind of war should be understood as a 
neo-liberist war. Indeed, the US neo-liberist model of production which is not based on 
traditional mode of production such as the European system- is based, instead, on a 
deficitarian state-system to the advantage of national military production and globalised 
financial markets.  
     Nevertheless, the analysis has underlined a far more critical issue related to the 
consequences of international relations on the systemic level leading to the four spaces of 
powers in the neo-liberism. The traditional liberal school, for instance, considers war to 
be an unfavourable future for economics and in this way we may see neo-liberism as a 
pure degeneration of liberalism.      
    To return to a political view, to European Union founders the concept of political must 
refer necessarily to the creation of a common-public sphere limiting the power of actions, 
while for the US the concept came to indicate a concrete distinction of friend and enemy 
at the basis of the statement with us or against us 353. 
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    In this way, the US ideology of politics proposes a reversal of the concept of the 
political for which human agents originally agree not to kill in order not be killed and 
advances the priority of killing in order of not being killed instead.  
    The principle, thus, allows the practice of exceptional actions that are free, in other 
words, from any limit or constriction. The concept of political, as with that of democracy, 
is qualified by freedom.  
   As such it has become a guideline for political alliances and recalls Schmitts concept 
of the political for which the identification of friend and enemy is seen as being related to 
the real possibility of physical killing in the most extreme condition of war and death in 
battle354.  
       Such understanding of the political is realistic and practical and goes beyond 
perceptions of ideals, circumstances of competitions or even common concepts of the 
adversary because the degree of intensity of an association or dissociation within a 
partnership is tied only to the possibility of killing in the end355.  
     To put it differently, transatlantic partners following Schmitts logic- may consider 
each other good allies because the possibility of being an enemy, to attack each other, is 
concretely remote.  
    Most importantly, however, is the identification of friend-enemy as the only founding 
category for the political that, in practice, creates an autonomous and independent realm 
disconnected from any other field of human activity356.  
    According to Schmitt, this reasoning was a powerful theoretical response to the liberal 
attempt at making politics a means of economic interests357.  
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    Nevertheless, the ideological process of purifying the political realm from any 
external element implied a second and specific finality.  
    An independent concept of politics is the space where an auto-nomos concept of 
authority also found ground for self-justified exercise because no derived limits can be 
posed on its definition and, thus, on its means and ends.  
    The aim was to make the realm of the political sovereign itself with respect to all other 
fields, such as economics or social life.  
     The search for a power of absolute authority has a very practical function, because it is 
viewed as the only source of power that can command men to lay down their lives in its 
defence358.  
    Hence, Schmitts friend-enemy category is primarily a theory of international relations 
and, more exactly, a theory of international war.  
    It helps us to shows how states behave when their founding principles of sovereignty 
are not capable of giving responses to domestic problems and are instead, systematically 
oriented towards external confrontation or tension.   
    Equally important to our discourse is that Schmitt elaborates his basic theoretical 
category looking at a domestic scene of unsolved conflict so that his concept of the 
political stems from the exceptional condition of civil war.  
    The abnormal state of civil war, therefore, is made comparable with the condition of 
war between nation-states. Nevertheless, if domestic and international scenes are 
comparable under the conditions of civil and inter-national war, this must be also 
considered an abnormal and exceptional as much as a civil war.  
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   That explains why the overall structure of the concept of the political is permanently 
based on a state of bellicose exception.  
   The historical condition of Germany and the theoretical answer of Schmitt reveals the 
break of a deep crisis in the realm of norms for collective and relational existence: the 
search for a state whose identity and purposes are identified with the practice of an 
exceptional authority -instead of that of a constitutional representation- indicate that the 
crisis is not about the relation between order and disorder, state of norm and state of 
exception.  
    Instead, the crisis is relational within the sphere of the order leading to a misuse of the 
sacred space, the space of the political-institutional.  
    If the function of this conceptual category normally would be that of granting limits 
and assuring a system of shared co-existence, in circumstances of changes, this space 
became the most important because whoever controls it will control the establishment 
and maintenance of the coming order.   
    The category of disorder through the future of exception became the main political 
instrument of the new world order.     
    This paradigm offers an explanation of the causes of the main political events under 
analysis: the cases of the Gulf wars.   
   Given the differences between the two Gulf wars in specific short-term objectives and 
historical contests, a relation of continuity between the second and the third Gulf war is 
found in the new geo-political function that the regional politics of the ME came to 
represent in the overall American strategy for global leadership and progressive 
expansionism in new areas of interests that emerged after the demise of the Soviet 
Empire.     
   In terms of the effects of the third Gulf war, we can recall the worlds of Waltz to 
describe a contradiction in the use of the US military capability for the establishment of a 
new world order: the perils of weakness are matched by the temptations of power359.  
    By consequence, a risk stemming from the state of emergency lies in the effects on the 
quality and nature of Western democratic governance.   
     What emerges as the most important outcome of the analysis of the global sovereignty 
paradigm started with a geopolitics connecting the ME to the Eurasia, are the results it 
brings in deepening our understanding of dictatorship, both historically and theoretically.  
     Global sovereignty based on the legitimacy of a pre-emptive ideology and state of 
emergency is a model that cannot truly be defined as a dictatorship but as a space devoid 
of law360.  
     This is not just a theoretical remark. A paramount aspect of modern dictatorship as 
with the Third Reich and Fascism- also highlights salient contemporary political aspects. 
Following Agambens analysis we do not need to look at dictatorship to understand 
political dictates and dictators, but we need to see mechanisms and substance inherent in 
the state of exception.   
    A paradox emerges here, for the prolonged existence of the Third Reich for instance, 
was not in place because of an institutional mandate of dictatorship. Instead the 
paramount existence of what we wrongly define as dictatorship depended on a total and 
                                                
359 Waltz 1979: op. cit. 201.   
360   the creation of zone of anomy in which all legal determinations find themselves inactivated. In this 
way, and in spite of the common view, neither Mussolini nor Hitler can be technically defined as dictators: 
Agamben 2006: art. cit. ibid.  
permanent state of emergency, a legally non-formalized structure that existed in parallel 
with the Weimer constitution.    
   We may recall, finally, the function of exceptionality in the exercise of the tyrant who 
acts by normalizing the exceptionality361 and, in fact, exceptionality and interminability 
are the two qualities in the paradigm of global sovereignty started with the Third Gulf 
War.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
361 Schmitt 1996: op. cit. ibid.   
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